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How is a good political order constituted? This work is a critical and constructive 
exploration of the problem of political constitution. Recent contributions to the study of 
this subject have often failed to adequately recognize its political nature, and have thus 
fallen short of being able to inform the challenges of actual constitutional development. 
This thesis argues for a broader conception of constitution that overcomes the limitations 
imposed by the legalist, formal-institutional, philosophic, and cultural-essentialist 
perspectives, and one that accounts for the political-ness of the matter more satisfactorily. 
Correctly understood, constitution of a well-ordered society is a practical, situated, and 
continuous predicament. 
From this broad view of political constitution the dissertation moves on to elaborate 
a more specific instance of it, the idea of pragmatic republicanism. Pragmatic 
republicanism is a comprehensive idea of political onstitution, comprising four main 
 
 
elements: a realistic vision of a good polity, a set of thin-normative procedural 
orientations of constitution, a set of basic empirical conditions of constitution, and the 
concept of constitutional crafting that is tantamount to the activity of constituting in the 
midst of the preceding three elements. Once these concepts are outlined, the idea of 
pragmatic republicanism is applied, by way of illustration, to the case of Kyrgyzstan – an 
instructive case of a seemingly hopeless constitutional malaise. 
This work builds upon a very eclectic range of litera ure as it makes the case for an 
interdisciplinary and ‘problem-driven’ understanding of political constitution. Contra 
some of the conventional criteria of good social scien e, this work defends the view that a 
proper understanding of constitution must accept conceptual complexity, deficit of 
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So, even if a theorist could provide a theory which specified the exhaustive 
conditions for the interpretation and application of the general terms of constitutionalism 
in every case, as modern theorists from Hobbes to Rawls have sought to do, this would 
not enable us to understand constitutionalism.  
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There are some countries in the world among which the United States, Great 
Britain, and Norway count.1 These are the countries generally considered to be good 
polities, or well-ordered constitutional orders. They all certainly have many problems in 
the ordering of their political life, but on the larger scale, they are the kinds of polities 
that are desired by peoples who do not enjoy such constitutional orders. Each of the better 
polities in today’s world, including these three countries, have arrived at their current 
condition through long, arduous, and not nearly linear processes of constitutional 
development. No single country’s path to its current condition is exactly the same – nay, 
not even merely similar. But however they may have rrived at it, they all now share 
some general properties that make them attractive for other, less-well ordered societies. 
They are stable, they have working laws, their governments are checked by laws, 
institutional design, and the citizens themselves, their social and economic welfare 
attainment is high as a rule, affording a relatively more comfortable life to its citizens; the 
citizenry of any of these countries – exercising broad and secure liberties – is able to 
make sure that over time their political regimes are maintained on the right course, 
through elections, referenda, regular civic activism, and occasional mass expressions of 
protest. The citizens see all of these activities as both their duties and entitlements, and 
generally, there is no danger to their safety or freedom for engaging in these activities. 
 
                                                
11 To this roughly the same set of countries, in various contexts and for somewhat differing purposes, 
concepts such as ‘developed countries’, ‘advanced industrial democracies’, ‘the First World’, or ‘zones of 
peace’ – as in Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky (1996) – are often applied.   
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There are many more countries of another sort around the world today among 
which Afghanistan, Egypt, and Kyrgyzstan would count as examples.2 These countries 
are clearly known as not well-ordered currently. They are countries whose citizens view 
the former sort of countries with admiration, or envy, or simply with a desire that their 
own countries were more like them. There is much greater diversity among this sort of 
countries in regards to the degree, quality, and scope of their problems in constitutional 
order. Some of them are somewhat closer to being well-ordered and some are very far 
from it. Some of these societies are experiencing interethnic or religious conflicts, some 
are undergoing severe cycles of hunger, some are overp pulated on a depleting 
agricultural basis, some are raw materials providers fo  the well-ordered economies, 
some are significantly threatened by the epidemic spread of AIDS, and most of them are 
states and societies with severe levels of corruption.  
Many among this sort of countries may safely be said to be in pursuit of better 
constitution, some for a long time, others since recently. Almost all of them have adopted 
seemingly good laws, almost all of them have governme tal institutions whose only 
justification in principle is to provide governance, some of them have seen mass-based 
civic activities demanding better government despite clear and evident danger to their 
safety, and some have long-standing citizen dissident groups, in exile or in prisons, 
protesting governmental oppression and domination. Despite all these and many other 
apparent signs of wanting better political order, most of these countries are not 
succeeding. Their citizens are more like subjects, not enjoying stable and guaranteed 
                                                
2 This type of countries, as distinct from the forme kind, is referred to – variously – as ‘developing 
countries’, ‘less developed countries’, Singer and Wildavsky’s ‘zones of turmoil’, or ‘the Third World’. In 
the anachronistic terminology of the latter concept, ‘the Second World’ would also count among this poorly 
constituted kind of countries. 
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liberty to pursue legitimate courses of life, not having the rights to oppose or criticize 
their governments; individuals and groups within these societies do not feel safe vis-à-vis 
the rest of the citizenry and the government; in times of need, these societies do not have 
provisions for emergency help, either as individual citizens or as groups within the 
society; they do not have satisfactory access or rights to education and healthcare.  
The sort of countries that includes Afghanistan, Egypt, and Kyrgyzstan need and 
want to achieve good constitutional order. But for many of them, even when they tried, 
and even when they applied concerted efforts, the good political order has proven to be 
too much to ask. These societies generally know the kinds of life they would like to have; 
they do not know how to achieve such life.   
  
II 
Today, constitutionally speaking, the question of ‘what a good political order is’ is 
not nearly as pressing as that of ‘how to achieve on ’;3 the latter is more practically 
urgent, less clearly understood, and has proven to be more challenging in the experience 
of the greater part of the world. So this dissertation is primarily an engagement of this 
latter question.      
All peoples around the world want to live in good polities – and the good polities 
they want are not imagined in some utopian terms, but in the terms and properties of 
actually existing or historically known polities. In early twenty-first century, it is 
plausible to say that there exists a more or less universally accepted idea of a good polity 
- a certain median idea of a republic derived from the common features of actually 
                                                
3 Literature that has dealt with ‘What is a good political order’ is vast, spanning a history from at least 
Plato’s Republic to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. For a very succinct primer on some more recent varieties of 
work on this question, see Stephen Elkin, “Constitutionalism: Old and New” (1993a).  
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existing good republics. Those existing republics – concentrated on the northwestern 
quarter of the conventional world map – arrived at their political condition through highly 
complex, generally very long and uneven historical paths, and no such republic can claim 
to have resolved all problems and achieved perfection. At least on this evidence, it can be 
reminded that no actual political order is ever goin  to be fully accomplished but always 
remain a work in progress. 
 If all peoples want to live in good polities, and if they generally know a realistic 
model of a good polity, the question that remains is: How is that desirable political order 
to be realized in societies that do not have it? How is the objective of a good political 
order – or good polity – to be pursued? Or, which is the same thing, how is a good polity 
to be constituted? The question of realization of a good political order is the question of 
constitution. Questions just asked are obviously not new, possibly as old as the very idea 
of a good polity. But by the preponderance of evidence in constitutional achievement in 
the contemporary world, it is clear that a satisfactory answer to this ultimate question has 
not been found. There are several distinguishable appro ches to answering the question, 
but they all reveal shortcomings in helping actual constitutional endeavors in places not 
yet constitutional. Consider a few of such approaches in the form of a stylized story.   
One approach to answering the question of ‘how to constitute a good polity’ – the 
‘legalist’ approach, as it is referred below – saw the question as a problem of law 
foremost, and went on to suggest that a good political order is constituted by establishing 
a proper system of rule of law, including the drafting and adopting of a sound set of 
constitutional laws, and establishing a constitutional court with power to guard that 
constitutional law through interpretation and review.  
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A second sort of an answer came from those who saw the question as one of correct 
arrangement of offices and powers: they suggested that a good political order is 
constituted by adopting a good institutional-administrative structure with separation of 
powers, sound electoral system, and preferably under a parliamentary form of 
government. To these we refer here as ‘formal institutionalists’.  
There was a third approach, ‘philosophic’, where thquestion was interpreted as 
essentially about the right understanding, and combination, of political and moral 
principles upon which a good political order is to be built. So their answers came as 
various prescriptions of liberty, equality, egalitarianism, justice, rationality, and much 
else – the different definitions and interpretations f these and their various combinations 
and discontents. 
From a fourth, ‘culturalist’, corner came answers still more perplexing: the problem 
of constituting a good political order was one of defining a nascent culture as a good 
political order – and in cases where many such cultures existed, the problem became one 
of putting all of them together and intact, and defining a good political order in their 
midst. 
Many societies around the world tried to follow these advices – beginning 
especially around the immediate aftermath of WWII and continuing to the present – in 
various combinations, with varying thoroughness, but essentially following all four 
advices. They adopted constitutions that proclaimed freedom and equality of the 
sovereign constituent peoples, and outlined various sets of protected rights and 
entitlements as well as underscored the preservation of the people’s cultural heritage, 
provided for all the main formal institutions of government separated from each other 
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with distinct sets of authorities and responsibilities, some under a presidential form of 
government, some under parliamentary, and many in some mixture of these. The 
resulting regimes most often did not differ much from what preceded such overhauls. It is 
all too easy to point to examples of countries which exhibit outwardly all of the above 
ingredients and yet are clearly known to be poor political forms.  
Upon reflecting on this dismal record, a decisive problem is revealed: the several 
approaches to the question of ‘how a good polity is constituted’ seem to have been 
answers to the question of ‘what a good polity is’. So the former question is still in need 
of a satisfactory answer. This dissertation is an attempt to face this challenging task: How 
is a good political order – a republic – to be constituted? The question is very big and 
difficult. What is proposed here may rightly be called a preface to a more complete 
answer, an effort toward such an answer, rather than a complete work. What it hopes to 
accomplish is to set out the main outlines of an alternative approach to facing the 
challenge, to propose the principal directions and concerns of this alternative view of the 
problem of constitution. Elaboration of the details of each of these elements, and a 
restatement of the overall argument in view of such detailed elements, will be left for 
subsequent work.  
In asking “How is a good political order to be constituted?” the two chief terms of 
the question must be clarified: ‘good political orde ’ and ‘constitution’. To the first, it has 
been proposed in the lines above that there exists today an idea of what a good political 
order is, and that it is a median idea, or model, of a republic, based on key common 
properties of actually existing better political orde s of current political civilization. The 
good political order today is a republic: the kind of order where the people are recognized 
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as the ultimate sovereign, the government is in the int rest of all of the constituent 
people, is run by the people’s representatives, and is exercised according to non-arbitrary 
laws and institutions. 4 This proposal may be immediately objected to as indefensible on 
various grounds; there is certainly no shortage of supply of serious problems that the 
actually existing better republics have. But the legitimacy of this proposal rests on a 
careful answer to the question, “What is a good politica  order, constitutionally 
speaking?” which underscores the empirical, practical, and even somewhat urgent nature 
of the question. Variously, a republican regime is defined as a regime of limited 
government, of rule of law, of popular sovereignty, of public interest, or even of public 
virtue, and each of these has its staunch critics. In any actually existing and generally 
recognized successful republic, all of these various defining criteria are present in some 
varying degrees. It is not of material importance, constitutionally speaking, to engage in a 
priori  debates of which definition is a better one, how exactly the various criteria must 
combine, what exact proportion of each criterion is be t to have, and so on. These kinds 
of concerns must be settled not prior to the actual constitution, through intellectual and 
academic debates, but in the process of constitution which is itself guided by the already 
mentioned empirically based median model of a republic. 
The concept of ‘constitution’, the second key term in our main question, thus 
becomes decisive here. The same assumption of [almost] universal agreement and clarity 
claimed for the main contents of ‘good political orde ’ cannot be granted in the same way 
to ‘constitution’. Hence the main question of the pr sent inquiry must be accompanied 
with this corollary question, “What sort of a problem is constitution?” Answering these 
                                                
4 The content of this model of good polity – republic – is elaborated later in several places. 
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two questions – or rather, again, working toward an answer to these questions – is what 
this dissertation undertakes to do. 
Constitution of a good polity is a practical, pragmatic task. Essentially, it is 
concerned with constituting a well-ordered people. If so, then constitution is always and 
necessarily a situated task, in media res. To speak of the task of constituting a good polity 
in the early twenty-first century, therefore, is to situate the task within the obtaining 
political historical context – wherein that generally agreed and aspired idea of a good 
polity is said to be found – and to see that the constitutional question is the question of 
achieving such good polities in societies and places where that is desired. Defining what 
a good polity is, in the abstract and in spite of existing good orders, is not a constitutional 
question but rather philosophic. So, how to constitute a good polity is the real question. 
From the nature of the question, or task, of constitution, derives the answer to the 
‘how’ question as well, as that is done in this dissertation. Understanding constitution as a 
pragmatic, practical predicament of approximating the known models of good polity in 
places where such polity is wanted, the challenge is to propose some practical ways and 
conditions of such ‘approximating’. To do so, it is necessary first to understand the 
political-ness of constitution, or put another way, to understand political constitution. In 
juxtaposition to legal, formal-institutional, philos phic, essential-cultural, as well as some 
existing problematic versions of even political, con eptions of constitution, it is argued 
that a properly conceived political constitution has to be a broad concept for a situated, 
practical, empirical idea of constitution.  
Political constitution is constitution of a people, not of a set of institutions or laws 
or ideas. All of the latter are essential attributes of a well-constituted people, its shape, 
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framework, instruments, criteria, and so on, but are not of themselves the constitution. It 
is only [misleadingly] possible to think of systems of laws and institutions as the 
constitution once a constitutional people is agreeably in place. Such a mistake is hard to 
make regarding a society that claims to have the same institutions – and has them de jure 
– but is obviously a poorly constituted one d  facto. Some have called such cases ‘sham 
constitutions’, but it seems more appropriate to recognize that there is no constitution at 
all in such cases. Any set of laws, institutions, ideals and values may be easily written 
down for a society, designed elaborately, well chosen from ‘available’ alternatives, but a 
well-ordered polity will not have been constituted by these activities. This is a way of 
saying that constitution of a well-ordered polity is a task of political constitution. 
 Understanding political constitution properly is thus very important, but it is also 
a very broad concept difficult to grasp clearly. As a more concrete, specific instance of it, 
this dissertation proposes the idea of pragmatic republicanism. Pragmatic republicanism 
can be said to be an idea of constitutional crafting. Guided by a sketch of a good polity – 
vision of a realistic republic – pragmatic republicanism posits constitutional crafting to be 
a creative process of ever approximating that vision based on given basic empirical 
conditions and following a set of thinly-normative procedural principles. Thus, four large 
elements of pragmatic republicanism are involved: the vision, the basic conditions, the 
procedural principles, and constitutional crafting itself. Crafting is, effectively, the 
activity of constituting per se. It is a particular kind of public engagement, distinct from 
designing, engineering, choosing, and other epithets that have now and then been used in 
constitutional talk. Crafting is always and necessarily situated within an empirical world, 
so awareness of that situated-ness is gained by attention to the basic conditions of 
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crafting: those of capabilities, context, and continuity. Crafting of a good polity, as well, 
is not an ethically neutral creative process where ‘the end justifies the means’; the process 
of crafting is itself part of what a good polity is, and as such, it is guided by a set of 
procedural norms that are constitutive of the good p lity; those procedural norms, also 
referred to as thin-normative principles, are those f priority of overlapping common 
goods, the principle of political vigilance, and a culture of political moderation. Thus, 
constitution of a good political order is this long and gradual process of negotiation of the 
four elements of pragmatic republicanism: vision of a republic, basic empirical 
conditions, procedural norms, and constitutional crfting.                   
As noted above, all peoples want to live in good polities, or to constitute themselves 
into good polities, and their general ideas of a good polity derive from the examples of 
good – or better – polities that exist in other parts of the world. The challenge is how the 
peoples not yet constituted as good polities become nes. Pragmatic republicanism, as an 
instance of the idea of political constitution, is proposed to help in understanding and 
dealing with this challenge – which is here called the constitutional predicament. One 
society that qualifies as an example of the aspiring but not yet succeeding cases is that of 
Kyrgyzstan5 - a case that is only as unique as any random society is from the rest and a 
rather usual problematic constitutional case otherwise. So this case is picked up for an 
illustration of the constitutional predicament and of what pragmatic republicanism may 
propose for its overcoming. A brief preliminary expose is relevant here. 
                                                
5 Kyrgyzstan is the author’s home country.  
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Upon gaining its independence from the Soviet Union n 1991, the country 
embarked upon the project6 of constituting a good polity, the Kyrgyz Republic. Since 
then, in an environment of what some have called chronic “institutional instability”, the 
country changed its Constitution seven times, to count only the major ones involving 
referenda (Huskey and Iskakova 2011). Within this pronounced constitutional instability, 
and often with the advice of international friends and donors, Kyrgyzstan embarked on 
some major processes of privatization, land reform, administrative reforms, numerous tax 
and electoral system reforms. These still un-terminated processes witnessed two 
occasions of ‘color revolutions’7, one in 2005 and the second in 2010, each ending with 
the fleeing of a corrupt and authoritarian president, a d ushering in even more political 
instability: the second revolution soon led to the country’s most tragic large-scale inter-
ethnic violence yet, claiming many hundreds of lives and thousands of real property.  
In part because of this lively political process, and in part despite it, Kyrgyzstan has 
at various times been dubbed an ‘island of democracy’ by its Western partners, 
surrounded as it is by three notable authoritarian egimes (China, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan) and one poor and mal-functioning authoritarian regime arising in the wake of 
a civil war (Tajikistan).8 This erratic ‘island of democracy’ claims a roster of over a 
hundred political parties, an opposition that is always vocal despite occasional waves of 
imprisonment and even killings, and thousands of NGOs – result of an ‘incubation’ 
project of some USAID programs to engender a modern civil society. However, this 
                                                
6 Constitution is referred to as a “project” in following Soltan (2010 and 2011). It is a project in the sense of 
a collective and practical engagement in creating something that was not there before. 
7 Application of the term ‘revolution’ has generally been doubted, often enclosed in quote marks. While t e 
doubt is admitted, for convenience (since reference to these events is frequent), quote marks are generally 
dropped hereafter.  
8 In the language of Polity IV for 2011, Kyrgyzstan – a “Democracy” – is surrounded by three 




democratic arsenal has been generally ‘feckless’, to borrow a term from Thomas 
Carothers (2002): the quality of governance, representation, and stability have all been 
meager in a climate of endemic corruption, clientelism, and socio-economic stagnation. 
As this work is being written,9 politics in Kyrgyzstan has been as alive as ever, 
witnessing the recent fall of yet another Cabinet – the first such fall under the new, more 
parliamentary version of Constitution, where the prsident has managed to regain a 
dominant status – the struggles of a new Cabinet to face imminent challenges, and the 
race among numerous parties for local assembly elections just ended with mixed results. 
As a severe economic downturn unfolds, and as the country’s foreign relations have 
developed in risky directions, with predation on businesses and investors on the rise, and 
as economic hardship adds on to the ethnic- and region-based antagonisms that are high, 
Kyrgyzstan may be habitually entering another zone f turbulence – or maybe not. It is 
‘dejavu all over again’.  
 
III 
In some important senses, it may be said that Kyrgyzstan’s mostly unsuccessful 
constitutional story has given rise to this dissertation. In trying to see through the thicket 
of Kyrgyzstan’s maladies, such a consideration willy-ni ly enters a conversation with 
constitutional political theory. Thus, having the case of Kyrgyzstan and similarly 
struggling and fledgling regimes (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, now Egypt, Libya, Tunisia) in 
the background adds some perspective and urgency to what has been said so far about the 
problem of constitution and specifically about its political-ness.   
                                                
9 The period concerned is December of 2012. 
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To say that constitution is of necessity a political undertaking is not to say anything 
controversial, it would seem. If this definition were heeded, however, one would expect 
to see a different kind of constitutional theory than what is the commonplace today; one 
would expect constitutional scholarship to speak with greater urgency, more breadth and 
correspondence to the actual constitutional endeavors around the world, both developed 
and developing. So, it is of no small interest that such a seemingly obvious property of 
constitution – its political-ness – has not adequately informed contemporary 
constitutional studies. In this light, it is worth frontally asking the question: In what way 
is constitution a political endeavor?    
This work is an attempt to grasp this essential prope ty of constitution. It maintains 
that, with some not wholly articulate exceptions, this property of constitution has not 
been understood as it should. Even in many works that have appeared in recent times 
bearing ‘political constitution’ or some variation thereof in their titles, the understanding 
of politics or the political has been unsatisfactory and misleading in the pursuit of 
understanding constitution. It further maintains that a variety of constitutionalism 
literature has rather clearly – if only non-explicit y – ‘elided’ the political-ness of 
constitution, much like Meili Steele has argued about the elision of history by many 
contemporary political theorists (Steele 2005). There is, this work proposes, a way of 
thinking about constitution in a properly political manner.  
To begin with, the full political content of constitution has a hope of coming out 
only if it is seen as constitution of a people. Constitution is not, as more commonly goes, 
all about “the arrangement of offices”, the way Aristotle misleadingly throws out for a 
cursory reader (Politics, Bk IV, Ch 3); even his elaboration that it is “[adopted] for the 
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distribution of offices, and for the determination f sovereignty in the constitution and for 
the end which the particular association aims at relizing” does not fully do justice to the 
actual work of Politics (Bk IV, Ch 1). It is certainly not about picking and choosing 
among a known variety of constitutional forms, as such a cursory reading of most of 
Politics may also suggest. Rather, it is the constituting of a viable political public that is 
the question – and for that pursuit, the various arrangements of offices and various 
systems of governing institutions are but the instruments, albeit of prime importance. The 
arrangements of offices, distribution of authorities and duties among them, the 
elaboration of complex legal systems, and even issues of political party and 
representation schemes – all of these are but an operational superstructure crafted by a 
public, and require a public constitutional culture or outlook that can enable and sustain 
these operating systems. Thus, thinking of constitution as something to be “adopted” is a 
misleadingly incomplete idea. This much can be extracted from a more careful reading 
of, or perhaps listening to, Aristotle – highly preferably by taking up his Politics and 
Ethics together.10 Helpfully, there is a tradition of genuinely political constitutional 
thought that might be called Aristotelian, or perhaps more preferably, republican: one that 
includes, among others, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville. There is also some 
contemporary scholarship that continues that tradition – or rather, has sought to revive it. 
Some of the elements of a proper viewing of this political-ness include keen 
attention to the contextual and historical situated-n ss of any particular constitutional 
project, the fact of any such undertaking happening in media res, and therefore the 
terminal indeterminacy of such an undertaking – the impossibility of predicting with any 
                                                
10 Not to mislead here: this is not a work on Aristotle’s constitutional thought, but a work inspired by some 




precision what will work, how a polity must be ordeed, or what should be avoided. 
Given these considerations, the theorists in this tradition have preferred to leave much of 
the constitutional detail to be determined by the subject publics – for they are the main 
authors of constitution. A theorist can at best be an accomplice in the contrivance of a 
good political order: she can never hope to be its author, unless the constitution is ‘in 
speech only’. These considerations provide a sense of that political-ness of constitution 
that is too often elided today.  
Given these complications, this work proposes to view constitution as a 
predicament.11 It is not a puzzle, a dilemma or tri-lemma, or a research question. It is not 
the kind of an intellectual question that modern positive political science is generally 
trained to address.12 ‘Predicament’ is comparable to Karol Soltan’s use of ‘impediments’ 
that constitutionally minded citizens often face and that are distinct from ‘causal 
determinants’, viewed as something static, by those who approach matters as ‘spectators’ 
(Soltan 2011: 117), only predicament is broader than impediments. Constitution, thus, is 
a practical predicament: a society, for better or wrse, lives on with its constitutional 
process ever lingering, and its constitutional success is a matter more of political 
judgment, art and intelligence than of intellectual acuity (i.e. phronesis and nous as 
opposed to noēsis). The predicament cannot be neatly reduced into discrete 
(parsimonious) variables and equations, because whatever gets ‘reduced away’ never 
                                                
11 The employment of the term ‘predicament’ here is in partial thanks to Dorf and Sabel (1998: 270ff), who 
write, very relevantly, of the American “constitutional predicament”, and to Ajami (1992), whose book 
discusses ‘the Arab predicament’, which may also be regarded essentially as the Arab constitutional 
predicament.  




quite stays away, always affecting the constitutional chances of a given society in some 
decisive way. 
This is not to suggest, obviously, that political theory of constitution is impossible.13 
It is only to suggest that such work must take its bearings from the predicament at hand; 
it should not, as it were, come condescendingly over the predicament trying to author its 
meaning. As James Tully has reminded, there is a living and functioning 
constitutionalism that is out there in the world – which he calls post-imperial 
contemporary constitutionalism – in spite of all the misleading distortions about it by 
imperial modern constitutional political theory, (1995).  
What such a political theory of constitution – of political constitution – may look 
like is suggested in the second half of this work. Indeed, it is only suggested or proposed, 
for elaborating a more complete theory appears to be a project for some better (and 
longer) time; in a strong sense, “theoretical completeness” is in fact argued to be not 
desirable or even possible (see top of Chapter 4). What is suggested comes under the title 
of ‘pragmatic republicanism’. Pragmatic republicanism proposes a generic and thin 
sketch of a good polity, based on the prevailing contemporary understandings and 
practices of good governance, and then proposes to consider a set of six aspects that 
attend and make up a constitutional undertaking: three of them stand for normative 
orientations of an intended polity and three – for its basic empirical conditions. These 
                                                
13 A recent issue of European Journal Political Theory (9/4, 2010) was devoted to the emergence of a 
‘realist political theory’ – the sort that might beable to meet the constitutional predicament better. Elkin 
(e.g. 2010: 223-224) is more disconcerting on this account, arguing that constitutional theory “ought to be” 
equivalent to political science as a whole, rightly understood, and even more than just political science. 
Ultimately, the present work can be considered an instance of ‘empirical political theory’ or of Elkin-style 
constitutional study.  
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aspects are proposed as a workable way for political theory to engage in constitutional 
thinking without reducing constitution to its inaccurate if simpler images. 
With these rather widely encompassing constitutional aspects articulated, political 
theory can go on to consider the many ways in which the constitutive political process 
might proceed. Pragmatic republicanism describes this process as crafting – a practical, 
ongoing, creative engagement of the constituent public in its search for constitutional 
betterment and preservation. Some discussion is devoted to what crafting is not, by 
reference to examples in literature, and then a number of different crafting strategies are 
considered in the example of Norway – a well-known good constitutional order chosen 
advisedly. 
In sum, then, this work proposes to make several contributions to political theory of 
constitution. First, it highlights – more completely than has been done previously – the 
major strands of scholarship that have evaded, or ‘elided’, the political aspect of 
constitution. In place of only one foil that political constitutionalists have often tackled – 
legal constitutionalism – this work identifies three more: institutional, cultural, and 
philosophic, thereby setting up a broader critical space. Second, this work argues that the 
perspective of some contemporary scholarship self-defined as political constitutionalist, 
while a welcome turn, has remained overly narrow in its conception of the political in 
constitution. A more comprehensive, fuller understanding of the constitutional political is 
elaborated. Third, the dissertation proposes one way in which political constitution 
properly understood could be expressed (and practiced) – what is here referred to as 




These contributions to political theory of constitution are not of prime concern in 
this work, however. There are some more important, more ultimate audiences that the 
work would ideally be addressed to. In a word, these are the constituents of good polities, 
the constitutional craftsmen and craftswomen. Here, th  implication is not necessarily 
about the nebulous constitutional populus assumed un er the idea of ‘popular 
constitutionalism’ (Kramer 2004), but more accurately, it is about the plural, changing, 
and contextually differentiated sets of relevant actors. Obviously, all of the people cannot 
possibly be actually equal participants in the activity of constituting; there will always be 
leaders and followers, elites and critical masses, the innovative and reformist few and the 
more conservative and conformist many. What is important here is not to reify this 
dividing line between the elites and the masses, as it were, but to recognize the fact – and 
to capitalize on the possibility – that any such division is tentative, able to move in either 
direction. In a good political order, such divisions will not be emphasized, their 
memberships open and shifting, and the dividing gap narrow. 
This being recognized, then, the present work is especially an effort to aid the 
leaders of constitutional activity, the activists of civil society, the political as well as 
economic elites, in their endeavors to effect positive constitutional development in their 
societies. It is an effort to explain to them the nature of the problem they have undertaken 
to tackle and to advise them on how to proceed withit. Along the way, it also points out 
to them some of the more dubious advice they may have received and tried to apply in 
the past. In a word, the hope of this work is to inform the practice of constitutional 





The work may be divided loosely into two parts. In the first part, mainly critical, it 
first identifies and lays out the scope – in the fashion of a more extended introductory 
chapter – of constitutional predicament (Chapter One); second, it discusses four different 
ways of eliding the political nature of constitution (Chapter Two); and then it takes up the 
task of outlining a more appropriately political understanding of constitution (Chapter 
Three). The second part is constructive, presenting a  elaboration of the idea of 
pragmatic republicanism. First, it outlines conceptually three of the main components of 
pragmatic republicanism: a generic sketch of a good p lity – a realistic vision of a 
republic, a set of three key normative orientations, or procedural norms, of constitution, 
and another set of three basic empirical conditions thereof (Chapter Four). Then it 
discusses how these components come into motion under the fourth component, 
constitutional crafting – the constitutive activity. Here, instead of mechanically adding 
the various elements into one, crafting is discussed in several stylized ways: by use of the 
analogy of saddle-making craft, by specifying some of what crafting is not, and by 
referring to examples of constitutional crafting in Norway (Chapter Five). Last, the work 
considers a particular case of constitution – the already mentioned country of Kyrgyzstan. 
From the properly political constitutional perspective outlined above, it presents a 
constructive critique of the relevant literature on Kyrgyzstan to date and proposes an 




Now before proceeding on, three general remarks would be good to make on some 
conceptual uses, in the form of caveats, even thoug these usage issues will be addressed 
more fully in later stages within the text.  
The first point concerns the term ‘pragmatic’. In speaking of pragmatic 
republicanism, a question is sure to arise. This esay is not an argument about 
pragmatism as the specific – and often problematic – school in philosophy. While 
benefiting from some of its propagators, including Dewey as well as Rorty, this essay 
settles on an agreeable and limited meaning of pragmatism – a meaning in which the 
word is often used in casual and practical political parlance – and sticks to that. In that 
meaning, ‘pragmatic’ stands for close linkage of thinking and doing, of ideas and deeds, 
and in that linkage, looks for the outer reaches of the possible. Put otherwise, pragmatic 
republicanism is about the possible constitution, or the possible republic. In a comparable 
non-philosophic, practical sense, this descriptor has been used in at least two other works 
on ‘pragmatic liberalism’ (Anderson 1995; Hunter and Milofsky 2007).  
The second point concerns the term ‘constitution’. This essay, for the most part, 
deals with constitution with a small ‘c’, as it is often referred. While Constitutions as 
texts are not argued to be wrong or unnecessary, it is argued that preoccupation with the 
drafting of singularly correct and best fitting Constitution is a wrong start – and one that 
has been entertained too often. Small ‘c’ constitution has also, however, been defined at 
least in two different ways – as ‘constitutional functionality’ (which is essentially the 
functionality of the written Constitution), (see Elkins et al 2009; Breslin 2009), and as the 
constitutional – or constitutive – process. The forme  is potentially problematic, since 
‘functionality’ often comes close in meaning to ‘agency’ (esp. Breslin 2009), in which 
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case it should be not the Constitution but the constituent public that acts out the written 
document for various functions. It is the latter – constitutional or constitutive process – 
that is adopted here. Also, attention is drawn to the difference between constitution and 
constitutionalism. While pragmatic republicanism does engage a normative ‘sketch’ and 
what are referred to as ‘thin normative orientations’ that fall more toward 
constitutionalism (a clearly normative concept), the broader and overall concern in this 
work is with constitution (a thin-normative and more practical concept). Thus, the 
presence or absence of the suffix ‘-ism’ within theext should be viewed as intended. 
The third remark concerns the first two and a whole l t more: Works of this kind 
are impossible – are difficult to imagine, at least – if not conceptual. In the plenitude of 
discussion of the relationships and differences betwe n various concepts, and 
introduction of new or “renovated” concepts, there is always a looming danger of 
drowning in a conceptual muddle. That danger is kept in view in this work. Still, for 
some the work can come out to be exactly that, a conceptual muddle. My reason for 
engaging in this work at all is a practical problem – that of constituting good polities, in 
Kyrgyzstan and anywhere else – and my suspicion is that the constitutional failures all 
around are in good part due to mistaken understandings, mis-conceived notions about 
constitution. Therefore, conceptual discussion is unavoidable, and the only remedy here 







Meeting the Constitutional Predicament 
 
What is a well-ordered constitutional polity14 today? It is possible to construct a 
broad outline of it based on some common characteristics of presently functioning 
constitutional regimes – much like Montesquieu did on the basis of the British model in 
The Spirit of Laws – with awareness of their own imperfections. Such a polity would be a 
stable political order animated by some [set of] values and aspirations shared and pursued 
by (most of) its members, providing security – to its constituent public in their capacities 
as individuals and groups, and to their property – based on legal and legitimate authority 
that also guarantees broad but not unlimited freedoms and dignity of citizens and 
precludes arbitrary use of political power upon citizenry; the polity is of the citizen body 
as a whole, a ‘body politic’, and as such, in maintenance of such an order, the 
participation of all citizens would be expected, although not absolutely, directly or in any 
dogmatic sense. More descriptive details can be elaborated into a much longer list but no 
virtue seems present in doing so. The above outline is sufficient to suggest the kind of a 
polity in view – republic.15 Suffice it only to add, however, that well-ordered 
constitutional polity, or a republic, cannot be thought of as an instant, or a still-image; it 
                                                
14 “Polity” is used in this work to designate “association which we call the state, the association which is 
‘political’”, and which is “the most sovereign of them all” (Aristotle 1981: 54); or, “collective and artificial 
body” or “public person” which “takes the name of republic or body politic” (Rousseau 1988: 93). The 
various commonly used terms are problematic: “state” is used in different meanings equally often, 
“country” is very imprecise, “regime” is too narrow, “society” is too broad, and “body politic” is awkard 
for systematic use. While “polity” is also used in narrower meanings (as the third element of a whole, next 
to ‘economy’ and ‘society’), it is less frequent in such use. It is often used to designate the whole of a 
politically organized society, the state in its broader meaning; it has the advantage of conveying the rig t 
normative idea, too, as in Aristotle’s designation by it of a good regime. “Republic”, as in Rousseau’s use 
in the above quote, could also be used, but it is a more specific term – especially as it has come to be used 
in contemporary vocabulary – and it is employed below in its proper place. 




is rather an objective of ongoing common life of a community within the actual world – 
with its blessings and vicissitudes, with better times and less good – never attained to a 
fully satisfactory, terminal degree.  
Good polity is a universal desideratum – all societies everywhere want to live as 
good polities, but realizing that wish has not been asy. Now, with polities that are 
already constitutional, well-established, stable, and tolerable – the ones based on which 
the above outline itself is sketched – almost any explanation and rationalization of how 
the good polity is constituted, if it has some sound logic and argumentation, can be 
plausible: because of their long histories and current state, such polities make it difficult 
to persuasively argue the faultiness of such explanatio s. To really appreciate the scope 
and the difficulty of constituting a good polity, one needs to turn to countries around the 
world that are far from counting as constitutional while they fight their ways to becoming 
ones. 
There is one such country in Central Asia, one of Sviet Union’s successors, 
officially calling itself the Kyrgyz Republic and more widely known as Kyrgyzstan. The 
story of the country’s recent history might be seen, to play on these two names, as one of 
a struggle between becoming a genuine republic and remaining one of the cliché-ed ‘-
stan’ countries. A more extended constitutional story of this country will be helpful to put 
the present work in a clearer perspective. 
 
Case in point: Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Malaise 
Kyrgyzstan is one of the fifteen countries that gained a somewhat ‘windfall’ 
independence in 1991 following the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the last referendum 
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of the Union conducted in March of 1991, where the qu stion posed to Soviet citizens 
was, essentially,  whether they wished to preserve the union, almost 96% of Kyrgyzstanis 
answered ‘yes’. This datum, often cited as an indication of how much these citizens did 
not welcome independence, should certainly be read with caution. At that point, even 
against the background of highly embattled state, ci izens throughout the union were still 
finding it hard to even imagine such a breakup or the very idea of independence. With 
some leeway, the situation may be compared to, say, asking Californians during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, whether they wanted the United States to stay or to have 
California take independence. That caveat observed, however, this return is indicative of 
Kyrgyzstanis’ identification with the Soviet Union, their extremely weak understanding 
of, let alone wish for, independent statehood. It was that highly unformed, indeterminate 
citizenry that was to make up within a year the independent modern state of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. The journey that this society has undergone since then has been difficult.  
If there is one rubric that renders the constitutional plight of the country, it ought to 
be that of chronic instability. Often talked of as bout to become a ‘failed state’, 
Kyrgyzstan has continually struggled to keep itself together as a functioning political 
unit, (see Engvall 2011b, Wilkinson 2011, McGlinchey 2011 and 2010).16Within less 
than twenty years of independence, it was possible to speak of a ‘third restart’, or as some 
politicians have preferred, of Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Third Republic’, (Juraev 2010). The third 
restart was launched with the second revolution (which remains nameless) of April 2010, 
which ousted the insatiably corrupt and violent regime of President Kurmanbek Bakiev. 
The first, ‘the Tulip Revolution’, had taken place in March 2005, when Bakiev’s 
                                                
16 In 2012 rankings of Failed States Index (by Fund for Peace), Kyrgyzstan was noted as ‘the most 
improved’ case from last year, its new score moving it from 31 up to 41 out of 177 countries, where th 
best five, predictably, includes Norway. See: http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=node/237 
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predecessor and the first president of the country Askar Akaev was expelled after about 
fifteen years in office. President Akaev’s unusual arrival to leadership – very different 
from all other emergent ex-Soviet states – was the beginning of Kyrgyzstan’s 
independent constitutional story.  
It was a rather promising start, especially considere  in light of the disheartening 
1991 referendum results concerning independence. Du to several special circumstances 
in early fall of 1990 – two major ones being the serious North-South elite competition, 
and the experience of the first major inter-ethnic bloodshed for Kyrgyzstan less than two 
months earlier – the parliament of then-Soviet republic failed to award a majority vote to 
any of three contenders to become the republic’s president, including the embattled 
incumbent party first secretary hailing from the south.17A new parliamentary vote was 
scheduled with new candidates – according to constitutional rules then, which were 
unbelievably abided, the initial candidates could not stand again – and the previously 
unknown candidacy of a physicist, head of the Kyrgyzstan Academy of Sciences at the 
time, Askar Akaev won. An intellectual, often citing Jefferson, Milton Friedman, 
Schumpeter and Hayek – unheard of from Soviet leaders – he was credibly democratic 
and stood up resolutely against the failed communist putsch of August 1991 as one of 
only a few republican leaders.  
What followed was a steady evolution of his presidency from a weak position, ever 
resisted by the parliament and the ex-communist appar tchiks, toward an increasingly 
centralized office, managed through repeated constitutional changes, all through national 
referenda, and increasing silencing of opposition. U der dire political and economic 
                                                
17 The gradual crumbling of the USSR was under way then, and the fifteen republics were declared – with 
Moscow’s support – ‘sovereign republics’ within the union, eligible to have their own presidents. That w s, 
in hindsight, just a short episode in the highly unclear ad hoc developments of that period. 
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circumstances of early 1990s, he pushed through rapid nd widespread reforms, 
especially accentuated by economic liberalization, privatization of state-owned assets, in 
close cooperation with international financial and monetary institutions. This process 
soon led to ‘insider privatization’, increasing economic disparity among the people, 
insecurity of private property and business activity, and severe lack of coordination 
among branches of government, (esp. Engvall 2011b: 26 ff).  
Faced with persistent recalcitrance from large swaths of the elite against the 
reforms, haunted by corruption allegations against him already in 1993, and hampered by 
the highly disorganized government system – where there seemed to be “as many 
governments as there were ministries and committees” (ibid: 28) – Akaev centralized 
power in the office of the president in a total of four constitutional referenda (1994, 1996, 
1998, 2003) (Huskey and Iskakova 2011: 3). In the fift en years of his presidency, he 
replaced close to a dozen heads of government, almost every such replacement 
precipitating replacements of many cabinet ministers, restructuring of the cabinet 
(ministries created, merged, abolished, etc). Public dissent was tolerated ever less, press 
freedom ever more suppressed, the judiciary ever used a  a weapon, opposition ever more 
persecuted, and the ‘inner circle’ ever tighter, eventually fully dominated by his family 
and a few clansmen. By early 2005, President Akaev is thought to have had little personal 
control over his ‘inner circle’: under the orchestration of his wife, his two elder children 
and a few others had set the country’s course down an unabashed road of universal 
corruption.  
As a lasting aftermath of police shooting of six peo l  dead during a protest march 
in a remote area in March 2002, after which low-intensity protests never stopped, as an 
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echo of the revolutions in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), and in an opportunity 
caught by the opposition following a parliamentary election mobilization in February and 
mid-March, President Akaev’s long rule came to an end on March 24, 2005. Started as 
localized protests against allegedly botched election outcomes throughout the country, 
the process culminated in the capital, Bishkek, in less than two weeks, taking the 
government down within a few hours of protesting that ran quickly out of control (due to 
regime’s inept efforts to counteract).  
After brief haggling behind doors, the ‘revolutionary’ opposition gave leadership to 
Kurmanbek Bakiev. A former prime minister and almost complete opposite of Akaev, 
Bakiev was almost proudly a non-intellectual, unceremonious, and full of gaffes and 
blunders by any Western standards every time he spoke. Coming from the south, he 
formed a leadership ‘tandem’ with a popular northerner, Felix Kulov, making him prime 
minister and thereby getting himself easily elected as president in a national vote in July 
2005. The five years of Bakiev’s rule were marred initially by high political instability, 
and then by great corruption, brutality and family rule. Following the revolution of 2005, 
the popular protest activities did not cease for over two years, among chief claims being 
property disputes, illegal land seizures, public office appointment disputes, and rallies for 
or against particular ‘political’ figures. In the process of power and influence 
redistribution, with and without Bakiev team involvement, half a dozen major criminal-
cum-political figures were assassinated within two subsequent years. Two more 
prominent and particularly brutal killings of non-criminals took place in Bakiev’s latter 
years, widely believed to be organized by his brother, chief of presidential security guard. 
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After resisting demands for quick constitutional changes following the revolution, 
Bakiev was forced to sign a new Constitution in a protest escalation in late 2006 when he 
was almost ousted from office. He then managed to change and re-sign the constitution 
with support of a new parliamentary majority that he managed to buy off within less than 
two months. By late 2007, he was in shape for a major showdown: he orchestrated 
scrapping of the constitution in both its November 2006 and January 2007 versions, 
which were adopted in sequence by the parliament, announced a referendum on a new 
constitution drafted largely behind curtains, then disbanded the parliament – which had 
generally been a thorn for him all along – and annou ced elections for a new, 100% 
party-based PR legislature with less than two months’ warning. The presidential party 
specially formed for the elections was made to win close to 50% of the vote, for which it 
was allotted close to 80% of seats, whereas a prominent opposition party that fulfilled all 
threshold requirements and came in second was denied a y seats. 
The leadership tandem was dissolved following one of the constitutional do-overs, 
in early 2007. After that, four different prime ministers served under the regime’s 
remaining three years, numerous changes were continually made in the structure of the 
cabinet. Economic life was highlighted by property rights disputes over several major 
enterprises, and in last few years, by unceremonious grabbing of them by president’s son, 
Maxim. Several months before the fall of the regime, Maxim was appointed to head a 
super-agency to oversee economic development, established as many believe specially 
for him under the Presidential Administration (that is, a non-cabinet structure).18 That 
                                                
18 See “Kyrgyz President Entrusts the Country’s Economy to His Son” for a brief description and some 
‘expert’ opinions on the agency and appointment. Accessible at:  http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5220 
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would have been the prelude for the son to replace his father, who had already then 
largely succumbed to the son’s – and a brother’s – diktat. 
It was this rapid growth of a highly predatory regime, catapulted by several 
economic decisions that would now predate directly on the population at large, that 
brought the regime down on April 7, 2010, in a bloody showdown resulting in close to 90 
people being killed in front of the Government House (usually referred as ‘the White 
House’). Given the much more tightly controlled political environment on its eve 
compared to pre-March 2005, and the relative acquiescence with the obtaining order 
among parts of the south of the country, it was an unlikely – and largely unpredicted – 
uprising of much smaller scale than five years ago, with questions still lingering about the 
methods of mobilizing the several thousand people. When shooting did not work, the 
occupants of the ‘White House’ fled, with president temporarily taking refuge in his 
southern home village before being flown out – with mediation of Presidents Obama, 
Medvedev and Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan – and eventually calling Belarus home.  
What remained was a country in severe trouble, yet again. The new wave of illegal 
land and property seizures, carousel of new appointme s from ministerial level down to 
high school principals, was now accompanied by increasing ethnic-based targeting. The 
Provisional Government, a self-appointed collegial leadership consisting of fourteen 
‘revolutionary’ members, with a head – Roza Otunbaeva – and three deputies, was 
caught, besides their internal disagreements, in a limbo of institutional illegitimacy. With 
ouster of the regime, its pocket parliament had self-dissolved, and soon after, the rubber 
stamp Constitutional Court was abolished by a decree. There was no institution left to 
grant legitimacy to the Provisional Government, and it ruled as it could by stamping 
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decrees. This legitimacy deficit handicapped its capa ities both at home and abroad. In a 
process of mal-governance that unraveled from its fir t days, its inability of law 
enforcement – especially in the south of the country – was the most pronounced as the 
situation steadily devolved, imploding on the night of June 10-11 2010 in the second 
major inter-ethnic bloodshed.19 
The violence took place in the city of Osh – second largest in Kyrgyzstan – and its 
surroundings, continuing for three days. In the end, it claimed more than 400 officially 
recorded lives, close to 2000 homes and businesses, aw more than 100,000 short-term 
refugees into neighboring Uzbekistan, who were sentback by Uzbek authorities under 
questionable circumstances within days of calm. Reasons for the conflict are many, and 
no singular explanation – such as deep-seated ethnic animosity, or economic inequality, 
or other structural problems in politics or economy – is acceptable as solely accurate. 
What it has left in its wake is a population much more deeply divided along the Kyrgyz-
Uzbek ethnic line, much greater and intolerant nationalism, wounded and for the time 
being suppressed feelings among many thousands who directly suffered. This conflict 
may be the singular most sobering evidence of the constitutional failures of Kyrgyzstan. 
The country has been slowly recovering from the tragedy in the past two years. A 
referendum held two weeks after the bloody events – as it was scheduled previously – 
introduced a new Constitution which changed Kyrgyzstan’  form of government from a 
highly presidential system into one where power is shared roughly equally between the 
                                                
19There have now been published at least four authoritative (official, that is) reports on the causes, 
consequences, and implications of the conflict, but generally all investigations have been disputed and 
lacking in credible information. The most comprehensive but also disputed international investigation 
report is Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (‘Kiljunen Commission’) report of 2011, accessible at: 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_490.pdf More recently (February 2012), 
a more extensively researched and possibly least bied report has been prepared by a Russian human 
rights advocate Vitaliy Ponomarev and his Norwegian colleague Ivar Dale, “A Chronicle of Violence”; 
accessible at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Report_2_12_ENG_nett.pdf  
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president, the parliament, and the prime minister. The referendum also confirmed Roza 
Otunbaeva, a woman, to note, as a transitional president of the country until the end of 
2011. The parliamentary elections held in October 2010 were rather well conducted and 
democratic, against much worse expectations, producing a five-party legislature, with a 
‘revanchist’ opposition party winning the greatest plurality of seats, and formation of a 
government requiring at least three parties to coalesce.20 President Otunbaeva served for 
another year – until a new president was elected in October, 2011 – taking mostly the 
backseat, letting the cabinet and the parliament do most of the driving, and preferring 
more symbolic speeches and appearances. Her prime mnister handily, albeit not entirely 
cleanly, won the presidential election, and is now President Almazbek Atambaev – 
another gaffe-prone former businessman, philologist by education, who has been able to 
assert more power than his predecessor but far less than the first two – just as one should 
expect if the new Constitution has any bearing on reality.  
This generalized climate of instability has been accompanied, or even shaped and 
produced, by several notable socio-political phenomena, which are already suggested in 
the above story. One is the alarming level of corruption that quickly spread after the 
gaining of independence and was catapulted in the process of privatization that was 
begun soon. In a post-Soviet culture that had regularized hypocrisy, when a public 
official with any responsibilities would resort to lying about their work both to the higher 
authorities and to the people, it was easy for mostly the same people in new positions in 
charge of considerable public assets to see wide open portunities. As time went on, 
more and more opportunities for gainful abuse were discovered and employed, such as 
                                                
20 An article in The Guardian, in a characteristic coverage of the elections, begins thus: “Foreign observers 




selling governmental posts, introducing schemes for embezzling international grant and 
loan funds, and then schemes for siphoning more genuin ly public, locally collected 
revenues such as utilities payments. In 2011, Corruption Perceptions Index (of 
Transparency International) had it ranked 164th out of 183 countries, and in all recent 
years, it has remained stably among the most corrupt 20-25 countries in the world.21 
Johan Engvall, in his dissertation, describes the many varieties, evolution, and 
functioning of corruption in politics and bureaucracy, suggesting that public service in 
Kyrgyzstan became just another – and the biggest of all – business, and more specifically, 
‘an investment market’, (Engvall 2011a).22 Fight against corruption has been the battle 
cry ever since the mid-1990s, and with every new such cry, the hypocrisy of it was louder 
than the words. The current president’s key theme in the inaugural speech was, again, a 
total war on corruption, but in the wake of several rather high level arrests on corruption 
charges, and given that the entire public service corps is corrupt anyway, suspicions are 
high that this is yet another round of political score-settling than anything else.23 
Another very evident theme in the above story is the level of political divisiveness 
in the country, where the North-South cleavage has been the longest running prominent 
problem, but the two bloody conflicts between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks indicate the 
inter-ethnic cleavage to be the more dangerous. However, neither has been always a 
standing problem, and usually they have risen with major political upheavals, and then 
receded somewhat in the intervals. There have been more lines of cleavage, including 
                                                
21 See: http://www.transparency.org/country#KGZ 
22 See also his interview where he describes this resea ch. “In Kyrgyzstan, corruption of not a problem for 
the state, it IS the state”. At:h tp://enews.fergananews.com/article.php?id=2735 
23 See a recent report by Chris Rickleton in an analytic news website, “Kyrgyzstan: Is corruption 
controversy a sign of political trouble ahead?”. At:http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65715 
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‘clans’, regions, religious differences, and other. More on this theme is discussed below, 
as it especially relates to the country’s constitutional problems. 
Not of least importance has been the problem of economic mal-governance. While 
it is part-and-parcel of the problem of corruption, the poor state of the country’s economy 
and government’s consistently poor policies have ben a problem on their own. A small 
and land-locked country with few attractive resources, Kyrgyzstan has had to rely on 
several unsustainable lines of national income: international grants and loans, remittance 
money from Kyrgyz workers abroad, mainly from Russia, and earnings from the major 
gold mine operated by a Canadian investor. The country’s foreign debt is currently at 
nearly 2.5 times the annual state budget, more than 60% of GDP, and debt servicing has 
been increasingly a strain on government. Of industries, the single most crucial enterprise 
has been a gold mining company, Kumtor, proceeds from which have accounted on 
average for 5-7% of GDP and for about 1/3 of annual exports ever since it started to 
produce gold in 1997. The Canadian-run company never had a respite from government 
encroachments ever since its operation began. Becaus  of rampant corruption, political 
instability, unattractive climate and location, foreign direct investment has been very 
weak whereas local private sector has been small, patronized, and/or stifled. 
Thus, Kyrgyzstan can be seen as a highly inhospitable country for constitutional 
development. However, some relatively positive sign may also be noted. In a word, it is 
about the persistent capability among the people to resist bad rule and to resent 
curtailment of their freedom beyond a certain level. Even in the worst oppressive periods 
of both toppled regimes, there was courage among people to protest, among the press to 
be critical, and among civil society organizations to carry on their politically 
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inconvenient work. Kyrgyzstan was dubbed an ‘island of democracy’ at some points, 
usually not lasting for very long, but the epithet has usually tended to return. The 
country’s current Constitution provides for a system that should not easily become 
centralized, unless the balance of political powers is tilted in a significant way. If the 
current status quo, shaky though it is, persists for one or two election cycles, there might 
be some light at the end of the tunnel. 
 
 This painful constitutional story has been suggested above to be a story of a 
struggle between realizing the desideratum of a republic, according to the country’s 
formal name, and remaining with the constitutionally problematic pattern of the region’s 
other ‘-stan’ countries. It is warranted to call it a struggle and not a wholly foregone case 
(very few cases, if any, are ever describable as totally hopeless): as observed above, 
sometimes dubbed Central Asia’s “island of democracy”, the country has repeatedly gone 
against the regional pattern and expectations, eventhough succumbing each time back to 
the grips of the regionally more common authoritarianism, corruption, and clientelism. In 
reflecting on these processes, two opposed narratives have recently been identifiable. 
On the one hand, there are voices of hope and inexorable progress. A prominent 
voice in this camp was, predictably, the former presid nt, Roza Otunbaeva, who soon 
after April 2010 (second) ‘revolution’ wrote in an op-ed for The Washington Post that 
“democracy was the only way forward”, that Kyrgyzstan “had firmly chosen its path” 
toward democracy, and so on.24 In an article of no less optimistic mood, Kathleen Collins 
(2011), a scholar of Central Asian politics more famous for her work on the ever 
                                                




subversive ‘clans’25, speaks of a democratic opposition aided by an active and potent civil 
society to overturn the repressive regime of Kurmanbek Bakiev in a second ‘revolution’ 
within five years, and how democracy is almost inevtably won for Kyrgyzstan.  
Many more voices, however, take the opposite view. In one of the more 
sophisticated analyses, a student of Kyrgyzstani politics Scott Radnitz (2006; see also 
2005), following the first – 2005 – revolution, wrote about the explanatory phenomenon 
of localism – multiple clientelistic networks of local communities organized around 
“own” businessmen and ‘strongmen’ – and how, catapul ed by such localist mobilization, 
the revolution held little hope of engendering an all-inclusive nationwide constructive 
agenda. Radnitz’ argument about the subversive power f localism could later be held up 
as a sound prediction of the fate of the post-2005 regime and of the second revolution in 
2010. Another commentator compared Kyrgyzstan in 2010 to a small airplane without a 
pilot and Kyrgyzstani politics to ‘running in circles’26.  
A more accurate position on Kyrgyzstan’s chances, predictably, will need to be 
found somewhere in the middle of the two opposed narratives. It is a difficult thing – 
building and keeping a democratic constitutional regime. The many details and instances, 
some of them quite hilarious, of trying to install  good constitutional regime in 
Kyrgyzstan will be left to be told in their proper place below, but suffice to note that the 
search has been active. The country’s trials and failures are illustrations of several more 
general problematic approaches to constitution – four f which are identified in the 
following chapter. The simple moral of Kyrgyzstan’s – and many other comparable 
places’ – story is that constitution of a good polity is a lengthy, uneven, and complex 
                                                
25 See for example, her The Logic of Clan Politics in Central Asia (2006) and “Clans, Pacts, and Politics in 
Central Asia” (2002). 
26 McGlinchey, “Running in Circles in Kyrgyzstan”, op-ed. The New York Times, April 9, 2010. 
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task. It concerns the whole of a society’s life – not just some elements or parts thereof; it 
concerns a continuous and non-linear process, not a one-time or short-run event; and it 
encompasses a society that is always already somehow preexisting and pre-constituted, 
with a view to how that society might change into a better constituted one. This is a 
challenging order; Stephen Elkin – in a critical take on [ideal] theories of deliberative 
democracy and in proposing how better to think about constitution – referred to this 
rather simply as ‘thinking constitutionally’ (2004). In a similar vein, one may call the 
challenge itself ‘the constitutional predicament’.27 
A few specific meanings are stipulated in calling it so. First, it is about a non-trivial 
puzzle or tight-spot to which resolution is wanted and can be achieved –that is, there is no 
objective reason terminally precluding its positive resolution. Second, the puzzle is not of 
a mysterious type – the issue is somewhat known, perha s all too familiar, and the puzzle 
is in effect a persisting unsatisfactory condition (a tight-spot) where plausibly workable 
ways out persist in failing. Third, constitutional predicament stipulates a specific kind – 
or class – of predicament, which is to say that it is both identifiable and its solution is 
contained in its class – in its constitutionality. The resolution to the predicament thus 
described cannot be expected to be an ‘eureka’ or ‘bingo’ moment; it is likely to come as 
a prolonged process. Having specified it in these trms, the constitutional predicament at 
hand may be restated once more in the form of a simple question:  
How does Kyrgyzstan change from being the traditional ‘-stan’ country into a 
republic recognizable as such by an impartial but knowledgeable observer? Or more 
                                                
27 This choice is in part suggested by Fouad Ajami’s book, The Arab Predicament (1992), where 
‘predicament’ stands to congeal the whole complex of difficulties that the Arab societies – Egypt being the 
main case – have met in building normal, functional modern states. Another origin of this choice is a 
lengthy article by Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism” 
(1998), where they refer to the ‘constitutional predicament’ in America. 
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generally, how to transform a poorly-ordered political regime, taking it the way it is, into 
a better-ordered polity that it can realistically become? 
 
The question is quite common-sense and unremarkable, except for qualifiers, 
“taking it the way it is” and “that it can realistically become”. These qualifiers make up 
the heart of the predicament, and so far, a satisfac ory answer to it has not been provided. 
To do so, then, is the ambition of the present work. As suggested above, the present 
answer will not be in any way miraculous or wholly new. Much like the culmination of 
the search for justice by Socrates and his young friends in Plato’s Republic (118-119 
[432d-433b]), the resolution of the constitutional predicament will have been ‘rolling 
around our feet’ all along and only needed to be pointed at. But to get started, a brief 
introduction is next in order. Let us call this part ‘meet the constitutional predicament’,28 
and that – in three ways. First, ‘meet’ as in ‘be introduced to’ – get a brief overview of 
the constitutional predicament as it has been observed in recent times. Second, ‘meet’ as 
in ‘comprehend it’ – a short introduction to the non-eureka way out of the predicament, 
which will come by way of restoring the idea of political constitution, an instance of 
which is proposed in the third meaning of ‘meeting’ – that of ‘finding a solution’, 
namely, a proposal for a pragmatic republican approach to constitution.               
 
Meeting the Constitutional Predicament I: The Problem 
“In Kyrgyzstan, corruption is not a problem of the state; corruption IS the state.”29 
Thus declares Johan Engvall, a young political scientist who recently completed a very 
interesting and critical study of political development of Kyrgyzstan (Engvall 2011c). 
                                                
28 To play on the title of Robert De Niro/Ben Stiller comedy, “Meet the Parents”.  





Rather than a condescending diagnosis from a happy Swede about the hapless Kyrgyz 
state (although it does sound like one), the statement is a prelude for a serious critique of 
the concept of state in general, and applications of the modular ‘Weberian’ state in places 
like Kyrgyzstan in particular. In this, he is in agreement with Lisa Anderson, who based 
on the ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ state problems of the Middle East writes thus: “the imposition of 
[European, Weberian-style] states often disorganized the local social and political 
structures, but the new arrangements equally failed to take root effectively, leaving many 
populations with neither authoritative local institutions nor robust Weberian-style states,” 
(Anderson 2004: 10). Present-day Afghanistan might be the epitome of problems of 
getting Western-style state machinery to work (see Worden 2010). In searching for more 
workable avenues toward better governance there, Barfield and Nojumi speak very 
interestingly about local informal institutions of governance, reflecting this unease: 
“[T]hey need to be viewed as the Afghan equivalent of civil society and 
treated accordingly. Government officials should seek their opinions in advance 
of implementing policy directives from Kabul… Their resolutions of disputes 
should have legal standing in the formal court system as long as they do not 
violate fundamental individual rights. They should not be asked to impose state 
law or to be used (sic) as agents of social change. (They only reflect community 
values; they do not have the authority to change them by diktat.) Because such 
bodies can only be effective when they retain their fl xible ad hoc character, they 
will fail if they are made permanent, given appointed leaders or put on the 
government payroll,” (Barfield and Nojumi 2010: pp. 47-48).      
 
It is not the suggestion here that the ‘Weberian-style’ state model is to be 
abandoned and some sui generis models to be sought for each particular society – the 
respective authors do not suggest that, and if they did, they would have to be confronted. 
The broad outlines of a good polity proposed at the beginning still hold. Rather, the point 
of these vignettes is to highlight the profound difficulties and conundrums involved in 
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establishing good political order in societies that do not have it and are at early stages of 
the pursuit. They illustrate the constitutional predicament par excellence. 
So, how have the 193 (as per UN membership) independent polities been coping 
with the constitutional predicament? Unfortunately, there is no single and comprehensive 
data available about the actual (de facto) success or failure of states in their constitutional 
endeavors. The fairly recent – and still growing – rich dataset produced by the 
Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP), which has collected data on literally all 
national constitutions that have ever been in force, is concerned not with actual 
implementation of written constitutions, but with de jure information such as existence, 
adoption, change, and suspension of constitutions.30 There is no dataset that answers such 
questions as “Which countries in the world are constitutional? How many? For how long 
has each country been constitutional? To what extent is each country constitutional?” and 
so on. The reason is, foremost, the difficulty in operationalizing the measure of de facto 
constitutionality of any country: too many variables can stand for very different 
understandings of constitutionalism, defying any effort at quantitative expression of 
general data if such data hopes to go beyond formalistic checkmarks. Still, such a project 
must be in the making. In the meantime, some other available data can be used as proxy 
measures of constitutionalism, with awareness that there are some discrepancies between 
what we are interested in and what they measure.  
                                                
30 http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/theoreticalmotivations.htm. Investigators write: “In 
order to investigate the correspondence between de jure and de facto law, one needs an accounting of both. 
Our interest, we remind, is in measuring the former.” 
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One of the more popular datasets is Freedom House annual reports on the state of 
freedom31 – not quite constitutionalism but an important element of it. While very 
informative of the world picture regarding freedom, these survey data also conceal as 
much as they reveal. Thus, according to Freedom in the World 2012 data, out of 195 
countries surveyed, 48 (24%) were ‘not free’, 60 (31%) ‘Partly free’ and 87 (45%) ‘Free’ 
in 2011.32 A breakdown by regions reflects a predictable pattern of difficulties with living 
up to the ‘Weberian-style’ modern state, with 21% of Asia-Pacific countries, 24% of 
Central and Eastern Europe/Eurasia countries, 72% of countries in Middle East and North 
Africa, and 39% of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa rated “not free”. By contrast, only 
3% and 0% of countries in the Americas and Western Europe, respectively, were “not 
free”. These simple statistics – essentially, that is what these percentages are – provide an 
ambivalent snapshot: based on the numbers and distributions, it is not possible clearly to 
say that there is too little or pretty good amount of freedom around the world today. 
Considered within the trend-line over the Freedom House ratings years (beginning 1972), 
the glass is half-full: there is a suggestion that freedom has been steadily growing. One is 
almost tempted to abandon any pessimistic wonderment about any ‘predicament’ and 
simply go on with democracy- and freedom-promotion. 
However, such rankings (Freedom House is not the only e; Polity, Bertelsmann 
Transformations Index, and Heritage Foundation are some other sources), are only 
informative to a degree. There remain big black boxes of freedom and good governance 
                                                
31 ‘Freedom’ in this survey comprises two main measure , political rights and civil liberties – the measure 
leaves out important questions such as economic inequality, welfare provisions, and various dimensions f 
stability, and it may be overlooking possible other ways of ‘consultation’ (Tilly 2007) in some cultures that 
would not count as conventional ‘rights and liberties’. These probably left out issues can seriously affect de 
facto constitutionality of a regime.  
32 Find this report at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202012%20Booklet_0.pdf  
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when the actual, lived processes of political development are compressed into a single 
digit with a decimal. Thus, a score of, say, “6.2” for political rights on Freedom House 
scale suggests a country has a pretty bad record. On which day it was 6.2, for how long it 
lasted at 6.2, does a 6.2 tell more about political participation or about political party 
system or about a president’s legitimacy – such questions of course cannot penetrate the 
box. Even with the country essay and with other countries’ and past years’ scores at hand, 
this is precious little as a way of knowing how thecountry’s political and constitutional 
development is proceeding The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region’s stubborn 
inhospitality to democracy and freedom, for example, is one big black-box. The very 
mixed and gradually disappointing outcomes of the recent long ‘Arab Spring’, if anyone 
wanted to have a good perception about their chances, ar  hidden tightly in that black 
box. So, based on the scores that Egypt received in 2011 – and with all other scores that 
may give a context to Egypt’s freedom score – it would be impossible to decide what 
President Morsi should do when he got elected and fced the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces who on the eve of elections had drastically cut down a president’s 
constitutional authorities and dissolved the parliament: go against SCAF and risk further 
turmoil? Play by SCAF rules and become a puppet of the military? Call on Muslim 
Brotherhood support and further entrench his ‘Islamist’ credentials that Western media 
were quick to stress before even saying his name?    
 A somewhat different picture is found in Polity IVdata in its Global Report 2011, 
also very relevant for constitutionalism.33 Here, Kyrgyzstan’s record under fragility 
ratings is a very curious case. It is defined as an “institutionalized democracy” – along 
with India, Timor Leste, and Sweden – with a State Fragility Index (SFI) of 14 (out 25 – 
                                                
33 Find this report at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf 
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most fragile). Notably, at that high index of fragility, Kyrgyzstan is the only country 
whose State Effectiveness is scored as more than twice more fragile (10) than its State 
Legitimacy score (4) – the two components of SFI. Polity considers two groups of 
countries as particularly fragile, Muslim and sub-Saharan African, and Kyrgyzstan is 
tagged as Muslim – it having precious little commonality with, say, Saudi Arabia, an 
‘institutionalized autocracy’, which is much more resilient with an SFI of 10: a score of 2 
for Effectiveness and four times greater fragility (8) for Legitimacy – another rare case of 
such drastic discrepancy. Most notable of all, it is never quite clear how, based on what 
sources, Polity assigns all of these scores on eight discrete component criteria for all of 
164 countries each year. The moral of this wonderment b ing: with this reputable and 
widely used political stability dataset – very relevant to constitutional development – one 
is again baffled with many more questions than before l oking at them. It is a great effort 
ending with a tendentious caricature of the world political outlook and quite frugal with 
insight.      
 
So, we do not understand how well-constituted polities emerge. The world may 
increasingly consist of better and better governed societies over the years, but there is 
nearly half of the world (by number of countries) that are not well-governed, and the 
distance from being well-governed is widely varied among them. One legitimate position 
may be simply to follow the developments, counting more and more democracies year 
after year, and even conduct large-n studies of correlates of democratization and good 
governance, producing (or rather more often, corroborating previously determined) sets 
of independent and causal factors that seem to be responsible for both democratization 
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and failures thereof. But such manipulations do not lead to real confronting of problems 
of political development in the actually existing polities; they are destined to stay at a 
level of generalizable abstractions. They do not tell how, in what order, with what 
relative weights, at what speed, all of those causal variables and correlates fall in place 
for a country X to make it a viable constitutional polity. 
One example might be helpful here. In one article of a series of related studies of 
‘electoral revolutions’, Bunce and Wolchik (2010) try o understand why in a group of 
comparable countries, all classified as ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’, one half (six 
countries, six elections) experienced a successful electoral revolution and the other half 
(three countries, five elections) did not. After failing to corroborate a wealth of what they 
describe as institutional and structural hypotheses, their data suggest that a set of ‘agency’ 
hypotheses – more specifically, electoral dynamics – are in better position to explain the 
variation of interest.  
Now, the wonderment is that those “electoral dynamics” hypotheses, almost fully 
shared among the successful cases and almost entirely absent in the ‘failed’ cases, can 
barely scratch the surface of the actual political processes surrounding the Tulip 
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, for example. One of the prominent arguments about recent 
Kyrgyzstani ‘revolutionary’ disease, coming from Scott Radnitz (2006), highlights the 
phenomenon of localism – a narrow and personalistic pattern of mobilization – playing a 
key role, and one that is quite ill-fitted for enabling robust democratization. Anything like 
this is wholly absent from Bunce and Wolchik’s discu sion. One could also note that 
Georgia, which is often noted (in the article) as a less democratic case along with 
Kyrgyzstan, is now clearly more democratic than Ukraine (under President Yanukovich) 
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– one of the more clearly democratizing cases discussed. While the latter – the posterior 
developments – are not properly the concern of the article by Bunce and Wolchik34, the 
general point here is that such larger-n, generalization-oriented studies are almost 
inevitably going to suppress the longer-term processes and the more idiosyncratic 
phenomena at work, resulting in findings that are neither good explanations of why 
something happened, nor good guidelines for making something happen in the future. If 
Bunce and Wolchik’s 9-country, 11-election sample is too generalizing, then the much 
larger-n studies such as the Elkins et al comparative constitutions project, the Freedom 
House and Polity rankings, and others are even moreso. 
The constitutional predicament, the way it looks, is about the inscrutable ways in 
which some societies are somewhat more successful than some others. Political science 
can go on with its efforts of coming up with good measurements of constitutionalism, or 
democracy, or stability, and so on, in the hope that t e predicament will be cracked open 
– for after all, political science is not concerned simply with description for its own sake, 
but with understanding how better regimes, better governance are possible.   
 
Meeting the Constitutional Predicament II: In Search of Remedy   
A way of entering this theme is by considering briefly some issues in state theory. It 
may be claimed that modern state theory has featured three main schools: the liberal 
pluralist, the organic, and the Marxist theories of state (see, e.g, Stepan 2001: Ch. 2). 
Putting the latter at rest for reasons easy to guess, it is the former two that seem of 
interest presently. While state theory as such has been somewhat sidelined in recent 
                                                
34 Albeit, if what happens after a brief period following the electoral revolution is not of interest, then it 
ought to be all the more uninteresting – it seems – to conduct a study of “successful” and “unsuccessful” 
cases in the first place. 
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political science, and is rarely invoked in constitutional theory (alas), it can be safely 
claimed that the greater bulk of contemporary political science sympathizes with the 
overall spirit of pluralist state theory; organic state theory or its guiding philosophy have 
long been out of favor in the mainstream. Without delving deep into this ‘side 
discussion’, the point is that quite possibly the organic approach might hold a promise for 
grasping the constitutional predicament.        
In an interesting essay, Grzymala-Busse and Luong (2002) argue that state theory’s 
main problem in general has been its static character, its inability to embrace the dynamic 
processes that make up and sustain the state. Based on the experience of the post-
communist state-building, these authors propose a dyn mic conceptualization of the state 
as a process of elite competition: punctured by the influences of civil society – to the 
extent the latter has any strength, and shaped by the extant institutional frameworks – to 
the extent they exist, the process is nonetheless and unavoidably one of intra-elite 
competition for power. If this openly elitist dynamic theory is to be linked to one of the 
above state theory schools, it appears to be most accur tely an outgrowth of the liberal 
pluralist theory whose elitism was noted in E. E. Schattscheider’s famous aphorism: “the 
flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class 
accent”. While elite focus by itself ought not to be a disqualifier for any theory – 
especially in speaking of state and state-building where the predominant role and 
prerogatives of elite groups is undeniable – what is roubling in this tendency is the 
reduction of the constitutional process of a state as a whole to processes within a narrow 
part of the society (to believe critics such as Domh ff (2009), such elites may make up as 
little as 1% or less of a population). For state thory and constitutional thought, it is an 
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unnecessary, probably empirically inaccurate, and certainly normatively an unwelcome 
move to base a theory in its entirety on the category of elites.   
Such elitism or narrowness is characteristic of some f the prevailing approaches in 
contemporary constitutional theory. Thus, two major pproaches – identified in this work 
as the legal and the formal-institutional – are similarly elitist. By focusing on higher 
institutions of law and government, respectively, their guiding logic can be characterized 
as one of a ‘tipping point’: they suggest that as long as (and as soon as) an emergent 
regime’s top – its high court and its powers, or the national level institutions and their 
balances – is arranged properly, the rest of society would magically fall in place to 
complete a constitutional project. The two other approaches identified in this work – 
philosophic and (cultural) essentialist – do not readily suggest a similar elitism, however 
its elements are to be found in them as well. (These four approaches to constitution are 
the subject of the next chapter.) Such narrow and mechanistic suggestions are 
problematic on their face, and they easily reveal un-s stainability in practice – as could 
be observed in the preceding section above.    
To back up a bit, then, while their ‘elite competition’ theory of state is thus deemed 
unsatisfactory for its narrowness and unjustified rsignation to elitism, Grzymala-Busse 
and Luong nonetheless open up an interesting route. If pluralist theory’s dynamic 
counterpart is ‘elite competition’ theory, what might be the organic state theory in a 
dynamic restatement? It ought to be political constitution. 
Organic theory describes the state as a complex organism where all parts are 
necessary for the whole, no part is extraneous or superfluous, and the whole is unable to 
be reduced to some simpler, smaller, more easily discernible version of itself. There is a 
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problem of static-ness with this view: the image of the organism-like complex state is 
proposed as already accomplished and destined to remain that way. Any actual organism 
goes through cycles of birth, growth, development, maturity, and decay. If a state is an 
organism, then its dynamic rendering would be the process of political constitution – the 
ever ongoing process by which an organism that we call state is constituted. Political 
constitution, hence, is interested in understanding a d explaining the processes involved 
in constituting a well-functioning polity as a whole. 
Entering the discussion of a remedy for the constitutional predicament via state 
theory and, specifically, organic state theory in this manner is gainful for several reasons. 
First, it makes salient the fact that in speaking about constitution, we are speaking about 
constitution of a state as such, not a mere set of distinct institutions, not a regime in some 
narrow sense, and certainly not a written document. In other words, constitution is 
equivalent to state-building (or, as preferred in this work, polity-building). Second, 
invocation of organic theory introduces what has argu bly been in short supply in recent 
constitutional thought, a holistic perspective. Third, by proposing political constitution as 
the dynamic counterpart of organic theory, we have also underlined the proper usage of 
the term ‘constitution’ in this work – it is about the process (and activity) of constituting 
rather than a static thing or an instant. Fourth and l st, by invoking political constitution 
in this setting, we have also highlighted political: in being juxtaposed to the narrowness 
of ‘elite competition’ of Grzymala-Busse and Luong (2002), ‘political constitution’ is 
offered as a broadly encompassing concept, where political derives from the noun 
‘polity’ – that is, the politically organized society as a whole. Instead of circumscribing a 
priori  all the decisive action to a particular segment, as elite theories do, the perspective 
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of political constitution leaves the entry open to a much wider scope of potentially 
decisive actors and sites – and, as it will become bvious in this work, it encourages such 
widening of the constitutional playing field.    
 
Of old, just as of now, people came together into political communities in pursuit of 
some shared good. That was the first premise from which Aristotle began his 
investigations into politics (Politics, p. 54) and ethics (Nicomachean Ethics, p. 3). That is 
also the premise in contemporary thinking, such as exemplified in corresponding 
arguments by J. A. G. Griffith (1978) and more recently, by Richard Bellamy (2007)35. 
Much the same premise, expressed in its negative, stand  at the origin of Hobbes’ 
commonwealth through social contract (the common desire to overcome the dangers of 
the state of nature), and now underlies its version by Rawls (but here, with ‘veil of 
ignorance’ applied to representatives rather to the w ole society, the reduction of the true 
political has already begun). It is difficult to pro erly and veritably examine the truth of 
this premise – if nothing else, because of a lack of any variation on the dependent 
variable. What may partially corroborate its truth is what can be plainly observed in 
contemporary world.  
There are now 193 member-states in the United Nations – recognized sovereign 
states in the world. By their claim to sovereignty, they – as collective entities, bodies 
politic – have declared to themselves and to the rest of the world, implicitly and often 
explicitly (in declarations of independence, in preambles of national constitutional texts), 
                                                
35 While the latter two do not explicitly say it – whic  is a problem in their respective works – this is a 
necessary, cornerstone assumption in order to hold on to a belief that a particular human society is not i  
danger of falling into warring with each other or cllapsing altogether the moment courts and lawyers step
aside. Only with the assumption of this underlying political goal is it possible to make the kind of 
arguments in favor of political constitutionalism tha  they have made. 
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that they have formed each a community to pursue the common, shared good of its 
members. Notably, a far greater half of these sovereign countries became such after 
previously being subjects of other sovereigns – colonial powers, empires, or earlier larger 
nation-states that included them. Many of them gained their independence through costly 
and bloody paths of struggle. Whatever else they can be thought to have desired in 
aspiring for and now claiming independence, it is undeniable that among their highest 
wishes was the wish to form each a community that governed itself in the best and shared 
interests of all its members. That collective wish  perpetuated in the very names of 
about 140 of these states36 who officially define themselves as either Republics or 
Commonwealths.  
Alas, all too many of these aspired republics have persisted in not materializing. 
That sad fact raises one more point that underscore the nuance of political constitution – 
as compared to four alternative perspectives on constitution – and the point is about the 
permanent indeterminacy, or uncertainty, of the constitutional endeavor. Constitution is 
ever a matter of forging agreement, shoring up support, dealing with differences, 
recovering from setbacks, taming radicalism and not falling into apathy. There is no 
Leviathan to do all this single-handedly – not for societies aspiring for good polity; 
constitutional indeterminacy involves all of its mebers and is generated because it is so 
broadly inclusive. This uncertainty is greatest during early stages of constitutionalizing – 
when a society embarks upon the project following the gaining of independence, or 
ridding itself of a dictator, or undergoing other kinds of systemic renewal. The 
uncertainty is less intensive but persists nonethelss once a country may be called a 
                                                
36 Based on a rough conservative count by the author. 
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‘resilient’37, consolidated constitutional state, meaning that te United States, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, and many similarly developed countries are not immune to 
constitutional crises and problems, albeit not to the same degree as, say, Kyrgyzstan.  
Steering this indeterminacy of constitution – which is, differently put, open-
endedness – in the preferred directions and keeping it in check is entirely up to the 
political life of the given society. Not the written Constitution, not a high court, not a 
president or a parliament or their particular conjunct re, but the whole citizen body is the 
ultimate agent that keeps a constitutional order afloat – or fails. The more successful 
societies at this task will be those that exhibit – given their circumstances and history – 
the most robust capabilities for constitutional stewardship – capabilities to cooperate, to 
judge, to keep responsibility, to maintain moderation, to resist abuse, and so on.  
The fact of constitutional uncertainty and the issue of citizen constitutional 
capabilities lie at the heart of the concept of political constitution. There are no clear-cut 
solutions to the problem of uncertainty, and there is no definitive recipe for ascertaining 
the needed capabilities: a constitution succeeds an stays put as a result of ever-active, 
ever-ongoing political crafting – some may call it a function of political balance of 
powers (Bellamy 2007), some may call it “shipbuilding on uncharted sea” (Elkin 2006: 
107), and some may even suggest it is “whatever happens” (Griffith 1978) – the point of 
these all is that a constitution is never “once andfor all”. This is the irreducibly political 
nature of the constitutional project. 
 
                                                
37 ‘Resilience’ is the term used in Polity IV vocabulary as the opposite of ‘State Fragility’. Resilienc is 
also in Pettit (2009) as a concept denoting capacity to withstand contingent shocks (fortuna) in politics. 
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To restate what has been said up to this point: all societies in the world wish to live 
in well-constituted polities, in genuine republics, but very many of them have persisted in 
failing to achieve that goal. Constituting a good polity is a complex, precarious, and long-
term challenge, and it may be called a predicament. There is no magic-pill for this 
predicament, and many constitutional theories that suggest such solutions must be taken 
with great suspicion. There is only one way to deal with the predicament – to understand, 
control and eventually to overcome it – and that is to realize that its solution is contained 
in the midst of the irreducibly political society itself. Such a realization directs attention – 
and efforts – to the permanent uncertainty of the constitutional project, and to the key to 
managing that uncertainty – civic constitutional capabilities. Without proper 
understanding of political constitution, the constitutional predicament cannot be ever 
remedied.  
Now, political constitution is a very general idea; the fact that it stands for most of 
what mainstream modern social science rejects, such as parsimony, generalizability, 
certainty and measurability, and embraces holism, contextualism, and more – all of this 
only complicates the matter further. This is no mistake: this is how it must be 
approached. A more specific formulation of conceptions of constitution from a political 
perspective is what needs to follow from this sobering ecognition. Next follows one such 
form of expressing and elaborating political constitution: pragmatic republicanism.   
 
Meeting the Constitutional Predicament III: Pragmatic Republicanism 
Pragmatic republicanism is proposed here as one possible way of elaborating the 
idea of political constitution. Relying on the broad of stock of republican political ideas, 
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this proposal is an attempt to specify to a certain degree (but only to a certain degree) 
some ways in which political constitution may be practically grasped and put to work. 
Specifically, it first outlines a generic sketch ofa good polity as understood in 
contemporary political world, a realistic vision ofa good polity, as it were. Then it 
attends to six different aspects of constitutional project: three of them the formative and 
guiding procedural norms of such a project (or, thin-normative orientations), three – the 
key empirical realities thereof; and then it considers the general manner of practicing – 
realizing – the project, referred here as crafting. Thus, pragmatic republicanism can be 
viewed as consisting of these four main elements, with constitutional crafting as the core 
term of constitution. To conceive constitutional crafting as a collective process geared 
toward a realistic vision of a good polity, proceeding in observance of three key thin-
normative principles, and always robustly grounded on its three basic empirical 
conditions – this is the challenge that pragmatic republicanism undertakes to tackle.   
It should be probably no wonder and easily acceptable that constitutional theory 
relates most closely with the republican tradition in political theory (pace Goodin 2003). 
All of the firmly established canon of republican thought, from Aristotle to Machiavelli 
(pace, now, McCormick 2003 on Machiavelli), to Montesquieu, to a score of English 
neo-Roman theorists (see Skinner 1998), to The Federalist Papers, to Burke, and de 
Tocqueville – some or another blend of these and other republicans adorn the pedestal of 
most important references in contemporary constitutional scholarship. The canon is of 
course not uniform, and all major and minor differenc s among them make up the 
decisive bases for allegiance of today’s constitutionalists to one or another great thinker. 
Thus, while the self-described republican constitutionalists of recent times have 
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particularly staked their arguments on Machiavelli, other politically-attuned 
constitutionalists have embraced, say, Aristotle, or Burke and de Tocqueville, and many 
theorists of more liberal leanings have found parentage in James Madison (in addition to, 
of course, John Locke, who has also been at times identified as republican). 
 This is not the place to discuss the differences among this canon, justification for 
such differentiations, and accuracy of republican identification of any in particular. (More 
on why such a discussion is unimportant for this project appears in Chapter Three.) 
Suffice it to state at this point that for the argument of this work and the ideas of 
republican kind it adopts, the long heritage of republicanism is in fact largely internally in 
agreement – their differences are not of the kind that can make or break republican 
thought. This position about a common “great tradition” of political theory in general, 
reportedly, was held with much conviction by Carl Friedrich, one of the earlier and more 
notable constitutionalists of the twentieth century, (see Germino 1979). There appears to 
be much to recommend in such an approach for a constitutional thinker: prioritization of 
the subject matter (constitution) and consideration f big themes, rather than 
preoccupation with fine details, wordings, and other exegetic material – these are best left 
for works on “the political thought of …”. 
 In its general outlines, republican thought (in the thoughts of Aristotle, 
Montesquieu, Burke, and de Tocqueville, among others) p esents the most compellingly 
rich, complete, and careful realization of the irreducibly political nature of the work of 
constitution. From a sober definition of constitution as a matter of collective public 
concern, to a disciplined concern for the realizable, possible constitutional perspective, to 
elaboration of a core of central norms and values of constitutionalism without being 
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dogmatic about them, and to strong emphasis on constitution being an ever-unfinished, 
ever uncertain project of public creativity, these thinkers make constitution unthinkable 
without its political-ness. It is on this central import of republican theory that the present 
proposition capitalizes.  
 Pragmatic republicanism, however, is not automatically ‘any republicanism’. In 
specifying it as pragmatic, the idea is to distinguish this proposition from a variety of 
recent versions of the theory that elicit very limit ng, stiffening, and ultimately disabling 
strictures. A prominent recent republicanism of this sort has been proposed by Philip 
Pettit (1999), (with its slight variations embraced by his collaborators such as Skinner 
1998, and Viroli 2002). Pettit’s republicanism is defined by a particular definition of 
freedom – as non-domination – as distinct from its two other previously enunciated kinds. 
It is in resentment of these inflexible, narrow theori s, often hostage to not wholly 
defensible definitions, that Robert Goodin offered a critique of what he called the 
“republican follies” (2003). That observed, Goodin is incorrect in throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater. Republican thought is, on the on hand, all of the different particular 
republicanisms taken together, and on the other hand, more than all of them. It is that 
broader republican idea to which pragmatic republicanism appeals. To underscore the 
nuance, it may be advisable to refer here to a republican ‘outlook’ or ‘perspective’ rather 
than ‘theory’.38   
Based on this broad reading of the republican perspective, as well as practice, it is 
possible to identify some of the key elements of what a good polity comprises today, to 
                                                
38 Pragmatic republicanism is, in part, to do just that undersco ing, for truly, ‘pragmatism’ cannot be a 
theory in a political sense – it can only be an approach, an outlook, a perspective. Charles Anderson 
relevantly writes: “when applied to politics, pragmatism needs liberalism if it is not to become a vague and 
indeterminate counsel, perhaps, in the end, a doctrine of sheer expediency” (Anderson 1990: 2).    
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construct a ‘sketch’ of a good polity, that is. To be stressed, these several elements are 
neither bound to a particular theory of constitution, nor claimed to be derived from some 
timeless and general metaphysic of good government. Rather, they are the key 
components of good polities that today’s political ivilization has elicited, and that are 
therefore realistic aspirations for the numerous self-declared republics to become ones.  
Five such key elements appear to constitute the corof a good polity, a republic, 
today: that it be committed to public good, maintai a mixed-regime government, 
embrace and defend social pluralism, uphold the principle of popular sovereignty, and 
nurture constitutional resilience. If a republic complies with all of these five criteria, then 
it would be identifiable as an established good polity. ‘Compliance’ here is of course a 
highly tenuous notion; as difficult as it is, however, it is the constituent public’s 
perception that ought to be the most important measur  of compliance. Such compliance 
is admittedly also not a constant: no constitutional order remains good once it is good, 
and none of the five criteria is ever secure by itself, or ‘self-enforcing’. The achievement 
of compliance and then the maintenance of a good polity are what the further, dynamic 
components of pragmatic republicanism address. The fiv elements are neither 
exhaustive (more attributes may be thought of), nor fully unambiguous. However, they 
are maintained here to be both necessary and sufficient for an envisioning of a possible 
good polity. Given the view of political constitution being proposed here, all of these 
claims are relevant: conception of a good polity cannot be exhaustive but can only be 
sufficient – only the actual constitutional process is able to fill out all remaining contents 
of a republic; such a conception does need to aim at identifying the minimum necessary 
contents of a republic; the minimally necessary criteria are themselves liable to be 
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conceptually ambiguous (or even, in this case, contested). Such ambiguity or contested-
ness, however, is itself a product of political practice and history, and can only be 
ultimately settled in the process of constitutional practice – and even then, always subject 
to revision. These five criteria effectively form the normative foundation (or telos) of 
political constitution – notably, a practical, empirically-derived normative foundation.  
Envisioning a desirable polity in terms of these criteria, a constitutional project 
must be concerned with three broad dynamic concerns: the normative, the empirical, and 
the practical elements of the task, all at once. The normative concern is effectively about 
dynamic normative orientations, or procedural norms, that would guide the practical 
constitutional project toward the envisioned sketch. Pragmatic republicanism proposes 
three key normative orientations that a project toward good polity would have to be 
guided by. Note: these are normative ‘orientations’, or procedures, and not substantive 
norms or values.39 First, the polity to be constituted will be one that aims at achieving and 
sustaining common (overlapping) goods of its public. The distinction of common or 
overlapping goods from the more familiar ‘common good’ is important: there is no 
presupposition of a unitary public all concerned with a singular common good (which, if 
taken up, inevitably ends up being a highly abstract notion), and there is an invitation, 
instead, to consider the possibility of a public sustaining amongst it a set of less abstract 
goods that need not all be shared by all with equal intensity at all times. This is, on the 
one hand, the realization of the ultimately politically decided nature of the goods, and 
therefore, on the other hand, the provision of a permanent opening for democratic 
political action.  
                                                




Second, the polity envisioned in a constitutional project will be centrally interested 
in preventing arbitrary use of political power, also referred to as the principle of political 
vigilance. This normative orientation (again, not a concrete value) encompasses a wide 
array of more commonly discussed themes, from limited government, to rule of law, to 
Pettit’s ‘freedom as non-domination’. Pragmatic republicanism asserts – with all 
constitutionalists – that a key threat to good polity is the abuse of the entrusted powers by 
those in government. Furthermore, it underscores that the opportunities for such abuse are 
many, and that, therefore, guarding against any instance of such dangers and attempts is a 
matter best left open for the daily life of the republic, not for a theory to predetermine. 
Equally importantly, this normative orientation leav s it open for the public to determine 
the levels of vigilance, the amount of power to be left with the government, and thereby, 
leave the chance that the limited government can, at the same time, be a strong one, not 
castrated. 
Third, pragmatic republicanism proposes that a well-constituted polity will adopt – 
and continually uphold and nurture – a political culture of moderation. Political 
moderation – again, a general public outlook – is an essential bulwark that enables a 
polity to survive, to steer clear of internal strife, of revolutionary instability, of 
intolerance. What kills a republic – and what has killed long-living stable republics in 
human history – is loss of a culture of moderation, allowance of excess in numerous 
respects of public life. Here, a pure logician would retort, that a moderate would need to 
be immoderate toward shows of immoderation – and the answer from pragmatic 
republicanism, which is a perspective suspicious of purely logical thinking in 
constitutionalism, is a yes: moderation will need to include the quality of ‘militantism’ to 
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be viable at all, (Soltan 2008a). These three thin-normative orientations are the sufficient 
(but may not be exhaustive) procedural principles to guide constitutional crafting toward 
the envisioned constitutional polity. They are, to be noted, not ephemeral, not fitted only 
for starting a constitution, but relevant and decisive indefinitely – just as any project of 
constitution is a long-term process lasting indefinitely – for they are also constitutive 
principles: they are not mere means to an end, but are hemselves part of that end being 
pursued.  
Moving on, pragmatic republicanism turns to what are called the basic empirical 
conditions of a constitutional project – the ‘site’, as it were, where the constitution is to 
be embarked upon. Again, three key categories are proposed as of central importance, 
without claim to being exhaustive. The most important of them – and for which the other 
two are definitive circumstances – is the category of constitutional capabilities. Human 
capabilities are many, of course, and the capabilities approach has recently been richly 
discussed in the wake of Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s works (see Nussbaum 
2010, bibliography). Here, constitutional or political capabilities (also referred to as civic 
capabilities) is a slightly different idea. Without the necessary civic constitutional 
capabilities found within a public, a particular constitutional vision is most likely to fail. 
Conversely, the constitution that will succeed will be the one most in agreement with 
extant capabilities – and the still better constitution is the one that realistically challenges 
those extant capabilities upwards. Thus, instead of capabilities being used as a measure of 
the success of a constitution or a policy, here, th capabilities are the category that makes 
a constitution or a policy realistic or fails it.  
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The second empirical condition is the context of a constitutional project. Civic 
capabilities are significantly (but not absolutely) shaped by the obtaining political 
context. While it is not an agency category, and is therefore not involved in the activity of 
constituting, context is quite literally the constitu onal site. Admittedly, it is a broad – 
and potentially way too broad – category. PR, it is here argued, need not spell out the 
strict limits of this category, but does need it to be highlighted nonetheless. A 
constitutional context may encompass issues of cultural context, socio-economic context, 
geopolitical context, and political-historic contex, to suggest a few. The point that can be 
clear from this, regardless of the breadth of ‘context’, is the situated-ness of a 
constitutional endeavor. Given that, therefore, a constitutional project may not granted-ly 
orient itself to some ‘universal’ goals, or Western-centric arrangements, or operate on 
assumptions that are valid for certain societies, or be guided by values and norms of great 
republics of history – all of these witnessed all too often. That observed, the 
constitutional context is not static – it is capable of, and inevitably does undergo, change; 
only at any given point, it is nonetheless a specific ontext, not just the same as anywhere 
else.  
The third empirical condition of constitution is tha  of continuity. Continuity is 
neither an agency category, nor a structural one; it is rather – for want of a better way of 
saying it – a dimension of political reality itself. Let us make several statements by way 
of building up to an explanation of what continuity means here. (1) A polity to be 
constituted never comes out of non-being – the public, the site, the society will have 
always preexisted, never a ‘clean board’ – and this means that, however dramatic a 
change, a constitutional project is still a continuation of a preexisting political life. (2) 
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The difference between evolution and revolution is one of degrees, not of kind. No 
revolution is ever a completely new start – in fact, strictly speaking, such a notion about 
political life is unimaginable at all. When a revolution takes place – be it in 1776 in 
America (see Levy 2009), 1789 in France (see Tocqueville’s Ancien Regime and the 
French Revolution), or on the Tahrir Square – what follows is a lifeto be continued on by 
a people who has lived before the fact, led by possibly new leaders who have lived and 
been formed before the fact, under institutions most of which will have preexisted the 
fact and will only gradually change from there on. (3) To say that any constitution is a 
continuation of preexisting social life is not to say that no change happens; it is also not 
to say that change is undesirable – far be it from this work. However, it is to say that a 
successful constitutional project must be keenly cognizant of the inescapable fact of 
continuity and be crafted in such a way that it aspire  to realistic, possible 
transformations, and not the impossible kinds.  
The continuity meant here, then, is not equivalent to ‘permanence’, but rather to 
‘uninterruptibility’: life does and can change, but it cannot be interrupted, taken from one 
track and put on another, as a toy train can be. Thus understood, continuity is consonant 
with the thrust of political conservatism, and specifically, with the Burke-an concept of 
constitutional inheritance (or “prescriptive constitution”), (see Burke 1987; see also 
Jacobsohn 2006), but only to a degree: they part ways here the conservatives embrace 
continuity as a normatively recommendable, substantive choice, and PR asserts the fact 
of continuity as a disciplining, inescapable empirical reality facing constitution without 
necessary normative import. For PR, continuity is es ential because a disregard for it – as 
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has been and continues to be seen around the world – leads to failures, setbacks, and at 
worst, to full reversals of the project. 
These three categories, referred here as the basic empirical conditions of continuity, 
are what PR argues make up the ‘construction site and material’: the constitutional 
project can only hope to succeed insofar as it adequat ly corresponds to the ‘site and 
material’. Not to overstretch the metaphor, let it be noted that both the site and the 
material here are capable of evolving, not static (or permanent). 
Having covered the normative orientations and the empirical conditions of 
constitution, pragmatic republicanism proceeds to discussing the manner of constituting, 
or the practical mode of it. And that is crafting. While the semantic and symbolic aspects 
of this term are to be taken up in its proper place, it may be now enough to say that 
constitutional crafting means a public’s engagement in practical political creativity – a 
process that is continuous, free from pre-scripted technique, open to learning while doing, 
and - all the while – purposive (in the sense of pragmatic – task- or problem-driven – as 
opposed to teleological or dogmatic). It is not exceedingly useful to belabor any 
definition of constitutional crafting. A more useful explanation of the concept will come 
by discussing actual examples of such activity, especially using the example of Norway 
(Chapter 5). For any specific constitutional project to be tried, crafting will feature an 
unpredictable amalgamation of particular experiences, xperiments, strategies and, 
definitely, mistakes that may not be possibly outlined in a work like this. While difficult 
and in this sense inadvisable to define constitutional crafting, it should be obvious and so 
recognized that of all four components of pragmatic republicanism – a vision, procedural 
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norms, basic conditions, and crafting – this last is he one most directly tantamount to 
constitutional activity, to constitution in its verb form.     
The four components of pragmatic republicanism make up a whole, which one 
might call a constitutional project, and they together in the way they have been specified, 
represent the political-ness of the constitution project. As is clear by now, no element of 
the above is strictly defined although each opens a particular perspective, or puts a 
particular emphasis. The logic – not a ‘pure’ but rather a simple and pragmatic logic – is 
that constituting a good polity takes place in the mode of collective crafting, where the 
thing being crafted is oriented through shared normative goals toward a realistic vision 
and is based on available empirical reality. Since it is a continuous project, all of these 
elements almost necessarily evolve – the goals evolv , the capabilities grow, the context 
changes, and crafting features ever evolving sets of activities and approaches. While the 
tone and some remarks above suggest that pragmatic republicanism is all about the 
beginning of constitutional projects, that is not necessary: all of the above applies with 
equal relevance to both the United States and the Kyrgyz Republic. Admittedly, however, 
constitutional problems are more pressing among the latt r type of cases, and so 
pragmatic republicanism is geared more toward them.  
This, in brief, is the outline of a particular conception of political constitution – 
pragmatic republicanism. In the relevant chapters blow (especially 4 and 5) that discuss 
all of the above in much greater length, attention will be drawn to explaining how 
pragmatic republicanism always maintains the political-ness of the constitutional 




TO conclude, good polity does not simply happen by itself – those that already exist 
were achieved and have been kept by people, and those at are yet to come will have to 
be achieved by people – under conditions not entirely chosen by themselves but whose 
favorable conjuncture is significantly dependent on them. The place of human agency in 
attainment of good polity is not erasable. Human agency itself, however, is neither an 
abstract nor a constant category. It is something that exists and is exercised in complex 
ways within a society, and a better term that conveys its socio-political situated-ness 
would be civic capabilities. Civic capabilities, being the term for agency of people who 
make up a political society and strive toward better governance in their midst, then 
suggest a historically and contextually situated an evolving category. Thus, the ambition 
of this work is to grasp the real and possible process of developing political societies, or 
good polities, by peoples given their circumstances and opportunities – an ever-prescient, 
complex, but not impossible task – what has been here d scribed as the constitutional 
predicament.    
This task, or predicament that the constituents face, is historical in the sense that 
Paul Pierson identifies in saying that “important aspects of social reality can best be 
comprehended as temporal processes. It is not the past per se but the unfoldi g of the 
processes over time that is theoretically central,” – and not just theoretically, one may 
add, (2000: 264, italic added). But whereas Pierson’s wise point about history is related 
to ‘path dependence’ and ‘increasing returns’ arguments that come out as overly stressing 
the self-entrenching and self-regenerating socio-political phenomena, the present work 
aims at locating human agency on that map of path dependent mechanisms. To go on 
with it, Pierson himself notes “a sensible and usefl challenge”, which is that “to many, 
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the significance of path dependence is belied by the evident dynamism of social life,” and 
responds essentially by saying that path dependence argument is not a determinist, 
categorical claim. Fair as that may be, the better rejoinder to that challenge, it seems, is to 
note the presence and (punctuated, maybe) effect of apabilities: after all, in any path-
dependent political process, there is still some degre  of capability, and depending on the 
degree of entrenchment of the path, the degree of salience of the concerned issue, and the 
level or strength of civic capabilities, ‘critical junctures’ or greater or lesser dynamism in 
a society are to be observed. That is the matter the present work proposes to discuss in 
































Avoiding Politics in Constitution 
 
As it is made obvious in the preceding pages, a proper political grasping of the 
problem of constitution is a highly methodologically unfriendly, inconvenient task. It is 
difficult to keep its entirety under control, let alone arriving at clear, testable causal 
propositions about it without analytically dissecting it into simpler and smaller parts – it 
is difficult to produce good science about political constitution, in the mainstream, 
positivist sense of ‘science’. The remedy to this stuation among constitutional 
scholarship, quite logically but very problematically, has often been apparently to avoid 
the political aspects of constitution.  
 This chapter is an extended discussion of the fourunsatisfactory approaches to 
answering the question of ‘how to constitute a good p litical order’ suggested in short 
stylized form in the Introduction. This is not an inquiry into the probable origins of the 
twilight of a political understanding of constitution in a historical sense – even though the 
argument is made, in the next chapter, that constitution was understood in a proper 
political sense by earlier constitutional thinkers traceable back at least to Aristotle, and 
including Tocqueville, Montesquieu, and Machiavelli, in particular. Instead, this is a 
discussion of several – four, without claiming this to be exhaustive – analytic ways of 
avoiding the encounter with the political in contemporary political theory of constitution. 
Let these four approaches be called the legal, the institutional, the philosophic, and the 
cultural versions of constitutionalism (LC, IC, PC, and CC, respectively).40 With this 
                                                
40 This ‘taxonomy’ is sui generis here, although somewhat comparable and at least partially corresponding 
conceptualizations can be seen in: Elkin (2006), Lutz (2000), McIlwain (1947), Jackson and Tushnet (1999: 
190). A rather different set of four meanings of constitution is suggested by Castiglione (1996).  
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kind of terminology, there is always a ‘want of a better way of saying it’, especially 
concerning the three less usual categories: by IC, what is primarily meant here is the 
tendency to focus on formal institutions and structures of government, while fully 
embracing the argument about the key place of institutions in general in any 
constitutional project (as in Elkin 2006); by PC, the focus is on ideal constitutional theory 
and not on any and all philosophy pertaining to constitutionalism (because, for example, 
Machiavelli’s is also a philosophy of constitution), and under CC, the point of interest is 
cultural essentialism which very often plagues discussions of culture in general (see 
Wedeen 2002); the important place of more dynamic conceptions of culture (as in 
‘cultivation’) in political constitution is, to the contrary, keenly recognized and stressed 
here. Thus, for want of better but un-cumbersome ways of saying them, these particular 
four names will need to be adopted. These nuances will be kept in sight as discussion of 
each unfolds below.     
 Identifying and critiquing the various un-political kinds of constitutional 
scholarship is not the core of the present work, but it has an important heuristic value: it 
leads to clarifying the concept of political constitution by discussing alternatives that 
have lacked the political in them. The eventual argument concerning these four foils is 
not that they are wrong and need be abandoned; rather, the argument is that they are 
unsatisfactory as stand-alone conceptions of constitution because they are severely partial 
treatments of the question. Political constitution s not put up to displace all others but 
rather to sketch the larger, more holistic constitutional canvass where all these alternative 
but partial approaches can fit if adequately revised – not as autonomous, self-sufficient 
views, but as integral and interdependent parts of he overall fabric of constitution. 
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 Thinking of the heuristic moment of this exercise raises one important 
observation that can now be mentioned, but will be eft for further discussion in the next 
chapter. The observation is that of the four variants listed here, legal constitutionalism 
has been rather well identified and has figured as the central foil in a number of recent 
works on political constitutionalism. There is a good suspicion here that in most of such 
works, legal constitutionalism has figured not only as a foil but also as a formative 
framework. The political constitutionalism defended in those works (e.g., Bellamy 2007, 
Thomas 2004, Griffith 1978) seems to be noticeably shaped by its very opposition to 
legal constitutionalism. If the suspicion is at allccurate, such a procedure had an 
unfortunate effect on those formulations of political constitution – the resulting 
conceptions were just as partial and narrow as the foil, only focusing on actors and 
processes slightly other than the ones held up by the legalists. In opposing legal 
constitutionalism, in other words, these authors seem to have had a problem much more 
with legal and much less, if at all, with constitution therein implicated.  
 The four distinct kinds of un-political constitutional approaches should help 
overcome the trap: by discussing the legalism, the formal-institutionalism, the 
philosophic idealism, and the essentialist culturalism of these approaches, the hope is 
ultimately to underscore the misunderstandings of constitution itself that they engender, 
both individually and collectively. In doing so, then, this exercise will help not only to 
note the variety of un-political constitutionalism but also to open up some previously 
proposed ideas of political constitutionalism to critique and revision. 
 Next, the four ways of eliding the political in constitution will be taken up one by 
one: their core ideas and concerns will be outlined with references to representative 
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literature. With each of them, of course, the claim is not that some author or group of 
scholars represent it in a pure form; nor is it the claim here that all four together exhaust 
the variety of un-political constitutional thinking. As already said, they are invoked here 
rather for heuristic purposes, not for a comprehensiv  diagnosis of the field of 
constitutional theory. Once each of the four has been outlined, their partly shared and 
partly distinct ways of avoiding the political will be discussed next.  
Legal Constitutionalism 
Legal constitutionalism is by far the most prominent – and for many, the only – 
problematic way in which constitution has been conceived (Bellamy 2007, Thomas 2004, 
Issacharoff 2004, Griffith 1978, Balme and Dowdle 2009). With major authors in this 
tradition including Friedrich Hayek, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Epstein, Frederick Shauer, 
and many more, legal constitutionalism may be said to be a negative constitutional 
variety (see Elkin 1993: 21ff): a perspective that prioritizes limitation of government 
power by encapsulating public life, and especially the capacities of government, within 
confines of law; or as Dworkin eloquently put it, by creating a Law’s Empire (Dworkin 
1986; see also Lowi 1969). Such limitation/encapsulation is made possible, for one, by 
adopting and entrenching a bill of rights or its equivalent, deriving those rights from the 
doctrine of natural right, for another, by elevating a constitutional court and its power of 
judicial review – staked on the promise of legal resoning – above more clearly political 
institutions of power, and for a third, by codifying all law and especially constitution 
itself into an (increasingly detailed) written Constitution (see Quint 2007). In all these 
ways, the overarching concern under legal constitutionalism is with making sure that the 
government does not overstep its limited territory, that the rights of citizens are 
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sacrosanct, and law – with its certainty, logic, predictability – maximally dominates over 
the uncertainties of the political sphere. In this view then constitution is essentially about 
law, and constitutionalism – about government by law.  
A number of more specific mechanisms and instruments are invoked to give this 
conception of constitutionalism life. Perhaps the most encompassing of such elements is 
the doctrine of rule of law (see Stimson 2008). As ambiguous as it is ambitious, the noble 
of maxim of “rule of law, not men” in public life is a difficult concept, which at every 
attempt of its disambiguation quickly tends to hit upon problems. Thus, Shklar’s 
objection in her critical essay on four contemporary ‘rule of law’ scholars (Hayek, 
Dworkin, Fuller, and Unger) is the various ways in which each has failed to account for 
the political-ness of the setting where rule of law is supposed to work (Shklar 1998, Ch. 
2). In a similar critique of ‘rule of law’ scholars, Elkin offers an interesting discussion – 
among others – of Friedrich Hayek’s contribution, critiquing it (and the work of his 
intellectual kin) as an attempt to override, or even to suppress, the more prior issues of  
democratic citizenry and political institutions, (Elkin 2006: 81-84). Not unimportantly, 
some recent republican theorists can be accounted among the rule of law camp. In their 
respective relevant works, Quentin Skinner (1998) and Philipp Pettit (1997) come to find 
the defining republican principle to be essentially the principle of rule of law. Pettit in 
particular is notable: for him, the distinctive republican conception of freedom as non-
domination, when imagined practically, is primarily f not exclusively a function of 
government (or rule) by law (1997). 
More practically, legal constitutionalism, anchored on the doctrine of rule of law, is 
particularly interested in two interrelated mechanisms: on the one hand, the reliance on a 
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constitutional court endowed with the power of judicial review, where the court plays the 
role of a constitutional gate-keeper by subjecting more political processes – especially 
ones produced in the legislature – to the scrutiny of legal reasoning that is itself guided by 
the standard of a written Constitution; on the other hand, the reliance on constitutionally 
entrenched – and therefore, not subject to further political debate – set of citizen rights. 
The logic of the former is captured in a critical passage from Elkin on American 
legalism:   
“the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are the custodians of legal 
reasoning and the law; the Constitution is a form of law, that is, the higher law; the 
courts in their exercise of legal reasoning are the custodians of interpretations of the 
Constitution; the Constitution defines the basic structure of the American regime; and 
thus the courts, again especially the Supreme Court, are the interpreter, and, given the 
relative open-endedness of much of the Constitution, the definer of that basic 
structure” (Elkin, ibid: 98). 
 
What results from such a logic (which is, of course, admittedly somewhat 
exaggerated for a succinct for formulation) is a noticeable diminution of the political side 
of constitution. In an argument sympathetic with Elkin’s, George Thomas argues for a 
need to revive the political constitution that Madison and colleagues had originally 
envisioned (Thomas 2004). This un-political aspect of legal constitutionalism is 
reinforced by the even more depoliticized doctrine of rights. Mary Anne Glendon (1991) 
and more recently Sonu Bedi (2009) offer critiques of LC:  on account of these legally 
defined and protected civil rights – and their unavoidable reliance on the judiciary for 
adjudication and enforcement. Still earlier, a criti ism of propositions for written and 
judicially enforced bills of rights, though on somewhat different grounds and in the 
context of British constitution, was made by J. A. G Griffith (1978). Griffith, not 
mincing words in his provocative essay, referred to the idea of codifying a bill of rights 
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as ‘nonsense of stilts’. On LC’s over-reliance on judicial review and ‘rights talk’, and a 
wide variety of other manifestations, Richard Bellamy offers a comprehensive critique 
based on the cases of US and, to lesser extent, UK constitutionalism (2007).  
While most of LC scholarship has focused on the American and British experiences 
(and a limited number of other cases), which by itself is a big part of its problems, the 
shortcomings of LC have not been missed on scholars interested in younger and therefore 
brittle constitutional attempts in other parts of the world. Samuel Issacharoff critically 
invokes legal constitutionalism in his discussion of problems attending the Dayton 
Accords settlement of the Bosnian conflict (2004); besides raising some of the same 
subjects as many scholars of Western constitutionalism, Issacharoff particularly notes the 
problems of reliance on a written constitution – and the Bosnian ‘Dayton Constitution’ 
has been a particularly notorious one – for a severely divided post-conflict society. In a 
bold if precarious attempt to talk about constitutionalism in China, the editors of a 
volume similarly raise concerns about the Western LC tradition that is singularly focused 
on “judicial power”, which they contend is an “actually incomplete” view of 
constitutionalism, (Balme 2009: 2). They express legal constitutionalism in a succinct 
syllogistic proposition similar to Elkin’s: “constitutions are phenomena that are regarded 
as laws; law is a phenomenon that is enforceable by courts; therefore constitutions must 
be phenomena that are enforced by courts; and therefor  constitutionalism is principally a 
product of judicial power,” (ibid). This conception f constitutionalism, the authors warn, 
“presumes a constitutional system that is already relatively mature”, and while possibly 
valid for cases like the United States, “it does not by itself provide an accurate description 
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of what happens in younger and more emergent constitutional cultures, like that of 
China” or Kyrgyzstan, (ibid).  
Such “younger and more emergent constitutional cultures” have much more to lose 
with a misleading conception of political constitution. Predictably, in most such cases 
courts have little, if at all, role to play in constitution and politics, so an excessive court-
reliance, except in corrupt ways, may not be a problem that applies to them. However, 
adopting the constitutional language of established polities, these ‘cultures’ insist 
nonetheless on seeing constitution as a matter primarily of getting the law right. 
Practically, that usually boils down to the written Constitution: the writing, adopting, 
amending, or replacing, of it. While some may see it as a “political paradox”, it seems 
rather very natural and predictable that “constitutions without constitutionalism” should 
arise aplenty when around the world constitutionalism becomes equated to the adoption 
of a written legal document, (see Okoth-Ogendo 1993). Precisely that has been the gist, 
and the tragedy, of Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional malaise: it has gone to seven national 
constitutional referenda, in addition to a few parliament-based constitutional changes, in 
the matter of twenty years. The opposition always demanded “constitutional reforms”, 
and the government – whichever happened to be in off ce – kept “responding” with 
“constitutional reforms” that only served its own pur oses. Thus, legal constitutionalism, 
to the extent that it was the guiding perspective on the challenge, became its own victim: 
the preoccupation with law in a narrow sense led to the ultimate corruption and hijacking 






If legal constitutionalism – in the narrow, problematic applications of it seen in 
Western scholarship and non-Western practice – doesn t work, formalistically-minded 
versions of institutionalism in constitutional scholarship fare no better. This second of the 
heuristic quartet refers rather narrowly to formal and positive institutional structures of a 
polity, and to “institutional design writ large” that Adrian Vermeule has pointed out 
(2007). A word of caution needs to be inserted here. Institutions, rightfully, lie at the core 
of any constitutional polity – and the very pointed arguments in Elkin (2006 and 2010) 
and Elkin and Soltan (1999) to this effect make the matter very clear as far as they go. 
Thus, when Elkin states that “[c]onstitutional theory is strongly institutional in focus” 
(2010: 224), that is very broad; saying “institutions are then simultaneously ends and 
means; … they are constitutive” (Elkin 2006: 111) gives some more direction, but is still 
rather open ended. Grasping the scope of institutions meant in his work, one requires to 
put it together with concern for capable citizenship (ibid: 83, 95) and the idea of public 
interest politics, and with “mores, virtues, social divisions and statesmanship” (Elkin 
2010: 224). Thus, within the vast and difficult language of institutionalism it is all too 
easy to dress up constitution in the skimpy but strait-jacket clothing of “official” and 
formal institutions.  
Harry Boyte resolves this complication rather lucidly, offering a more preferable 
way of understanding institutions: “Rather than seeing institutions as defined by 
structures, procedures, rules and regulations, the conventional way of looking at them, it 
was necessary to reconceive institutions as living a d dynamic communities, with norms, 
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values, leadership, and cultural identities,” (Boyte 2011: 94; italic in original).41 It is only 
understood in a manner like this that institutions can fully carry out their proper part in 
the project of political constitution. ‘Structures, procedures, rules and regulations’ are 
only meaningful and effective viewed as decisions ad outputs of institutions rightly 
understood. To give this understanding of institutions a firmer foothold, it is worthwhile 
to speak of a ‘capabilities institutionalism’ as contrasted to a proliferation of “new 
institutionalist theories” in recent political science.42 But our institutionalist 
constitutionalism (IC) pushes in the opposite direct on.       
It is when constitutionalism is understood (or defin d) as ‘limiting the power of 
government’, or limited government, that institutionalist constitutionalism is readily 
invoked. At its origin stands the doctrine of separation of powers, with its resulting 
mechanism of checks and balances that is commonly attributed to Montesquieu and most 
successfully contrived and put to work in the American constitution as understood 
through the Federalist Papers. Both the British and the American cases of separation of 
powers have, willy-nilly, worked out (but here, see, .g., Elkin 2009 and Levinson 2006) 
– and only because they worked could James McIlwain complain about the doctrine. 
“Among all modern fallacies that have obscured the true teachings of constitutional 
history, few are worse than the extreme doctrine of the separation of powers and the 
indiscriminate use of the phrase “checks and balances”. … Political balances have no 
institutional background whatever except in the imagin tions of closet philosophers like 
Montesquieu,” (McIlwain, 1947: 132). That is, only when separation of powers worked 
was it plausible for McIlwain to observe its “weakening” effect on gubernaculum (the 
                                                
41 Elkin’s (1993b) definition of a third aspect of institutions – as formative of civic character – is close to 
this understanding of institutions. 
42 A separate work in the form of an article on ‘capabilities institutionalism’ is in progress. 
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realm of the executive) vis-à-vis jurisdictio (the realm of law and adjudication) – the 
point of his complaint.  
The British separation of powers does not owe its working to Montesquieu; even 
the Publius cannot be quite fully credited for the success of the American case. But they 
were all superb constitutional thinkers – and that is why their names got so strongly 
attached to the idea of separation of powers, and checks and balances. Contemporary 
institutionalist constitutional scholars, alas, lack the abilities of Montesquieu and the 
Publius. McIlwain’s complaints about “the extreme doctrine” and “the indiscriminate 
use” may have only now become deserved if addressed to to ay’s culprits. 
Today, it is hardly possible to come across any voice arguing against separation of 
powers; it is a sine qua non of contemporary constitutionalism. Yet just as unqestioned 
its validity, so formalistic and positivist its application has become. Lacking the 
contextual depth of both Montesquieu and the American Founding Fathers, the issue has 
become just another item to be check-marked in the writing of constitutions. Thus, one 
can see an article that begins by equating constitutionalism to “[adopting] a written 
constitution” to go on to specify “three fundamental constitutional inquiries”: into human 
nature, into institutions of government, and into individual rights to be protected, (Epstein 
2011: 290 on)43. Epstein is a good representative of contemporary positivist optimism, as 
he proclaims that “conscious design … is a necessity, not an option”, and bravely puts the 
question thus: “…what institutional features a [written - mine] constitution can put into 
place – legislatures, executives, judges, administrat ve agencies – to help constrain the 
                                                
43 Not entirely coincidentally, one might note that Epstein’s three ‘inquiries’ quite closely correspond to our 
philosophical (PC), institutionalist (IC), and, a bit less obviously, legal-slash-essentialist cultural (LC/CC), 




manifest and pervasive imperfections in both the governed and the governors,” (ibid: 290 
and 291-2). The language of constitutional design and choice has indeed become 
ubiquitous among institutionalists. Thus, we witness the prominent debate about 
“constitutional design for divided societies” between Arend Lijphart and Donald 
Horowitz, (see Choudhry 2007: 15ff; O’Flynn 2007: 734-738 for brief reviews), where 
each proposes a competing alternative, focusing on electoral-representational systems, 
that should make the divided societies of the world - the Sunnis and Shiites of Iraq, the 
Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda, the Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia, the Pashtuns, 
Tajiks, and everyone else in Afghanistan – somehow able to share a workable 
constitutional system. 
Possibly the most troubling, if occasionally comical, is the prolific literature in 
comparative politics about choice of forms of government, and especially, one based on a 
parliamentary-presidential spectrum (see, e.g., Stepan and Skach 1993; Cheibub and 
Limongi 2002; Fish 2006). In a popular-scholarly article, one author scolded the 
Ukrainians for not knowing recent political science r search, which has already 
established parliamentary system to be the better choice for democracy, contrary to their 
stubborn insistence on variations of presidentialism (Umland 2010). The author proudly 
cites a rich variety of constitutional choice that comparativists have identified, including 
“super-presidentialism”, “semi-presidentialism”, “hig ly presidentialized semi-
presidentialism”, and maybe most ingenuously, “balanced presidential-prime ministerial 
semi-presidentialism,” (ibid).  
Given such ‘advice’ from political scientists, it is no wonder that strange and 
curious things happen in actual constitution-making. A memorable debate took place in 
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Kyrgyzstan following the March 2005 ‘Tulip revolution’ – the first of the recent two 
forced changes of government. The president, the parliament, political parties, and 
anyone else who cared, took sides on which choice would be best for Kyrgyzstan’s new 
constitution: presidentialism or parliamentarism. At one point, then-President Bakiyev 
tasked a working group to design (meaning “write up”) three drafts of a constitution: one 
with parliamentary, one with presidential, and one with a mixed system of government. 
That the experiment went nowhere need not be a surpri e. The same debate, however, 
took a more serious turn when following the second ‘revolution’ of April 2010 
Kyrgyzstan’s new interim leadership opted for a more parliamentary option. The many 
critics of the move included then-President Medvede of Russia who thought it would be 
a “catastrophe”, and the supporters included some in the US government who thought the 
move would usher in a viable democracy.  
The point here is not to unreasonably reject all such options,  but to ask the good 
“policy question” which is “whether one can stick any institutions into some particular 
conditions and expect that they would function in the same way as they have functioned 
elsewhere,” to quote Adam Przeworski (2004). The obverse of Przeworski’s question is 
equally important: whether a state is locked into its existing institutional system and no 
serious change is thinkable – as Medvedev’s opinion about Kyrgyzstan would suggest. 
The answer has to be somewhere in the middle, though s rely not a mathematically-
arrived middle: it must be that institutions are exportable to some degree, and that they 
are changeable and not permanent to some degree. Th question is where and how these 





The less explored member of our constitutional quartet, but again mostly 
problematic even in the limited scope of attention t  it, is cultural constitutionalism. 
When it is not conflated with ordinary ethno-nationalism, the cultural constitutionalist 
approach is usually an appendage to the primarily legal and institutional discussions, not 
a thing on its own. In such conventional constitutionalism parlance, cultural factors have 
been construed mostly in very essentialist, parochial, and primordialist ways. To remind 
of an earlier warning, it is precisely such essentialis , static notions of culture that are 
targeted here. Similar to the point about institutions, culture – as in 
constitutional/civic/political culture (or its more active kin, cultivation) – has a central 
place in constitution. But that potential – necessity, even – is cut short when culture is 
sold short for certain myopic, static ideas. In its problematic meanings, predictably, 
culture in the context of constitutional theory is liable to the same important criticism that 
the idea of civic culture, or political culture, was subjected to in political science in the 
wake of Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture: the liabilities of parochialism, 
ethnocentrism, determinism, and so on (see Sabetti 2007). A concept of culture that 
defines a society into a still-life – either homogeneous or heterogeneous [as might be 
applicable to multiculturalist as distinguished from inter-culturalist arguments (see Tully 
1995)]44 – once and forever in the most decisive aspects of that society is, indeed, neither 
accurate nor helpful for a political science, constitutional or not.     
                                                
44 The rhetoric about multiculturalism having failed by Angela Merkel and some others in recent times, 
much criticized in the media, can be seen as arising precisely from this problematic conception and 




Take the already noted essay by Donald Lutz (2000), where he defines a version of 
a constitutional triad, culture-power-justice. Of culture, he writes: “[the] term is here used 
in a more formal, anthropological sense to refer to a shared set of symbols, […], that is 
passed from generation to generation.” He goes on to say that “cultures” are “historically 
pre-political because they were used long before the creation of the formalized political 
systems of any type,” (128). Predictably, he suggests that “the cultural element is 
generally found in long preambles, opening declarations, and more recently in bills of 
rights. The definition of citizenship and/or characterization of who belongs to the people 
or nation … is also a fundamental expression of the cultural element,” (ibid). All of these 
quotes clearly indicate a very essentialist and reified meaning of culture: it is a body of 
fixed ideas and notions particular to a self-defining nation, unique and timeless. Similarly 
concrete, reifying cultural elements are found in modern constitutional preambles as 
discussed in a recent article by Sanford Levinson (2011), where he cites many examples 
from around the world, including Ireland, Pakistan, Poland, and South Africa, as he 
wonders whether preambles – the often overlooked or passingly regarded item – have a 
meaningful role. If all such attributes are what truly defines a constitutionally relevant 
meaning of culture, then it is a short step to arguin  that some cultures are unfit for 
constitutionalism (see Kedourie 1994), and other cultures, already luckily constitutional, 
are fixed so as to preclude constitutional development, evolution or change.  
A compelling critique of cultural constitutionalism is found in James Tully’s 
already mentioned book, A Strange Multiplicity (1995). Tully writes about the problems 
of cultural recognition, about the incapacity of reigning conceptions of what he calls 
‘imperial modern constitutionalism’ to recognize cultural diversity. Essentially, the 
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‘modern constitutionalism’ that Tully outlines and critiques – for its being anti-cultural – 
can be taken as an example of our cultural constitutionalism. It is an understanding of 
constitutionalism constructed after the image of European civilization’s historical 
development, from imperial times to today, expressible only in the language of that 
civilization, and therefore, only able to entertain ‘others’ insofar as they fit in its own 
world and language. While cultural recognition as such has not been resented in 
contemporary constitutional theories – after all, for example, Kymlicka’s [whom Tully 
mentions critically] multiculturalism is about the search for cultural recognition (e.g. 
Kymlicka 1996) – Tully objects to the essentializing, totalizing language of such theories. 
Modern constitutionalists operate on a “shared concept of identity” which comprises such 
concepts as “culture, citizen, society, community, association, nation or people”. “The 
concept of identity”, Tully objects in agreement wih post-modern critics, “… is unable to 
account for a crucial feature of contemporary identity: hat it is always different from 
itself, as well as from others,” (p. 45). Opposed to the problematic narratives of modern 
constitutionalism in regards of cultural diversity, Tully finds a living contemporary 
constitutionalism where cultural recognition takes place through an ongoing constitutive 
negotiation. He writes: “Constitutions are not fixed unchangeable agreements reached at 
some foundational moment, but chains of continual intercultural negotiations and 
agreements in accord with, and violation of the conventions of mutual recognition, 
continuity and consent, (183-4). Tully spells out in some detail how contemporary 
constitutionalism works in the actual constitutional world. One may have some 
reservations as to the validity of the somewhat overly optimistic depiction here by the 
author. However, the more important point about the problems of cultural essentialism in 
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political theory – and often in political practice, too – is made amply clear in this brilliant 
book.      
The world of constitutional practice, predictably, plentifully complements the 
failings of academics to articulate – and to locate within constitutions – a more workable 
and helpful conception of culture (but see Wedeen 2002; Jacobsohn 2006); problematic 
insertions of ‘cultural element’ into written constitu ions of course owe primarily to their 
authors: the drafting commissions, politicians, and mobilized groups of citizens, (for a 
recent difficult drafting occasion, see Barnett Rubin (2004) on “crafting a constitution for 
Afghanistan”). Kyrgyzstan provides some telling illustration. For example, a staunch 
opponent of the parliamentary form of government, prominent politician Adahan 
Madumarov made it a key argument of his party’s recent (2010) election campaign, that 
Kyrgyzstan needed a single ‘strong hand’ in the office of a president, a version of an 
‘oriental despotism’ argument; a similar point was often made by many pundits in Russia 
– rather literally wondering whether parliamentary rule befit an Asian society. The 
opposite side, on the other hand, appealed to similarly superficial cultural arguments that 
because the Kyrgyz in the past had a nomadic culture hat defied strong central 
authorities and featured a sort of warrior democracy, and because the Kyrgyz were 
traditionally organized along primordial tribal groups, parliamentary government could 
work much better than presidential rule. On the question of secularism, one side argued 
that secularism was a cornerstone of the universal culture of recognition and human 
rights and was properly spelled out in the Constitution, whereas the other side argued that 
it was an alien Western imposition upon the Islamic culture of Kyrgyzstan in which 
secularism has no place. And of course, as noted by constitutional scholars, the preamble 
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of the constitution was always a site of ‘culturalist’ contestations: the current version of 
the document, heeding to greater cultural sensitivity among its drafters, avoids openly 
Kyrgyz-centric declarations, whereas most of the older versions had very explicit 
references to ethnic Kyrgyz privilege. 
 
Philosophic Constitutionalism 
The last of the quartet of problematic constitutional approaches is philosophical 
constitutionalism (PC) – or ideal constitutionalism. While philosophical, or even ideal, 
constitutionalism is not a term seen anywhere before (at least by this author), the 
inclusion of it presently is warranted on several grounds. First, if constitutional thought 
had an origin ever, it is undoubtedly in political philosophy – it is too big an elephant in 
the room to be overlooked. Second, a number of critics of un-political constitutional 
thought have specifically taken issue with ideal phi osophic thought for its avoiding the 
political (e.g. Elkin 2006, 2010; Barber 1988; Mouffe 1993). Third, in considering it in 
relation to the other three culprits – and to political constitutionalism – PC cannot be 
included or subsumed under any of them. In fact, at a basic level, all of the preceding 
three conceptions of constitution owe to PC: some of the core underlying principles and 
logic behind all of them is the fruit of philosophical inquiries into constitutional issues. 
So, what is PC, and why is it problematic? 
This version of constitutional thinking is prima facie the least able of 
accommodating the messy political-ness of the matter: it is interested in the ideals of 
constitution. Instantiations of PC in both old and contemporary literature are numerous; 
they do not neatly fall under a single organizing lo ic and theme. What unites them all – 
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per definition of PC in the present work – is operation at a necessary (and very high) 
level of abstraction from the empirical life. PC is impossible without caveats such as 
ceteris paribus, assumptions such as equality and especially equal rationality mong all 
humans.  
Possibly the earliest known example of PC is The Republic of Plato. Socrates and 
his interlocutors, sitting in Piraeus near Athens i the period of the long Peloponnesian 
War, and arguing about the meaning and worth of justice, end up building a city in 
speech, an ideal republic where they could see justice and see why it was better to be just. 
The Republic is probably the clearest instance of an rchitectonic work, as Wolin 
describes Plato’s political philosophy, as distinguished from political thinkers who took 
political life more as a problem of management, manipulation, dealing with, e.g., 
Machiavelli (Wolin 2004: chapters on Plato and Machi velli, passim). That is, the work 
re-imagines the entirety of political life from A to Z, or, re-constitutes the society ‘from 
scratch’, as it were. For the ominous implications f the city in speech for actual social 
life, if ever imagined as so applicable, and especially for its effect on posterior political 
thought, Karl Popper counted Plato as the first of he enemies of open society (Popper 
1971). Popper’s conclusion may only be defensible on very circumscribed and slim 
grounds, and for the present purposes, Plato’s other important constitutional works, The 
Laws and The Statesman, for example, may be better choices to pick. The limited point 
here is only that The Republic, taken as it is, represents a very good instance of PC.  
Possibly the most important contemporary PC thinker is, predictably, the late John 
Rawls. Between his two most eminent works, A Theory of Justice and Political 
Liberalism, Rawls offers an impressive idea of political constitution – nearly as 
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architectonic as any work of earlier times. Without elaborating on Rawls’ overall project 
– given the plentiful supply of such literature by extremely more capable students (e.g. 
Barry 1973 on A Theory of Justice) – it may be excusable presently to simply indicate  
number of key elements of his constitutional thought – elements that are, of course, 
philosophic and are, ultimately, problematic for being incapable of accommodating the 
political. Such problems start from the very beginning – and here, of course, all 
contractarian theories join: Rawls’ original position and veil of ignorance resolve for him 
the inconveniences of ‘circumstances of politics’ (Bellamy 2007: 5). No such instruments 
are available to resolve such predicament for any aspiring (or mature) constitutionalists. 
From that moment, Rawls has almost irrevocably parted ways with the irreducible and 
unavoidable political-ness of constitution. The entir  rich constitutional vocabulary that 
Rawls subsequently works up – from the two principles of justice, to assumptions about 
the critical human capabilities, to overlapping conse sus, to the idea of public reason 
(and the curious notion of background culture), to deliberation and its exemplars, and 
numerous other fine concepts – all of them are destined to remain the thing of PC, and 
incapable of informing actual political constitution in any material, practical way. Given 
that Rawls maintained that his work was ‘political, not metaphysical’ (1985), this 
complaint against his monumental work is not entirely misplaced. A more thorough 
critique of ideal theory (of Rawls, mainly) from a constitutionalist perspective can be 
found in Elkin (2004).  
From a somewhat different – and somewhat unexpected – corner, Philip Pettit can 
also count as a contributor to PC also (after contributing to LC), albeit not his entire 
work. His signature conceptual achievement, the idea of freedom as non-domination, is 
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again the case in point (Pettit 1997). He offers a critique of two existing conceptions of 
freedom – non-interference (negative) and development (positive) – by use of some 
interesting examples (slaves and spouses) and referenc s to some close reading of various 
sources (e.g. Hobbes). In place of these problematic conceptions of freedom, he proposes 
the idea of non-domination – and elaborates it with similarly interesting fine work. At the 
end of this critique and construction, a constitutionally-minded reader (and Pettit is, of 
course, a highly constitutionally minded thinker) is left wandering how the fine 
differences actually play out in political life, towhat extent one kind of un-freedom is 
worse than another, and to what extent a general pub ic is likely to share along 
distinguishable lines particular conceptualizations of their freedom so as to 
correspondingly form their political attitudes and claims. Ultimately, it appears, Pettit’s 
fine work in this regard is largely of relevance for philosophers.   
 
Avoiding politics in constitutional theory 
All of the above approaches to thinking about constitution, in their different and 
shared ways, have avoided the necessarily political nature of the task. That is the 
problem. Law, institutions, culture, and values andnorms are not to be rejected as wrong 
themes for constitutional theory; in fact, they areguably all that constitutionalism is. A 
sound constitutional thinking will have all of these categories in the center of 
consideration.45 But there is a great difference between considering each and any of these 
                                                
45 Bringing all of these categories together is obviously not easy; these dense lines are some indication: 
“[Constitutional theory’s] strong institutional focus includes the politics that are given form by the 
workings of institutions including those that animate it, surround it, and operate within it. But constitutional 
theory cannot solely be concerned with institutions if it is to meet its obligations to provide guidance for the 
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categories discretely, as definite, clear, and constant concepts, and considering them all as 
partaking in a comprehensive political process that is constitution. The prevailing 
constitutional scholarship in the four described pers ctives is clearly more identifiable 
with the former, more problematic approach.    
All of the four approaches seriously overlook the dynamic factor of civic 
capabilities. If there is any implicit – and therein, idealized – capability being assumed in 
any of these four perspectives, it will have to be a capability to strictly and uniformly 
obey the structural and regulatory arrangements that the theory proposes. Admission of 
the productive, creative, resisting, critical and other more active aspects of civic 
capabilities will inevitably render the theories uns stainable. This disregard for 
capabilities may as well be no wonder since the greate  part of contemporary 
constitutional thought – especially LC and IC – is guided by the interest in taming human 
behavior, be it in terms of ‘limiting the government’ or producing of ‘law-obeying 
citizens’. The problem is that the desired outcome of these theories is only achieved by 
assuming the problem away. Capabilities, of course, ar  not all positive and conducive to 
constitutional order, and taming – or better said, cultivating and ‘ennobling’ – their 
negative effects into positive ones is a key concer of constitution; only doing so requires 
working from that messy reality of capabilities, not past or arund it. 
To the emphasis on civic capabilities, it may be retort d that the more 
constitutionally urgent ‘capability’ is usually called power, by which it is usually meant 
                                                                                                                                      
creation and maintenance of good regimes and related matters. It must also concern itself at a minimum 
with mores, virtues, social divisions, and statesmanship. The institutions that are constitutional theory’s 
principal concern are ones directly involved in lawmaking. In good regimes, law forms much of the 





competitive elite power, and when such elite power is housed in an office, then it often 
turns to coercive power. Hence, it may be further remarked, that it is more appropriate to 
speak about ‘taming’ of power, of ‘limiting governmental power’, or the power of those 
who attain governmental authority, rather than about an unspecific, nebulous notion of 
civic capabilities. After all, in its so many varieties, both obvious and latent, it is power 
that both enables political life and at the same time endangers and corrupts it, it may be 
asserted with reference to numerous literature.46  
The answer to these retorts might be simply ‘but, of course!’. Of course, power is 
the cornerstone and most ubiquitous problem of constitution. But precisely because of its 
ubiquity, and if more narrowly conceived, then also because of its reductionism, the 
concept of power can too often lead to foreclosing a y further discussion. Because it is 
such a ubiquitous phenomenon, it ends up reducing the purview of a political thinker, 
subsuming everything else about social life under it. The concept of civic capabilities 
includes in it the meanings assigned to the concept of ower, but it also situates power in 
agency (of citizens) instead of leaving it in the abstract, conveys the idea of its variability 
more clearly, lacks the same ‘predatory’ effect on the universe of social life that the 
concept of power enjoys, and plainly, does not bear the same stultifying intellectual 
baggage that the concept of power has built up in modern times. If power has come to 
stand for ‘what is’ for the realists of various branches, then capabilities stands not only 
for what is but also for what can be (but not for ‘what ought to be’, to avoid a likely 
                                                
46 The literature is indeed vast, although some of the most common references would include C. Wright 
Mills (e.g. 1956), Michel Foucault (1980), and further back, Nietzsche, Weber, and Marx. A good 
argument, complete with a helpful mapping of the lit rature, is still Steven Lukes’s Power: A Radical View, 
(2005).        
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confusion). Therefore, for thinking constitutionally, civic capabilities is a more preferable 
concept, by including the idea of power but avoiding the pitfalls of the concept of power.           
In all four of the approaches, there is also a noticeable lack of appreciation of the 
empirical continuity of political life – that is, the fact that no arrangement of political life 
is ever ‘once and for all’ but is always subject to revision or reaffirmation because no 
agreement in political life, with its infinite and even inscrutable plurality of agents and 
factors, is ever quite fixed. Recognition of this knd of continuity would require viewing 
political life as analytically very uncertain, resistant to proposition of clear and logical 
causal (or correlational) statements about it. Continuity – understood not as permanence 
but as (flexible) uninterrupted-ness – is a key elem nt obligatory for any analysis of 
political life, and hence, for any constitutional discussion. 
Not least, these four approaches in their varying ways also tend to disregard 
constitutional context, or the situated-ness of anyconstitutional project. The truth is, of 
course, that these apparently universalist theories ar  themselves products of situated 
constitutional experience – be it that of the United States, Western Europe, or the ancient 
Rome. Where CC may be one approach seemingly most determined by contextual 
fidelity, that is not quite correct. If anything, the criticism of James Tully against certain 
multiculturalist theories is in large part a criticism of de-contextualized ‘imperial 
constitutional’ thinking. Contextual awareness in a constitutional manner is one that 
admits both the situated-ness and the openness to change within political continuity. 
Cultural essentialism, therefore, is no equivalent of contextual awareness but quite the 
opposite of it. 
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Thus, all of these four constitutional approaches, in their somewhat differing ways, 
have taken the political-ness of constitution out of he picture by disregarding some key 
empirical properties of constitution. This disregard could not be compensated by stronger 
normative and theoretical argumentations or large-n comparative studies. As has been 
remarked earlier in the introduction, constitutionally speaking, theoretical precision and 
elaborate philosophical argument may be quite the wrong kinds of emphases. The much 
greater and more urgent concern is with the dynamics of constituting, because that is 
where the political nature of the predicament lies, and that is also the only way 
constitution is realized. Almost any piece of writing on constitutional matters in the 
manner of any of our four perspectives tends to make for a very clear, very logical, 
precise and fine reading. The problem is that the nature of the subject matter – political 
constitution – does not lend itself to such elegance unless accuracy is compromised (see 
Salkever 1999).     
This outcome – of avoiding the political-ness of constitution – could be explained 
rather simply (or complicatedly, maybe) by the very standards of contemporary social 
science, and political science in particular. As Elkin has argued, constitutional theory is a 
different kind of a subject requiring, essentially, its own disciplinary kind: it cannot be 
dealt with simply as one theme among others within existing disciplines 
(compartmentalized and specialized as they are) of social sciences or law, (see, e.g., Elkin 
2010; see also Gibson 2011: 126-127).  As has been not d earlier, political constitution as 
defended herein defies some of the central tenets of ‘go d science’; it cannot be done in 
compliance with them (Elkin 2010: 224). Any question of political sort, constitutional or 
not, can only be addressed with the political placed in the center of discussion.  
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 Over the years, a number of critical works have come out concerning the deficit 
of appreciation of the political and politics for what it is. In a classic essay in APSR, 
Sheldon Wolin spoke in criticism of political science for prioritizing method over 
substantive issues, which he argued led to eventual insulation of the discipline from 
actual political life, to stultification of imaginative thought among growing conscripts to 
the profession, (Wolin 1969), and later, to fashioning a democracy in its own image 
(Wolin 1996). At about the same time, from a rather different direction, a no less famous 
essay by Michael Oakeshott attacked what he called ‘rationalism’ in politics – a 
‘technique’ of thinking about politics based on strict and sterile rational logic, (Oakeshott 
1991).47 Yet another call for restoring politics to its proer meaning came a bit later from 
Bernard Crick, who argued – anchored generally in the climate of British politics – that a 
number of themes, or rather, ideological ‘-isms’ rooted in various philosophic arguments, 
had eclipsed the real core of what politics was, which, in his view, had a right to 
independent recognition (effectively, Crick’s politics amounted to a form of republican 
political theory and practice), (Crick 1993). Benjamin Barber, in his turn, came out with a 
rather polemical – but eloquent as usual – outcry against ‘the conquest of politics’ by a 
series of major liberal political philosophers and theorists, where his objection was 
particularly against the liberal theorists’ prizing of theoretical [philosophical] certainty – 
about a world of politics that, if anything, was uncertain, (Barber 1988). To end this 
listing with (without exhausting such examples), one might mention the work of Chantal 
Mouffe, whose line of argument is somewhat similar to Barber’s, although she comes 
                                                
47 For an illuminating and brief discussion of agreemnt between Wolin and Oakeshott, see Aryeh 
Botwinnick, “Wolin and Oakeshott: Similarity in Difference”, (2001). 
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from (and goes to) a different political-theoretic agenda, that of inspiring a radical 
democratic left, (e.g., Mouffe 1993 and 1996).  
 All of the above critical takes on un-political political science and theory can be 
confronted for exaggerations, superficial treatment of their foils, reliance on the all-
purpose and reductionist concepts of power as discussed above, and other faults, and such 
criticisms against them have come out in no short supply. But even taken with 
precautions, these numerous works by some of the notable but very diverse members of 
political science do suggest serious problems with the discipline’s ability to grapple with 
the political. The variety of recent constitutional political scholarship discussed above is 
all fair targets for these critics. 
 Insofar as a political theory or theorist takes upa political problem of 
constitutional level, the claim is automatically made to say something of relevance about 
the political life as it is, the life that inexorably proceeds in its circumstances, with its 
public, within an unstoppable practical time. If no such claim is implied, then it would be 
a curious thing that such an issue was taken up at all. Thus, our theorist consciously 
positions herself in the midst of political life. What she faces there is a common life of 
human beings who have existed in the permanent mode of managing that commonality: 
managing their internal disagreements, sometimes resolving them and sometimes failing 
– and then, sometimes, undergoing grave consequences; sharing common language and 
understandings, ever updating their vocabulary and concepts but never all of them 
equally succeeding in keeping up; admitting varying degrees and forms of inequality 
among them, but debating on legitimate and non-legitimate inequality, explicitly or 
implicitly; claiming privileges and accepting responsibilities – but never in a single voice 
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on either; coping with challenges from without, be they economic, geopolitical, or 
ecological; and all the while, with widely varying success rates, aiming at improving their 
lives. That is, our theorist faces a highly uneven t rrain of social relations, where the 
public manages their life to the extent of their ever-evolving and always uneven 
capabilities.  
No simple formula is thinkable to seriously affect the nature or quality of this 
common life. A law, cleverly written and proposed by our theorist, has no guarantee of 
flying high. A nice institutional structure of government by our theorist has no guarantee 
of working as she thinks it will. A scheme for accommodating multiple identities within 
the society, no matter how elaborate, has no insurace of being adopted or even 
understood by the public. And the most comprehensiv and likable value or procedure 
has no guarantee of ever touching ground in that society.48What our theorist, to be 
relevant to this common human life, needs to do first and foremost is comprehend this 
life as it is with all its perplexing messiness, resisting the urge to operationalize it into 
methodologically and logically neat categories. She will then recognize that all of the 
members of this society have agency – at widely varying levels, with widely varying 
activity, and able of widely varying kinds of organization and atomization. Her 
theoretical insight, to be able to communicate to this society, will have to gauge the ways 
in which that elusive but ever-present civic agency can be capitalized upon and organized 
for the various possible causes that the society takes up – and our theorist will keep her 
distance from closed-ended, definite, predetermined propositions on how that civic 
agency might work. In other words, her theory would then account for the political-ness 
                                                
48 For alternative - surely more interesting – fables, see Lon Fuller’s story of King Rex (1969), or 
Oakeshott’s examples of learning to cook from a cookb k (1991a and 1991b). 
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of the life and aspirations of the given society. The suspicion is that all of the above un-
political theorists of constitution have tended to fall far short of these lines.  
Now, it is of no little importance that with all their shortfall on account of politics, 
the copious un-political constitutional works have actually been produced and continue to 
thrive. As it were, if the market is still buying the stuff, then the good being supplied 
ought to be quite good. Without venturing deep intothe logics of markets and academia, 
the point here is to return to an observation hinted at a few times above. It concerns the 
nuance of talking about constitution in regards to not-yet-constitutional polities, as 
opposed to discussing societies such as the United States, the United Kingdom and a few 
others. A great bulk of recent constitutional scholarship applies to the latter. 
When constitutionalism is working, it might be safe to say, it is working regardless 
of what the many theorists argue about the reasons for its working – or the reasons for its 
minor hiccups. With the stable constitutional order in the United States for some two 
hundred years, it is of no practical import whether one explains it by the agency of the 
Supreme Court through its interpretation of the Constitution, or by the particular system 
of checks and balances contrived by Founding Fathers, or by the high ideals of life, 
liberty, and justice that the country believes stand as her core philosophy, or by the 
particular American culture – the ‘melting pot’ of generally tolerant multiplicity of 
hyphenated identity groups (as per Walzer 1999) began by the English Puritans (who, of 
course, had arrived into an empty house politely vacated for their arrival). American 
constitutionalism, by and large, is not affected by the various theories about it; it is 
certainly not going to collapse because a theorist de cribes it the wrong way. This is, 
obviously, not to say that any theory is just as good – it is only to say that the faultiness 
94 
 
of a theory is much harder to detect. This just could be why the rather un-political 
theories of constitutionalism continue to sell in this and similar markets. 
The worth of a constitutional theory, therefore, is best tested upon cases of societies 
that are not yet constitutional but are aspiring to it. How does constitution begin? How 
does it persist on course against all odds of its early age? What are the ingredients – 
necessary and sufficient – to see a constitutional project take off? These are difficult 
questions to answer. In a recent book, Andreas Kalyvas addresses a comparable problem, 
that of democracy in extraordinary times (Kalyvas 2008) – he finds a dearth of literature 
on the working of democracy in times of crisis, following a revolution, and other 
extraordinary periods: the literature is too consumed with democracy’s normal times. The 
point about constitutional scholarship here is the same. But while suggesting a helpful 
analogy, Kalyvas’s argument should also be taken cautiously. Be it about democracy, or 
about constitution, such periodization can mislead. Distinguishing between extraordinary 
and ordinary times, or constitutional and normal politics, as Bruce Ackerman has done 
(1991), may suggest that political life is like driving a ‘stick shift’. Metaphor of an 
‘automatic shift’ can be just as accurate about politica  life – the problem is not about the 
mechanics, it is about the skills of driving – which are tested the best when the engine is 
just started, on rough roads, at tight parking spaces, and on stopping. To get back to the 
question: it is not that a different sort of constitutional theory is needed for young 
constitutionalizing societies – it is only that a good theory needs to account for 
constitution’s young age (because, turning back to cars, every once in a while any 
constitution – if it is one – will need to go through rough roads, stop signs, and restarts). 
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Thus, to conclude, the challenge is to bring politics back into constitutional thought. 
LC, IC, CC, and PC, it has been argued, have generally avoided politics, and thus, have 
punted that challenge away. But the challenge is still greater than just that: not only how 
to bring politics back in, but in elaborating a political form of constitutional 
understanding, how not to punt away law, institutions, ideas, and identity/culture. This is 






































Restoring Politics in Constitution 
 
The task that must be met by constitutional scholarship, then, is to bring politics 
back into constitution. It would of course have been noticed that political 
constitutionalism was omitted from among the four kinds of constitutional thought 
identified above. Or, rather more accurately, it will have been understood that this is a 
separate matter for discussion. And it really is. What this chapter aims to accomplish is 
an ambitious three-part task. First, it will discuss the problems attending the already 
mentioned growing literature about political constitutionalism; second, it will turn to two 
contemporary schools of constitutional thought – and briefly, to some of their roots in 
earlier thinkers – to derive, as it were, a language for a different, more appropriate 
conception of political constitution, and third, it will conclude by elaborating and 
restating more fully – informed by the first two actions – what a better, more acceptable 
conception of political constitution would be. 
 To begin with, a small but potentially important distinction needs to be made. 
There is a difference between constitution and constitutionalism, and when one or 
another is used with any consistency, it is used so for a reason. Dario Castiglione prefaces 
his essay with attention to this difference; he defines “the constitution as a political 
concept, constitutionalism as an ideological construction”, (Castiglione 1996: 417). Here, 
it is the former that is of greater interest, and where Castiglione takes it for granted that 
constitution is a political concept, it is clear from the above chapter that ‘political 
constitution’ may be needed to stress the import intended here over LC, IC, PC, and CC. 
By political constitution here is meant that broadly creative political activity which is 
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tantamount to ‘constituting a polity’. Hence, this is more of a generic concept than part of 
a specific theoretical argument on a par with the above four approaches. Ultimately, as 
remarked above, political constitution will need to be conceived as that broader and more 
accurate idea of constitution that combines the central categories of LC, IC, PC, and CC 
in a comprehensive, holistic account of the activity of constituting.     
 
Some problems in recent political constitutionalism  
 The fact that political constitutionalism (Bellamy 2007), or ‘the political 
constitution’ (Griffith 1978; Thomas 2004), has been taken up and defended in a growing 
body of work is a good beginning. What they have argued, in a broad brush, is that 
constitutionalism depends for its maintenance and fu ctioning not so much on formal law 
and its enforcing institutions of judiciary, but on the political battles that are fought 
continuously by the several branches of power, by the political parties behind them, and 
by the democratic citizens behind the parties and other political organizations. This 
reorientation takes constitutionalism into the midst of active, dynamic political life as it is 
conventionally known, and with good justification. However, this is only a partial 
correction, and in terms of the concerns of the present work – no more than a good 
beginning. 
 The first – less pronounced – problem already indicated above is the implication 
of political constitutionalists that, effectively, law is not where constitutionalism resides. 
As was suggested, this implication would be the logical outgrowth of the dichotomy that 
these authors have created between political and legal constitutionalism. Denying the 
Supreme Court, judicial review, or bill of rights, or even judicial interpretation as a form 
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of constitutional reasoning, their place and role within a constitutional artifice is equal to, 
essentially, cutting a part of actually existing and functioning constitutionalism out (cf. 
Walen 2009). That seems to be effectively the upshot of a somewhat earlier essay by J. 
A. G. Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1978). The better stance to take concerning 
these matters, it seems, would be to consider the ways in which the political aspects of 
constitutionalism are able to inform them and not be superseded by them in a systematic 
way. 
 A second related problem – practically, the other side of the first – detectable 
within the present setup is that in opposing the legalism of LC, too often political 
constitutionalist thinking ends up in the swamps of IC, PC, and CC – all at once or some 
at a time. Insofar as political rivalries and balances are invoked – in most of political 
constitutionalist work – let alone elections and party systems more specifically, the 
tendency would be toward institutional constitutionalism (IC) as identified above: 
examples of that would be Bellamy, Thomas, Whittingo , etc. Alternatively, some anti-
legalist thrusts may lead our colleagues in philosophic constitutionalist territory – an 
example, again, is Bellamy’s central constitutional orm of ‘non-domination’ (off of 
Pettit), and procedure of ‘public reason’ (off of Rawls and others). Of course, invoking 
institutions or values or identities is not a problem by itself; rather, it is suggestive of a 
problem of identifying the problem: is it the legalism (its positive manifestations) of LC 
that is the problem, or is it the particular understanding of constitution that legalism 
engenders that is the problem? When the ‘solutions’ ffered to LC’s problems seem too 




 The third problem in political constitutionalism – flowing from the first two but 
more important – is the narrowness of the space and sites allotted to politics. A 
particularly obvious example is seen in George Thomas’s interesting piece, entitled 
“Recovering the Political Constitution” (2004): as the definite article “the” readily 
suggests, the essay is indeed about a particular constitution, and moreover, it as about 
“the Constitution” of the United States. The author provides an enlightening argument on 
Madison’s original vision about contriving a Constitution where not the Court but politics 
would be ‘interpreting’ the balances of power within government. But, for all that the 
lofty reference to ‘the political constitution’ may suggest, Thomas never leaves “the 
Constitution”. He concludes the essay: “To see the Constitution in a more political light 
is to recover a more traditional understanding of cnstitution; it is to see how our 
Constitution constitutes our life…” and so on. A political constitution that is envisioned 
strictly within the scope of a capitalized Constitution – one that, moreover, is thought to 
“constitute our life”- is a problematically narrow conception.  
 Not being a subject of the American Constitution – but of one that is difficult to 
refer to as “the Constitution” – Richard Bellamy does not operate much with capital 
letters. However, his book Political Constitutionalism (2007) is built on a concept of 
politics that is also rather narrowly construed. The four senses in which he uses the 
political are: 
- “First, a constitution offers a response to […] ‘the circumstances of politics’. 
… [T]he constitution cannot be treated as a basic law or norm. Rather, it offers a basic 
framework for resolving our disagreements… 
- “Second, the constitution is identified with the political rather than the legal 
system, and in particular with the ways political power is organized and divided. 
- “Third, it draws on work in the field of public law political science, […], and 
sees law as functioning as politically as democrati politics,”(sic), and, 
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- “Finally, it offers a normative account of the democratic political system. In 
particular, it shows how real democratic processes work in normatively attractive ways so 
as to produce the constitutional goods of a respect for rights and the rule of law by 
ensuring legislation is framed in ways that treat all as equals,” (Bellamy, ibid: 5). 
 
In this definition, the focus is incessantly drawn upon a limited space (normally 
found in the centers of capital cities of nation-states, geographically speaking): on the 
organized, institutionalized processes of political debate, on the overall design of political 
institutions themselves, on the political functioning of the law, and on political impact on 
legislation. This is an instance of what was taken up a few pages above – the reductionist 
and limiting effect of the concept power; to be sure, the concept has a central place in 
Bellamy’s work. For this conception of the political to be the exclusive content of 
constitutionalism, much of public life that leads up to it will have to be left outside the 
door. The daily life of the citizenry as adult person  – with their non-constitutional 
disputes, contracts, and commitments, the numerous way  of civic communion – upon 
professional, religious, and other interests, and the very varied – often not directly 
constitutional in Bellamy-an sense – ways of civic political education, or cultivation, will 
need to be accounted for outside his political constitutionalism. Bellamy’s two defining 
procedures of political constitutionalism – public reason and balance of power – further 
reinforce this sense of a rather elevated and exclusive conception of the political. Yet, in 
order for political constitutionalism thus defined to function, there needs to grow up a 
constitutionally capable public to inhabit and fulfill the above senses of the political – it 
needs to come from somewhere, and the political must include that ‘somewhere’, too.  
 On this point, a startlingly open-ended assertion about political constitution by 
Griffith is of interest. He writes: “The constitution of the United Kingdom lives on, 
changing from day to day for the constitution is no m re and no less than what happens. 
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Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened that would be 
constitutional also,” (Griffith 1978: 19). The literal relevance of this statement presently 
is to suggest, to Bellamy, that apparently much more space asks to be included than his 
four-part delimitation of the political in constitutionalism. 
But, for all its hilariousness and witty remarks, Griffith’s argument cannot be 
bought wholesale. He writes the above statement to drive home “a highly positivist view 
of the constitution” (ibid), by which he means that the way the society is governed – or 
constituted – with all its working laws, compelling values, and effective distribution of 
rights and duties, is no more and no less than a result of the obtaining balance of political 
power held by competing groups of political agents. No moral or other claim, but the 
simple and naked power of competing interests is what explains a constitutional 
conjuncture any day – and if the conjuncture changes th  next day, that would be because 
the balance of power tilted.49  
Griffith’s radically positivist view comes close tocynicism, if not irresponsibility. 
Constitution might be “what happens”, but constitutionalism as such is all about 
managing the options of what can happen any day. To foll w Griffith liberally, one 
would find rather unpleasant constitutions in ‘late century Africa’, as discussed in Bates 
(2008). So, while constitution may be whatever happens, such an observation cannot be 
where a constitutional thinker can afford to stop. Be it through promulgation and 
propaganda of some civic and human rights – which Griffith denounces as ‘nonsense on 
stilts’ – or by more politically-attuned civic education and cultivation, or any other 
manner, constitution needs to also elicit a formative process on which it can then rely: the 
                                                
49 For a more generous reading of Griffith’s article, suggesting the author makes a disguised normative 




“whatever” cannot be anti-constitutional, destructive, or unsustainable – because then, 
there is no more constitutionalism to speak of. Again, such a thing might be safe to utter 
in the United Kingdom – which must have been the grounds for Griffith to say it; it 
would not be a safe proposition in numerous other places. 
Griffith’s remarks lead to the fourth and last concern about political constitutionalist 
literature – and it is about the definitive mode attributed to politics: that of conflict, or 
antagonism, or struggles for power. Of course, the most radical of the theorists of this 
kind of the political was Carl Schmitt (2009): for him, unless one was talking about an 
enemy-friend relationship, one was not talking about a political relationship at all. 
Cooperation, co-creation, agreement, co-development – such notions were for him simply 
not political. Chantal Mouffe, in her rally for reinserting the political into democratic 
theory, gets some of her toolkit from Schmitt (e.g., Mouffe 1993: 2-3); despite 
underscoring that for her, not enmity but adversity is the defining moment of politics, the 
difference is only of degrees, and tenuous at that. 
The political constitutionalist scholarship reveals  comparable tendency to define 
politics by antagonism, cycles of power struggle and conflict – albeit, without any thanks 
to Schmitt. That, obviously, is precisely how Griffith understands political constitution. 
The same understanding of politics – sometimes less starkly, as ‘competition’ rather than 
‘conflict’ – attends the political constitutionalism of Bellamy (see esp. Bellamy 2010), 
Thomas, and others. If constitution is to be always staked out through conflict, 
antagonism, and at mildest through competition, andif cooperation, community, co-
learning, and sharing are somehow not constitutive, hen Griffith’s suggestion (op. cit.: 1) 
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that constitution had too often been understood as a form of equilibrium would be quite 
on target – and that equilibrium would be a highly tentative and un-enjoyable one.     
To sum, the important point that these conceptions verlook – as heartening and 
encompassing as they are – is that any conception of political constitutionalism has to 
rely on some pre-existing, stable and generally workable ‘background culture’, to borrow 
from Rawls. But, pace Rawls, that background culture cannot be bracketed out of the 
most decisive spheres of political constitution – only by encompassing that wider range 
of public sphere can political constitution be complete. If the narrow meanings of the 
political as listed above continue to apply, then for safe operation of these conceptions 
one has to assume a society much like those of the Unit d States, Britain, and a number 
of other old Western polities. Some may call these conceptions too narrow; some may 
call them parochial. What is needed is a conception of political constitution that can 
address itself to a much wider world, a much longer range of history, and – practically – 
apply to cases beyond those that are already stable constitutional orders. And for that, it 
has to be political in a fuller sense.  
 
THUS, ‘the political’ found in most of political constitutionalism is unsatisfactory, 
and the concept needs to be revised. The previous chapter set the beginning of this work: 
it expanded the range of foils that a political coneption of constitution must face. 
Without claiming to have exhausted all thinkable foils, it has discussed at least three 
more besides legal constitutionalism: ideal, institutional, and (essentialist) cultural. While 
interrelated at some levels and on some themes, all of these are different claims – from 
each other and from legalism. With them, a renewed political conception of constitution 
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has a much wider front to cover, and hence, needs itself to come out much wider in 
scope.  
A good starting point is to adopt Sheldon Wolin’s (unelaborated enough, alas) 
definition of the political as synonymous with “common”, “public”, “general”, as 
referring to order, authority, and other subjects (2004: 10). He then defines politics as “a 
form of activity [centered] around the quest for competitive advantage”, “[occurring] 
within a situation of change and relative scarcity”, and producing consequences affecting 
the whole or almost the whole of a society, (ibid: 11). It is the first part – the political – 
that is particularly appealing, albeit very broad; nd in the second part – on politics – 
Wolin opens the door to the attrition of the concept toward a crude meaning of ‘power 
struggle’ found in most of the literature mentioned above. The difference between the 
two may be attributed to Wolin’s overall project of tracing political thought from Plato to 
the present, not least attending to departures fromthe above definition. But there is no 
logical or theoretical necessity to overdraw the distinction between the political and 
politics: it ought to be much simpler – one is the noun and the other adjective, or one is 
the substance, the other the practice – of the same referent. Thus, a slightly different 
formulation can be proposed: “politics is the whole complex of a public’s engagements in 
the pursuit of public interests”. This formulation does not deny the moment of 
antagonisms and political conflicts, but it goes well b yond them; it also does not deny 
the centrality of the conventional ‘political actors’ such as parties, politicians in offices or 
those competing for them, but importantly it includes all of them within a much broader 
variety of political agents that would include ordinary citizens and their associations and 
movements. Not least, this formulation does not resrict the forms of pursuing public 
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interests: they would include legal entrenchment, deliberative activities, political 
mobilization, as well as various ways of propaganda and, in the longer term, habituation 
to certain values and ways.  
Two examples of envisioning politics somewhat differently may help locate the 
present conception (these two not being viewed as in ny way singularly compelling). On 
the one hand, for Chantal Mouffe, who argues for recognition of the irreducible and 
permanent factor of political struggle of modern society, politics is essentially about “the 
constitutive role of antagonism in social life”, (Mouffe 1993: 2). So, antagonism, or 
adversity or agonism – as she has variously referred to the factor of politics – is then the 
key to her understanding of the political. On the other hand, Harry Boyte thinks of a 
“different kind of politics” (2003) that emphasizes citizen cooperation and co-creation of 
the polity as such, to which he refers as “public work politics” and defines as: “free 
action by distinctive agents who engage with each other to address common problems 
and shape a common world,” (Boyte 2011: 85). 
These two views on what politics is – or can be, in Boyte’s case – may be seen as 
two extremes where Aristotle’s mean might be employed to settle the dilemma (with 
virtuous mean being often closer to one of the extremes (Ethics Bk 2, Ch. viii) – in this 
case, preferably, the Boyte-an extreme). Mouffe’s version of politics is all about 
antagonism, Boyte’s is all about cooperation and agreement. However, this is not such a 
choice situation. The resolution is that, in accordance with the above formulation, the 
entire range that these extremes span is rightly political. For in defining politics, one may 
not – because a public itself rarely can – only pick the kinds of engagements that are 
preferred and exclude those that are not liked. Thus, it is almost useless to try to define 
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politics by the manners of engagement in it. It seems, it is better to focus on what it 
produces, or aims at. “Collective pursuits of public interests” seems an approximately 
satisfactory formulation of that thought. There is also a slightly different way of 
formulating it, with some advantages. Hiding in the dusts of somewhat outmoded 
political science is an interesting definition that David Easton once proposed. He defined 
a political system by what it does – its function: “authoritative allocation of values” in 
society, (Easton 1965). Obviously, Easton was interest d in a political system – by which 
he meant the complex of a state’s formal governing system – and was interested in a way 
of assessing, evaluating the system. That way was thought to be the functionalist way: 
evaluate a system by the performance of functions expected of it.  
Presently, it is not a formal governing system but more broadly, politics that is the 
concept of interest. Correspondingly, the concern is not with any predetermined and 
concrete functions but with a continual political life process. But the formulation, 
“authoritative allocation of values” is still meaningful even when these two changes are 
applied. It is imaginable that, if it were offered for their consideration, both Mouffe and 
Boyte could have accepted this formulation as accurate of their vision of politics. The 
important element in this formulation is attention t  the qualifier ‘authoritative’. In any 
political engagement insofar as it concerns an issue of public interest – or values, in 
Easton’s formulation – the objective of all participants is to arrive at some authoritative 
settlement of the issue.  That is, in any such engagement, formal or informal, 
governmental or civic, what is vied for is to render a particular vision or program 
‘authoritative’ in the eyes of the general constituency. Therefore, the earlier formulation 
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about politics may now be made more complete by introducing this element: “politics is 
the whole complex of a public’s engagements in pursuing authoritative public interests”. 
 
The language of a different conception of political constitution 
This present study does not need to come up with a new conception of political 
constitution, in better accord with the above formulation of politics, wholly from nil and 
on its own, thankfully. There is a good foundation f r such an exploration already laid 
out in a range of existing works, less among contemporary and more among some earlier 
thinkers. The kind of constitutional thinking being pursued here has already been for the 
most part formulated by a circle of scholarship that, of right, can be called home for this 
study, the PEGS School. There is another school very akin in its approach to PEGS, the 
Bloomington School, which may also be called a slight y more distant (in space as well 
as time) home.  Both these schools of constitutional thought, mostly overlappingly, go 
back in their roots to a line of older constitutional thinkers, the most obvious and 
influential of them being James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, but also very central 
among them being Alexis de Tocqueville, Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, and Niccolo 
Machiavelli. What follows below, then, is a predictably selective and brief overview of 
this range of scholarship with the intention of deriving a vocabulary, or even a whole 
language, for a different, more appropriate understanding of political constitution.     
 
On republic, democracy, and liberalism 
But before doing that, this might be a good point to settle a sort of a house-keeping 
question, so as to prevent confusion or wonderment down the road, the question of three 
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‘elephants in the room’: the ideas of republicanism, liberalism, and democracy. The 
discussion so far has had little to say about the relationship between them, simply 
adopting republicanism as the language – where “-ism” has been admitted only with 
reluctance. Each of the three concepts comprises enormous literature and claims distinct 
doctrines, core concepts and normative imports, supposedly. The proposition held here, 
however, is that the distinctions between the three can only be valid within the 
framework of political history, in studies of the rise of each in the course of evolution of 
constitutional order and political thought. In political and constitutional thinking 
appropriate for contemporary age, however, the three id as are impossible to separate.  
In a critical essay questioning the worth of recent engagements with republicanism, 
Robert Goodin argued that many ideas of republicanism are either covered by theories of 
liberalism, democracy, or nationalism, while most of the remaining, strictly republican 
ideas are at best suspect of being normatively unfit for today’s society (2003). Without 
engaging Goodin directly, Lovett and Pettit propose in pages of the same journal a neo-
republican project that is implicitly in tension with both liberalism and democracy 
(2009). But famously, Pettit does confront liberalism and democracy, in their respective 
core ideas of liberty as non-interference and as development, respectively, with a 
republican idea of liberty as non-domination in an earlier work (1998). Shortly later, 
Maurizio Viroli, in his turn, offers a succinct view of republicanism, where he maintains 
that both democracy and liberalism belong under the larger theme of republicanism 
(2002). Still more recently, an objection has been raised by John McCormick (2003) to 
viewing Machiavelli as a republican – an objection t  the so-called Cambridge School, 
including Pocock, Skinner, Pettit and Viroli. He argues that the republicanism of 
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Cambridge School has rather to thank Guiccardini, a contemporary and sometime 
interlocutor of Machiavelli, whose ‘elitist’ political views, trained on controlling the 
masses and retaining authority to aristocratically composed institutions of representation, 
are at stark contrast to Machiavelli’s ‘plebeian democratic’ views (McCormick 2011). 
While it is an important argument in setting the record straight about what Machiavelli 
really argued, it appears to be more of a ‘battle of concepts and brands’ when viewed in 
the larger picture of constitutional thought. Quite obviously, among today’s most 
developed democracies there is almost no ‘plebeian’ feature to be seen; they are all rather 
aristocratic or at best mixed, and hence Guiccardinian democracies. McCormick’s 
objection can only be accepted on narrowly defined grounds of what republicanism and 
democracy, respectively, mean.   
All of these border-drawings are not helpful, nor do they offer any worthwhile 
insight for constitutional thought. Norberto Bobbio, an eminent theorist of democracy, 
expressed impatience with such distinctions in a conversation with Viroli, suggesting that 
“the republic of the republicans, of which you are one, is a form of ideal state, […] It is 
an ideal state that exists nowhere, or exists only in the writings of the authors you 
quote…” (Bobbio and Viroli 2003: 11). Take any of the, say, 30 or even 50 best 
performing polities by Freedom in the World rankings for all the years that they have 
been conducted, or all the most stable democracies (not autocracies, some of which are 
also very stable) in the Polity rankings.50 It is impossible to argue that any of them is not 
a “republican and liberal and democratic” regime at the same time. Trying to argue that 
in today’s world it is possible, let alone advisable, to have a pure regime of only one of 
                                                
50 For Freedom House “Freedom in the World 2012” repot, go to: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202012%20Booklet_0.pdf ;   
For Polity IV “Global Report 2011”, go to: http://www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf 
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these orientations – being an even less sustainable argument than the ‘governmental 
form’ purism discussed under Institutional Constitutionalism above – would be childish. 
Because none of these three big ideas has remained unchanged throughout its centuries of 
history, and has existed and evolved in conjunction with the other two, today any good 
polity is a case of all three (see Kalyvas and Katznelson 2008).  
It seems Montesquieu – one of liberal republicans mentioned by Kalyvas and 
Katznelson (2008: 6) – proposed a good way of relating republic and democracy. The 
latter, along with aristocracy, were for him the two kinds of republic that are known. 
Democracy, just as aristocracy, is about the manner of conducting government, from the 
main players in it to its definitive procedures. The kind of polity that both democracy and 
aristocracy fall under is republic, which for Montesquieu, of course, is itself on a par with 
monarchy and despotism. Not holding on to this Montesquieu-an framework, The 
Federalist Papers juxtaposed republic and democracy as two competing choices in 
America’s constitutional quest, as did Kant – in somewhat more suspect way – in regard 
to chances of a perpetual peace. In so doing, The Federalist merged ideas of liberalism 
into their republican constitutionalism. That merger culminated, of course, in the 
appendage of the Bill of Rights to the US Constitution. Yet today, America is best known 
around the world – and is presented to the world by its leaders – as the ‘greatest 
democracy’, not ‘the greatest liberal regime’ or ‘the greatest republic’. On republicanism 
standing at the roots of political liberalism, a very able study has been offered by Kalyvas 
and Katznelson (2008), where they study the politica  thoughts of six preeminent liberal 
republicans (or republican liberals) who came and shaped what they claim to be the 
precise period of the merger of the two ideas, 1750-1830. 
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It ought to be beyond question that discussing these three ideas as distinct from and 
even antagonistic to each other is pointless in thiking about constitutionalism today: the 
desirable constitution today can only be imagined within the bounds of some sort of 
liberal-democratic republic. So, why then adopt the term republic here instead of the 
other two? That is because republic is the best term that stands for a polity, or 
constitution, as a whole. Both liberalism and democracy are descriptors of republic as we 
know it today; neither of the two, as words, as terms, stands for ‘a polity’. Thus, speaking 
of constituting a good polity, one is always talking of a republic, and depending on the 
parameters and properties that are meant, one speaks of ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’. 
Moreover, res publica, insofar as modern non-monarchic, non-despotic governance is 
concerned, is the most encompassing rubric for speaking of a society’s common 
concerns. Those concerns can include individual as well as group rights, citizen freedoms 
and their responsibilities, public access to power, power’s accountability to the public. 
The specification and securing of objectives in anyof these regards is what republican 
constitution is about. It is now time to turn to just such kind of republican constitutional 
thinking in the examples of two contemporary schools and three of their predecessors.   
 
The PEGS and Bloomington schools of constitutional thinking 
This project gets inspiration from many sources. The c ief practical inspiration, 
albeit mostly of negative kind, was said to be the story of constituting Kyrgyzstan and 
many similarly struggling places around the world. It also derives immense intellectual 
inspiration from a broad range of constitutional scholarship, going back all the way to 
classics. But there are two contemporary circles of scholarship – we may call them 
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schools – that bring together very much of that older political thought to formulate an 
attractive, genuinely political conception of constitution, or ‘a new constitutionalism’ 
(Elkin and Soltan 1993). One is the scholarship center d around the Committee on the 
Political Economy of Good Society (the PEGS School), and the other is work done by the 
Indiana Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (the Bloomington School). 
The two schools elicit some differences, too, but their overlaps are clearly much greater. 
There is certainly a notable degree of exchange and collaboration between them (e.g, see 
the Symposium in The Good Society, 20/1, 2011). Without hoping to provide a fair 
discussion of either – which would require a separate dissertation – the following tries to 
describe some of the key contributions each school makes toward a view of the question 
of constitution.51  
One distinctive focus of the PEGS School, possibly the key to rethinking the rest of 
what constitution is all about, is the meaning of citizenship. They try to go beyond the 
question of ‘who is the citizen?’ to asking ‘what does the citizen do?’, (Boyte 1999: 259). 
Harry Boyte’s suggestion applies to the whole of the PEGS philosophy: the real, 
constitutionally relevant questions, about citizens are about citizen capabilities, or 
competence – essentially, whether citizens are capable of securing a constitutional order, 
and what kind of an order they are capable to secure, (Elkin and Soltan, 1999; Elkin 
2006). Running throughout PEGS literature, the discus ion of citizen capabilities (or 
competence) takes on numerous issues, such as their role as co-creators of constitutions 
(Boyte, 1999; Soltan 1993b), good citizens (or, citizen virtues) (Elkin 2006: esp Ch. 7; 
Elkin 1999; Barber 1999), civic moderation (Soltan 2008; Soltan 2010), citizen 
                                                
51 On PEGS, Karol Soltan’s ‘four themes’ identified for the first edited volume (1993: 13-16) seem to apply 




capabilities within institutional and political environment (Elkin 2006), and more. What 
this emphasis does is take the question of constitution away from the dominant prisms of 
formal institutional design, of legal rationalism centered on constitutional interpretation 
by the Supreme Court, of positive scientific prefernce aggregations (all of these are chief 
foils in Elkin 2006). It points out that citizens are not mere voters, or consumers, or 
spectators. Citizens are the core of a constitutional rder; such an order survives insofar 
as it corresponds to the citizen capabilities to uphold it; capabilities are varied and 
variable, situated within actual political contexts and not in the abstract.  
The theme of capabilities leads to the theme of institutions – the sites where 
capabilities are applied, which capabilities create nd maintain, and which themselves 
cultivate capabilities in turn. As Soltan begins his introduction to the first of PEGS 
trilogy, “[T]he new constitutionalism … contributes to the current institutionalist turn in 
social science… It is a program for the study of political and economic phenomena from 
the perspective of an institutional designer”, (Soltan 1993a: 3). It is probably not so trivial 
to note that the terms ‘constitution’ and ‘institution’ not only sound similar but are very 
close in meaning, too. In a literal rendition, the one would mean ‘putting together’ and 
the other ‘putting in place’. Constitution is essentially the putting together of what is put 
in place (the ‘package’, in Elkin’s language) – albeit, lacking any simplicity of a 
mechanical motion that this suggests. This observed, however, ‘what is put in place?’ – 
that is, ‘what is instituted?’ – is not a very easy question. While the term ‘institutions’ 
probably appears at least once on every page of every PEGS publication, it still remains a 
somewhat elusive concept. Elkin writes, “[C]onstitutional theory is strongly institutional 
in focus”, then relates institutions to politics, complements them with mores and virtues, 
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and also says that “[I]nstitutions that are constitutional theory’s principal concern are 
ones directly involved in lawmaking.” (2010: 224). This is a lot, and how the various 
elements of what is said relate to each other and into a whole, is not easy to picture. 
Boyte’s story of “[reconceiving] institutions as living and dynamic communities, with 
norms, values, leadership, and cultural identities” is indicative of some important ideas, 
but is again a rather fuzzy way of putting it (2011: 94). What is clear is that for PEGS, 
‘institutions’ means immensely more than just “offices and powers” (Elkin 2006: 95), 
and “structures, procedures, rules and regulations”, (Boyte op cit: 94), but it remains 
unclear just what that distinctive quality is that c n tell an institution.  
One way of going about this difficulty offers itself without leaving the language of 
PEGS. It seems crucial – nay, the only way – to understand institutions in tight relation to 
citizen capabilities. For constitutional thinking, the concern must be with capabilities to 
secure institutions, which in turn can support capabilities, stabilize th  achievements of 
capabilities, and so on. Institutions are how citizen capabilities are arranged, or 
organized, to be stable and to show resilience in the face of constant challenges. This is 
very important. So understood, institutions introduce the issue, and become the medium, 
of constitutional resilience as such; in order words, they are what keep stable the 
achievements of citizen capabilities en route to a desired constitutional order.  
Such a conception of institutions turns attention t the theme of politics in PEGS. 
As acknowledged from the start, PEGS’ perspective is very much political 
constitutionalist. Reconstructing the Commercial Republic is essentially an argument to 
deepen Madison’s understanding of the political-ness of constitution, to see that even 
Madison, as acute as his sense of constitutional politics was (his discussion of factions 
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being the strongest demonstration), failed to grasp – and account for, in his theory – the 
whole of politics. Politics is as much about cultiva ion of capable citizenry (including 
leaders, and especially legislators) as it is about managing overt clashes of factional 
interests. Thus, Elkin calls for the maintenance of a balance between conceiving “politics 
as instrumental activity” and “politics as creating and maintaining durable modes of 
association among people”, where he would probably gree to call the latter option 
‘politics as institutional activity’ as distinct from ‘politics as instrumental activity’, (2006: 
109). The former, then, is close to saying ‘politics s the activity of making constitutional 
order resilient’, to follow up on the note above. In an even greater departure from the 
conventional, Boyte speaks of a “different kind of p litics” understood as “free action by 
distinctive agents who engage with each other to address common problems and shape a 
common world,” (Boyte 2011: 85). The emphasis on the creative, productive, cooperative 
sides of politics is a very important corrective upon more common reductionist views of 
politics as (mainly or only) the expression of the irr ducible conflict in human societies 
(esp. Mouffe 1993, and, of course, Schmitt 2007 [1932]). 
The three themes above, the way they are conceived by PEGS scholarship, lead to 
one more general feature of their constitutionalism: the awareness that constitution is a 
practical process, situated in time and society. This awareness gives rise to two related 
points about constitutional thinking: one, that constitution is an ever-ongoing, evolving 
process, defying permanence of any purposes or institutional shapes, and two, that 
because of its ongoing evolving-ness, constitutional theory is not an enterprise of 
completely spelling out the normative values of a constitution a priori (Elkin 2004). “The 
central concerns of constitutional theory, - Elkin writes, - … are the realization of good 
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regimes, their maintenance once established, the prevention of bad regimes, and the effort 
to transform bad regimes into good ones,” (2006: 95). This means that constitution is 
never over, because in the practical political world no political regime works forever 
(and/or) exactly as it was designed. The awareness of empirical situated-ness and 
continuity of constitution suggests nuances to a ‘realist constitutional theory’ in the 
normative sense, too. Such a theory’s “normative claims […] are more securely rooted in 
an assessment of the capabilities and limitations of human action” (ibid: 95-96, italics 
added). 
Realism in constitutional thinking, thus, orients one toward normative values and 
ideals in a disciplined way: disciplined both by the continuity of constitutional enterprise 
and by what is possible given the available capabilities. Thus, Elkin consciously employs 
a seemingly under-specified idea of ‘liberal justice’ that ought to orient the aspirations of 
the American commercial republic. To potential objections on this point, he replies, “for 
the purposes of constitutional theory, and, in particular, for an account of the commercial 
republican public interest, [proper characterization of liberal justice] matters much less 
than is often supposed,” because no specific conception will be easily translatable into 
lawmaking in the first place, and different conceptions of liberal justice are unlikely to 
lead laws “down substantially different paths”, (ibid: 131-132). The more empirically 
based, ‘actionable’ as it were, specifics of liberal justice are then spelled out in 
elaborating the idea of public interest and of ‘a public interest politics’. 
There are many other important PEGS themes, usually closely related to these. 
Within the limitations of the present work, these few themes, however, already give a 
good idea of what that ‘new constitutionalism’ would be. In borrowing this conception of 
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constitutionalism for wider application – as the prsent study does – one issue arises: that 
nearly all of PEGS scholarship is rooted in the American case and speaks, essentially, to 
American constitution.52 This need not be a major problem, but it does introduce some 
nuances. Thus, the slight unease with the language of institutionalism in this literature is 
in part to be explained by it being rooted in the American context. In Elkin’s book, for 
example, the somewhat unclear status of institutions gets much more specificity once 
applied to elaboration of ‘seven components of the public interest’, (ibid: Ch. 5). In the 
language of Elkin’s ‘shipbuilding at sea’ analogy, actual constitutional cases are likely to 
vary noticeably with regard to how close to shore th y are, whether or not they discern a 
distant beam from a lighthouse, and how much experience and leadership the sailors on 
the ship can muster. 
One PEGS piece of much relevance here and free fromAmerican-rootedness is 
Karol Soltan’s essay, “Generic Constitutionalism”, (Soltan 1993b). This is an attempt to 
express the idea of possible, not “ideal” constitutionalism that can apply, as it were, 
universally. The idea rests on an understanding that there exists a universally shared core 
of what constitutionalism implies, and so aims to explicate that core. The ability of PEGS 
constitutionalism to ‘travel’ outside the United States (and The Federalist Papers), then, 
is predicated on the possibility of expressing it in the language of ‘generic 
constitutionalism’. Soltan’s essay itself is the beginning of that universalist extension. 
Building on its start, the present work may be seen as another step in such an extension.  
The core themes of PEGS constitutionalism outlined above make up some of the 
key departure points for the present work. Most of hese themes are also shared by the 
                                                
52 Soltan identifies “the importance of American politics as an example” as one of the four main themes in 
A New Constitutionalism (1993a: 15). 
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Bloomington School. A recent issue of the PEGS journal, The Good Society (20/1, 2011), 
in honoring the Bloomington School, offers many ways in which the perspectives of the 
two schools are closely shared. The output of this large cohort of scholarship from 
Indiana, too, is immense and impossible to do justice within a short text, so that is not the 
intention. Instead, it is pertinent to highlight a couple of important themes they add to the 
above. 
One theme that is highly prominent in the Bloomington School literature is the view 
of citizens as artisans, and of institutions – culminating in constitution as a whole – as 
artifacts, (V. Ostrom 2008 and 1980), sometimes using craftsmanship interchangeably 
with artisanship. This term is particularly attractive – and crafting is adopted as the 
constitutional activity (see below) – because it isevocative, in an imaginative way, of the 
kinds of activities most associated with human creativity, thus being a more concrete 
concept than, say, creativity per se, or design. The vocabulary of 
artisanship/craftsmanship, then, is a poignant, un-cumbersome expression of the integral 
link between PEGS themes of citizen competence and institutionalism, as proposed above 
– not surprisingly, the same vocabulary is often to be met in PEGS literature as well (e.g. 
Soltan 1993b: 72).  
But here, a warning is warranted. Vincent Ostrom’s own use of ‘artisanship’ is 
closely tied to the idea of ‘choice’, as in constitutional or institutional choice. ‘Choice’ is 
not a random term for Ostrom; it is one of the central issues in his reading of The 
Federalist Papers, inspired as it is by Hamilton’s famous question about “reflection and 
choice”53, (esp. V. Ostrom 2008: Ch. 3), and also rooted in his pioneering interest in the 
                                                
53 Hamilton wrote: “It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of 
this country to decide, by their conduct and example, the important question, whether societies of menar  
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public choice approach in political and administrative sciences (e.g. V. Ostrom 1975). 
Strictly speaking, the meanings of the words ‘artisnship’ and ‘choice’ are almost at 
odds: artisans/craftsmen create, don’t choose. More generally, the latter term is 
problematic in view of its close association with te vocabulary of (formal) 
institutionalist constitutionalism discussed above. ‘Choosing’ certainly is an element in 
the overall process of constituting, but it is not preferable as a rubric to describe all of 
what constitution posits.  
Another theme, probably even coined by the Bloomingto  School, is the idea of 
polycentricity (see McGinnis 1999; also Soltan 2011: 114). It is he empirically based 
claim about the pluralism within any larger system of governance: that a workable system 
elicits many centers, or institutions, of governance. This idea stresses an inherent 
pluralism in governance, and draws constitutional thought toward local, sub-national 
levels of governance, to associational life, and to small-scale rule-making communities.  
The theme of polycentricity leads to the broader theme of institutional design, 
which is another, possibly a core, area of interest for he Bloomington School. Based on 
data from numerous studies of small-scale common pool resources governance in the 
United States and around the world, the Bloomington School (principally, Elinor Ostrom) 
has extracted a general ‘diagnostic’ framework for analyzing institutional design and 
development – the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, (E. Ostrom 
1999: esp 509). The framework introduces more concreteness to questions of institutional 
design and agent (citizen) choices in the process – an issue of relative obscurity in PEGS 
                                                                                                                                      
really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are 
forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force,” (Fed # 1). Mark Tushnet 
(2008: 1473) helpfully notes the important reference to “the people of this country” in this quote to suggest 
that Hamilton may not have said this in any universalistic sense. 
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literature, as noted above – but that comes at the pric of adopting a rather heavy dose of 
rational choice language, further deepening the ‘choice’ unease, and substantively, 
requiring rather demanding assumptions of rationality mong agents. While the empirical 
studies of small-scale common pool resource governance may be interpretable in such 
rationalist languages, it seems much more difficult to adopt the same language in larger-
scale, longer term constitutional projects. 
Even so, the very findings that Ostrom and her colleagues have revealed about the 
capabilities for self-governance among small-scale ommunities in as diverse places as 
the United States, Switzerland, Japan, the Philippines, India, Nepal, and so on, are very 
valuable. What they tell is that workable institutional craftsmanship is not limited to 
Western societies, does not take place over elaborate designing boards, and, most 
importantly, citizens are capable of self-governance, with or without a sword (of their 
own making). Harry Boyte describes this import of the Bloomington School as 
demonstration of a ‘public works politics’ actually working in diverse settings and 
societies (Boyte 2011). The international application of IAD framework by the 
Bloomington School has been limited to studies of CPR regimes. What would be highly 
interesting now is to take the broader constitutional perspective in the manner of PEGS 
and Bloomington schools (including Boyte’s own idea of ‘public works politics’) 
similarly to the international, global scale. 
To sum, between the PEGS and Bloomington schools, there emerges a very 
different conception of political constitutionalism than the ones taken up at the top of this 
chapter. This conception is very empirical, located at the juncture between the normative 
and the practical, emphatically anchored in citizen capabilities, and oriented toward a 
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continuous, essentially never-ending constitutional process wherein the key ingredient is 
not so much attainment of some ideals as maintenanc of a resilient institutional 
ensemble that secures realistic political objectives and values. If there is one word to 
describe this conception of constitution – if only to avoid having to repeat such long and 
convoluted sentences again – the word might be ‘pragmatic’. This term seems to be well 
advised also on the grounds that PEGS literature often uses it, and for Charles Anderson, 
it is a focal term (1993; 1990).  
 
From Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville 
It is now worth to pause for a moment on some of the sources that inform and 
inspire these two schools themselves. Their pragmatic conception of constitutionalism 
owes much to a line of earlier constitutional thinkers. The most central place of The 
Federalist Papers (mostly of Madison, and for Vincent Ostrom (2008), also of Hamilton) 
is already very obvious, and it may be redundant and also difficult to dwell on them here. 
There is also the large shadow of Aristotle in the background, which also may be relieved 
here in view of its ubiquity. There are three other, modern thinkers that are very central 
and very interesting, Alexis de Tocqueville, Charles de Montesquieu, and Niccolo 
Machiavelli.  
These three authors, all of them described variously as republican, liberal 
republican, republican democratic and so on, are key figures in a canon of constitutional 
thought that presently has been described as pragmatic. A notable biographic detail about 
all three is that they were both observers (students) of politics and its non-trivial 
participants, or practitioners. It is more than like y that their perceptive understanding of 
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how politics and constitution actually work has much to do with their practical 
experience of it.54  
Machiavelli, the oldest of them, is possibly the most controversial political thinker 
that ever existed (see Berlin 1971), but his credentials as a champion of republican 
constitution (as opposed to principality/monarchy) and of civic liberty may now be 
assumed as very much settled, (e.g. Viroli 2002). If so, then his manner of thinking about 
politics is of interest. Arguably the most prominent characteristic of his political thought 
is its pragmatism, more often referred to as realism. Sheldon Wolin described his political 
theory as concerned with manipulating or managing political reality, as opposed to 
Platonic ‘architectonic’ theory; for Machiavelli “[P]olitical action, therefore, was 
essentially manipulative, not architectonic,” (2004: 194). It is manipulative in the sense 
that Machiavelli took political reality as it is and thought about how a workable 
republican regime, able to guard civic liberty, might be possible. Throughout his 
Discourses, in observations seemingly so obvious and even mundane, what Machiavelli 
stressed so persistently is an acceptance of political life without filters, of human society 
as it is, of interests as they tend to be, of contingency as it tends to happen – and all of 
that not to preach some doom scenario but to show h governance is possible, and 
possible at less costs than often unnecessarily incurred.55 So, Machiavelli’s theory is 
                                                
54 Machiavelli served the republic of Florence for some fifteen years as a high-ranking diplomat, before 
seeing harsh reversals of fortune of a politician’s career and life. All of his most important works were 
written after his political career. Montesquieu presid d over the criminal division of the Parlement of 
Bourdeaux for over ten years, carrying out judicial and administrative duties. The longest and a more 
significant career in politics was Tocqueville’s who in total served in public capacities for nearly fifteen 
years, including a brief appointment as Foreign Minister and, more relevantly, active role in the drafting of 
the Constitution of the Second Republic.     
55 Wolin’s more famous claim about Machiavelli is that e was a theorist of ‘economy of violence’, 
advising only sparing resort to violence when necessary, and of course perfectly happy if non-violence was 
capable of providing the intended objectives. The claim about it being a ‘manipulative’ kind of theory is to 
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realistic, but not hopeless – in fact, it is not hopeless precisely because it is realistic. The 
hopes that Machiavelli sets for political life are themselves realistic, achievable ‘hopes’, 
ones that he knew to have been realized in the past, and not abstract ideals. Those hopes 
are, quite simply, the preservation of seemingly countervailing two goods, order and 
liberty, in a republic – both for citizens and for constitution as a whole (see Bk 1, Ch IV). 
Neither liberty, nor order (or discipline, or tranquility, as Machiavelli interchanges) 
is ever safe. They not only tend to oppose each other – as shown in the “short” life of 
Solon’s constitution (Bk 1, Ch II) – but are preyed upon by so many internal as well as 
external threats, that their ability to last is alwys precarious, and only a prudent 
combination of order and liberty in a strong regime (or better, nation) may hope to have 
them last. Machiavelli proposes numerous ways of ‘manipulating’ this precariousness of 
a liberal political order in order to avert failure: adopting a mixed regime where the 
people and the nobles checked each other’s power, using the disciplining and moderating 
promises of law and religion, maintaining moderate institutions of accusation, honoring, 
and punishment, resorting to the educating and mobilizing potentials of rhetoric and 
exhortation, using demonstrative examples from history when relevant, and cultivating 
citizen virtue, to name a few. The last one is of interest, earning Machiavelli the title of a 
father of modern nationalism, albeit he rather preferr d to speak of patriotism (see Viroli 
1998). He thought maintenance of political order and liberty needed some serious 
devotion of citizens to the republic – only if it is valuable for them are they able to 
maintain that prudent balance of order (which is neither oppressive, nor weak) and liberty 
(which is neither license nor servitude). 
                                                                                                                                      
argue that Machiavelli’s theory is about manipulating political life in order to economize on resort to 
violent means. See (2004: 197-200). 
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More generally, however, it seems most worthwhile to heed to Machiavelli not so 
much for the literal things he said and advised (as Viroli likes to do), but for his keen 
sense for the nature of political life. What is valuable and desirable in political life is 
always in need of vigilant watch. There is no God, except when it is believed; nor are 
there laws, except those that human beings are able to institute amongst them and 
enforce. All that political life can rely on is what’s within the capacity of people to affect: 
some things are less capable of being affected – such as fortuna, some things more – such 
as law and patriotism, but that floating margin of affectability is all the handle that human 
society has to achieve and keep the life they want. A d this is to say, contrary to how it 
sounds, that there is an almost limitless scope for shaping political life. Peoples’ treading 
through that wide scope, always under circumstances of the context, to ever shape their 
common lives is what politics is all about.  
 
A little over two centuries later, there appeared Montesquieu’s treatise on the 
republican constitutional theory, The Spirit of Laws, a work quite different from 
Machiavelli’s Discourses in style and even much of content, but one that also carries on 
some of the important themes of the latter. Judith Shklar, in an essay comparing the two 
thinkers, described Machiavelli’s as classic, militant, or warrior republicanism, and 
Montesquieu’s as modern, moderate, commercial republicanism (Shklar 1998, Ch XIII). 
She also suggests that Montesquieu did not particularly admire Machiavelli, thought his 
ideas (and him?) to be too immoderate, and preferred rather to turn to Thucydides and 
Cicero, (Shklar 1987, 15-16). While that may be up for debate, there seem to be at least 
very important common themes between the two, differently treated as they may be – 
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quite understandably – given some dramatic changes between their times. A rather rich 
civilizational change had taken place from early XVI century to early-mid XVIII century 
– from the end of Renaissance, to the Reformation, o breakthrough in natural sciences, to 
the Enlightenment in full bloom. Montesquieu offered his considered thoughts (result of 
twenty years of research, as he reported) on how to think about constitution, and how to 
maintain a workable, free constitutional order, and i  this, he continued Machiavelli’s 
adherence to the practical context, rejection of abstr ct metaphysics, and a sharp sense for 
the art of political life.  
The title is important: The Spirit of Laws is about the ‘spirit’ of societies governed 
by law, not about the design, application, or reason behind law per se.56 Law’s spirit is, 
essentially, the character of the society concerned, the political culture and aspirations of 
that society, its experiences and capabilities for g od governance, which Montesquieu 
suggests are formed by numerous factors including even climatic conditions. What does 
this rich, difficult, very long work about the spirit of laws tell generally about politics and 
constitution? It tells many things, but only a few points are possible to be highlighted 
here. 
Possibly the most important constitutional teaching derived from this work is the 
idea of moderation. Moderation is the definitive virtue, or principle, that is needed in a 
republic. The doctrine of the separation of powers – the still more famous idea attributed 
to Montesquieu – can only be appreciated fully as one of the mechanisms of 
                                                
56 Montesquieu writes: “I have not separated the politica  from the civil institutions, as I do not pretend to 
treat of laws, but of their spirit; and as this spirit consists in the various relations which the laws may bear 
to different objects, it is not so much my business to follow the natural order of laws as that of these 
relations and objects”, (p. 7). The very first sentence of Book I indicates how broadly Montesquieu views 
law: “Laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of 
things,” (p. 1). 
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constitutional moderation. In an interesting discusion of Montesquieu’s application of 
separation of powers to the case of Britain, Vile explains some seeming inconsistencies 
therein – Britain’s constitution normally viewed as rather weak form of separation of 
powers – by stressing how Montesquieu depicted the British system differently, (Vile 
1998: Ch. 4). But the answer to the puzzle of Montesquieu’s fascination for the British 
constitution with its debatable separation of powers, it seems, is that political moderation, 
and not separation of powers per se, is what concerns the thinker the most. Moderation 
for him relies on much more than institutional design, contrary to Vile’s rather more 
‘institutional design’ perspective. It relies on a political history that has inculcated the 
right kind of a political outlook, or culture, that values and can abide by moderation. 
Correspondingly, his highly practically-attuned comparative discussions of various places 
around the world, including China, Spain, and Russia – even when not necessarily 
precisely correct on historical facts – unmistakably underscore his prime emphasis on the 
situated-ness, empirical-ness of constitution. Introduction of changes in law for him was 
very little about drafting, designing various codes, and very much about understanding 
the social and cultural setting of law, and therefor , about cultivation of the appropriate 
‘spirit’ of law.  
Thus, at the minimum, Montesquieu’s constitutionalism is a teaching in 
constitutional moderation, in attaining and maintaiing such moderation, in the 
pertinence of social-cultural environment in pursuing moderation, and in showing law to 
be the medium of moderation. It stands to be noted here, Soltan’s argument about law as 
essentially a strategy of moderation, is a thoroughly Montesquieu-an argument, albeit 
aimed at a level somewhat alien to Montesquieu – global constitutionalism, (Soltan 
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2010). He might have gone along with such an extension, provided that the requisite 
discipline of moderation is applied: that it is a soberly empirical, historically set, 
culturally realistic application. There was no global constitutional civilization for 
Montesquieu – indeed, that was precisely what he str s ed – but there was a lot of 
despotism, the third alternative, an immoderate and l wless kind of constitution which he 
regarded as no constitution at all. On account of his discussion of despotism held together 
by terror, some have suggested that Montesquieu – among other things – was a theorist, 
or even the philosopher, of fear and terror (see Robin 2000). The much more agreeable 
way to think, it seems, is that for him, despotism was that illustrative stark alternative, the 
bad form, a heuristic device, as it were, in order to show the distinctions of monarchic 
and republican constitutions, the centrality of moderation and law in them, and also, 
possibly, to suggest a live and constant danger that moderate constitutions face of 
devolution into despotism.   
 
Another century or so later, a third notable constitutional thinker became known, 
Alexis de Tocqueville. In Sheldon Wolin’s work on Tocqueville, it is richly shown that 
both Machiavelli and Montesquieu (especially) had enormous bearing on his political 
theory (Wolin 2001). Much like them (and certainly more than Montesquieu), 
Tocqueville also combined in him the perspectives of a political theorist and of a 
politician – the interplay between these “two worlds” being the organizing theme of 
Wolin’s book. Unlike them, Tocqueville also had the practical wisdom gained by 
witnessing two of the greatest modern revolutions. I formed both by his predecessors and 
two revolutions, Tocqueville further extended their teaching about republican 
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constitution. The immense volumes of Democracy in America are a difficult text, not 
because of style – Tocqueville’s is one of the most lucid styles – but because of the 
overwhelming wealth of subjects taken up, numerous returns to the same themes, 
occasional contradictions on such repeated discussion . 
In the first lines of his work, Tocqueville’s reports that he was struck by ‘the 
general equality of conditions’ he saw in America. That equality was the foundation, the 
springboard, of democratic and free governance. Yet soon enough, equality and freedom 
were realized as being at odds with each other. Americans’ jealous love of equality, under 
the condition of citizen sovereignty, stood to sacrifice the freedoms of the better off, of 
the higher achievers, in the name of equality, producing what he called the tyranny of the 
majority. If this tension is to be taken as the keytheme organizing Tocqueville’s thought, 
then his constitutional theory can be read as investigations into how political life, or the 
political, can mitigate, smooth, or control this tension. Again, much like Machiavelli and 
Montesquieu, although yet again in a rather different setting and facing rather different 
kinds of problems (at least in the case of Democracy in America), one finds a very rich, 
broadly construed, but also very empirical, practical, onception of politics. 
In Tocqueville’s conception, politics contains the rich arena – and arsenal – for 
dealing with the vicissitudes of democratic governance. Seated in the bed of customs, 
religion, history, providence, and geography, politics encompasses the wide spectrum 
from formal constitutional issues, to numerous democratic institutional devices, to less 
formal institutions of associational life, to public spirit, to cultivated ‘habits of the heart’ 
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and ‘habits of the mind’, to political culture and education.57 Because of the tension 
between equality and freedom, and the threat of the tyranny of majority, democracy is 
always captive to the danger of self-destruction. But this tenuous balance is not 
necessarily so tenuous after all, and it need not be. Security of democratic constitution is 
based, of course, on the summary effect of all the above levels of political life, but in 
particular, it is deposited in the requisite political culture which he found possible during 
his travel in America – and which he could not yet observe in Europe (in France, mostly) 
– a culture of public-spiritedness, of egalitarian ndependence, of general inventiveness, 
and of moderation through law and legally procured rights. This political culture is the 
bedrock of democratic constitution, the measure of its resilience in the face of challenges 
certain to arise continually.  
 
For all three constitutional thinkers, political-ness is at the very heart of the 
predicament of constitution – it simply cannot be any other way. This political-ness is a 
broad idea, not confined to any set of formal institutions, not limited to only some kinds 
of social interaction such as antagonism, and not aim ted by any singular motivation 
such as want of power. Rather, political-ness is the w ole essence of social life insofar as 
its constitution and governance is concerned. If so, then constitution of a political order – 
both its creation and maintenance – is a question of creative management of its numerous 
discontents, in a pragmatic manner, by cultivating the requisite capabilities among the 
constituent public that best respond to the evolving context of any constitutional 
endeavor. None of these thinkers would suggest either at there is a singular 
                                                
57 See Kraynak (1987) for a perceptive discussion of ‘T cqueville’s Constitutionalism’ as a theory 




constitutional order permanently best fitted for a given society, or that any society can be 
easily molded into any desirable constitutional form. From all three, the larger message is 
that constitution is a situated, continuous, pragmatic political engagement within the 
scope of the possible.          
Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Tocqueville, as noted, are not the only thinkers of 
this mode of constitutionalism. With differences here and there, this line can be continued 
with John Stuart Mill, Burke, Rousseau, and many more as one goes back in time, ending 
at least with Aristotle and Thucydides. These three thinkers are the ones particularly 
visible in the background of the constitutional thought of the PEGS and Bloomington 
schools. Of course, again, it is Madison and Hamilton who sit most centrally in the 
presidium on this scholarship. The PEGS and Bloomingto  school constitutionalism as 
described above carries on all of the main highlighted themes – and some more – in 
Machiavelli’s, Montesquieu’s, and Tocqueville’s thought. That is to say, it is a 
perspective with some serious ancestry, and one that had the advantage of having been 
gestated by some of the greatest political thinkers who had first-hand acquaintance with 
political life itself.                  
 
Idea of Political Constitution Restated 
Based on all of the preceding discussion, some general conclusions can be drawn 
about the idea of constitution politically understood. It is not, in contrast to some of the 
literature noted above, one species among a variety of other conceptions of constitution. 
It is an empirical idea of constitution, based on the understanding that constitution of 
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good polities is itself necessarily a very empirical, that is, practical, idea. Political 
constitution as restated here, therefore, is tantamount to the idea of constitution as such. 
For such an understanding, the very first, highest-level normative question, which is 
effectively a rhetorical one here, is whether constitution as an enterprise aims at a 
political order oriented to provision of justice, freedom, and respectful life for its citizens-
constituents, or whether it is in pursuit of objectives at variance with justice, freedom, 
and equal respect. Simply put, is a constitutional project aiming at a good polity, or is it 
aiming at a bad one? This question, for all intents, can be taken as resolved for 
contemporary constitutional thought. It is not anymore of any urgency to begin with this 
question, and so, it is not important for constitutional theory to engage in defense of 
justice, freedom or equal respect and dignity of citizens. Such questions, insofar as they 
need to be taken up, are best left to moral theory, not constitutional theory rightly 
conceived. For particular odd cases, where even these questions are substantially in 
dispute, constitutional theory – empirically understood – has little to offer. Empirical 
constitutional theory has to be able to assume that any particular society to which it is 
directed, has resolved these questions, and that cons itution of a good polity – one that is 
aimed at securing this set of general normative values – is known to be the objective.  
When that much can be assumed, there are some general cha acteristics that apply 
to the idea of constitution. The first of those is about this very normative content. 
An empirical idea of constitution rests on a thin and generic normative core. That 
core can be expressed in the form of an idea of ‘liberal justice’, as Elkin does, or as the 
idea of popular self-government, as Rousseau can be read to be arguing, or as the pursuit 
of highest level human good or happiness, as Aristotle prefaces his discussion. Detailed 
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and rigorous specification of the core normative orientations of constitution are apt to 
remain on paper, and as a constitutional project proceeds, those core ideas are apt to 
evolve and take shape in ways that could not be entirely predicted beyond general 
outlines. Political theory often speaks of dangers involved in certain ideas, especially 
ones that are not well specified or are teleological. Thus, one commentator has suggested 
an affinity between Plato’s theory of forms to the National Socialist racist project (Forti 
2006); the danger that ‘popular self-government’ can easily produce despotism of a 
majority is another familiar theme. To these concers of danger, the answer that the idea 
of political constitution gives is that the averting of these dangers is the job far more of 
the practical constitutional development than of a priori specification.58 Political life is 
dangerous; the seemingly un-dangerous parliamentary democratic constitution of 
Germany, operating through democratic elections, under certain circumstances was able 
to produce the greatest political evil humankind ever saw. Averting of that danger 
depended not on fine polishing of the normative core. 
Relying on a thin and generic normative core, the constitutional process elicits an 
ever ongoing negotiation between the desirable and the possible, between aspirations and 
realities, between the normative and the practical, as Elkin indicated. It is in that process 
of ongoing negotiation that the actual specifics of the normative constitutional content are 
filled out. The negotiation, to be noted, is not a singular event, not a mass convention of 
all concerned, but rather an amalgam of interactions at many levels, among many 
different actors, on numerous issues and objectives. While they negotiate and renegotiate 
                                                
58 A political attitude of awake-ness to such dangers is Judith Shklar’s “liberalism of fear” (1998a), (also 
taken up in Katznelson, “At the Court of Chaos”, (2001)). It is a sobering attitude, but as Walzer rejoined 
on it, constitutional politics must go beyond consta t guarding against danger (Walzer 2001). 
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continuously in this way, the thin and generic normative core stands as their overall 
orientation, their lighthouse.  
Such an idea of constitution, then, suggests the nec ssity of a broad conception of 
politics. This broad conception suggests that, insofar as human beings are ‘political 
animals’, everything that relates to the building, securing, maintenance, and development 
of a common life among them is inherently political. Bernard Yack has offered a 
compelling discussion of the richness of Aristotle’s conception of ‘political animals’ and 
their life, located as it is in an interplay of every-day politics of conflict and debate, and 
the ideals of a good political order that are striven for, (Yack 1993). The political, 
therefore, encompasses a much wider range of interactions than just antagonism or 
adversity; it extends well beyond struggles for power in any apparent sense. Nor is 
politics confined to the opposite corner, understood as common engagements in 
cooperation and harmonious life. Rather, political relations comprise the entire range of 
public engagements from the most conflict-prone to the most harmonious, and since these 
relations are never to end and are never pre-scribed, conflict-prone relations can become 
relations of agreement, and agreements can change into sites of contestation. Those 
engagements are political because they are not ‘just so’ engagements, but ones pursuant 
to issues, interests, values, or simply questions of pertinence to the public, and hence, to 
their polity. Because the sphere of the political is so wide and so plural, it is not 
meaningful to view politics as purposive in any strong sense. The people rarely engage in 
politics en masse in the name of some distinct and high common purposes; much more 
often, they engage in political interactions because that is the way they live as a collective 
body, as collective political animals. 
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This broad conception of politics in constitution points to two themes that animate 
and sustain such political interactions. First, there is the centrality of citizen capabilities 
for engaging in politics in productive, effective, constitutionally-conducive ways. 
Second, insofar as such capabilities require to be set and sustained in a medium or shape, 
that medium or shape comes in the form of institutions. Said together, constitution is a 
process of political engagements defined – or carried out – by citizen capabilities and 
expressed in and centered on institutional creation and maintenance. Institutions are 
understood broadly, well beyond the formal offices and powers of a government, 
although including them, too. They are meant not as sites (of agreement, of allocated 
powers and values, etc.) but as products and processes. There is a close, direct linkage 
between capabilities and institutions. Civic capabilities are what produce and sustain, 
ultimately, a constitutional order, but since capabilities are an ephemeral and intangible 
category, the manner in which they are registered and maintained is through institutions. 
Institutions are multi-purpose; they not only help xtant capabilities to produce some 
result, but they produce, maintain, and channel capabilities themselves.    
This broad conception of politics at work in a constitutional process leads to another 
pair of important elements of political constitution, which are already presupposed in the 
above points but deserve explicit note. One is that, under this view of constitution, the 
relevant social setting is characterized by serious pluralism. Soltan’s discussion of 
pluralism, along three levels, is well fit as a depiction of it: “pluralism of ideals, 
institutions, and creative projects”, (Soltan 2010: 238). In view of these, constitution is 
not and cannot be confined to issues of central formal institutions of a regime; nor is 
constitution thinkable as somehow applying to society as one monolithic whole. Thus, 
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constitutional relevance is shared among all ‘units’ comprising the given society – units 
capable of changing, uniting, disintegrating and overlapping. From the individual to the 
society as a whole, the infinite variety of societal groups, networks and projects 
contribute their share to constitution – and demand their share from it. This 
multidimensional pluralism is why constitution requires a broad conception of politics. 
The other point deserving explicit note about constitution, having been already 
mentioned at the very beginning, is its empirical-ness. Political constitution is strictly 
empirical, not utopian, formal, logical, or rational in an abstract sense. It is empirical in 
the sense of being always and necessarily situated in actual life, in media res, always in a 
real context. This is why constitution is not an engagement in detached speculations 
about a desirable life. Constitution of a good polity must happen here, in this context, 
with these people, in this neighborhood, given these resources, against these odds and 
problems, and so on. It is tempered by numerous contrai ts and limitations. It cannot be, 
even if tried hard, made into a clean and convenient ca vass, into a mostly logical puzzle. 
Here, an objection is relevant to V. Ostrom’s stress on clarity of language (1997; 
2008: ch. 10). It would be quite nice, if every word meant exactly the same thing to every 
person, so that every utterance in a constitutional process was understood exactly how it 
was meant by the speaker, and so on. That would facilitate agenda-setting, agreement on 
actions, etc. But this notion of logical clarity of language, tracing its roots most notably to 
Thomas Hobbes, and culminating in the nearly incomprehensible propositions of logical 
empiricism in the early 20th century, is, constitutionally speaking, meaningless.  
Its empirical grounded-ness makes constitution alsoware of empirical continuity. 
Social life is continuous, an endless and flexible trajectory of common experiences, 
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developments, achievements, and failures. At any point in a society’s life, it will have 
pre-existed up to that point and will go on indefinitely into the future. A constitutional 
project takes place within that continuity. It is not a discrete one-time operation, nor is it 
possible to plan it as a project of some duration with limits. It is only thinkable as an 
ongoing process without a clear terminal point to it. This makes constitution always a 
matter of achieving a certain political modus vivendi, not just any – insofar as animated 
by orientation toward a thin normative core shared by the public, and insofar as it is an 
ongoing negotiation of the desirable and the possible, the modus vivendi cannot be an 
empty, motive-less condition: it would be very much a lived and ever so contested 
condition, a continuum of checkered equilibria, as it were. Insofar as the modus vivendi is 
at any point a result of confluence of public interests forged by extant civic capabilities, it 
is also a robust and stable one – and the best consitutional order is able to achieve the 
most stable modus vivendi.  
Thus, political constitution is oriented toward a thin and generic normative core; it 
is sustained by politics broadly conceived, which can be understood as a process of 
ongoing negotiation of the desirable and the possible, c ntered on and actuated by citizen 
capabilities; it takes place within the condition of social pluralism, and is also an 
empirical process, wherein especially to be noted is the continuity of that process. 
Described in this way, political constitution is a very pragmatic project.  
Earlier, it was warned that ‘pragmatism’ here is not used in the specific philosophic 
senses, and stays away from the swamp of relevant philosophic debates. Still holding 
onto that distance, the pragmatism of political constitution can be said to be very much 
Dewey-an as informed by his The Public and Its Problems (1954). That is: it is a quest 
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carried on within the bounds of the actual common life itself, a quest for a better, 
acceptable public life in view of the life and problems people experience, where along the 
process the public itself gets formed and developed. It is a quest carried on by a plural 
public, where not individuals only, not a single community only, but a broad range of 
actors – defined not by metaphysical laws but by their real aspirations and actual 
experiences – forever contribute their varied demands and input. It is a quest that is not 
amenable to a priori determination of its ends, because those ends are very much shaped 
and determined in the process of the quest. And it is a continuous quest because the 
object of the quest itself is never defined finally, and because – as it is about common 
human life – the process is not one of inexorable upward development but more likely 
one of recurring slopes. It is pragmatic in the sense of eliciting all of these characteristics.   
 
Consider the more appropriate, or even simply the right, conception of political 
constitution to have been restated now. The conception is about how to think about 
political constitution, but is not too much about what to think about. Getting clear on 
‘how’ is an important but only partially accomplished job. To complement it with some 
more substantive content is what would take the job nearer to completion (but it will 
never be completed, to be sure). A full, ripe job of this order is normally called a theory. 
Providing such a theory is beyond the realistic ambition of this work. What follows in the 
remaining chapters is an elaboration of the idea of pragmatic republicanism – an inroad 
toward, or a preface to, a theory, while stopping short of fully expounding one. What it 
does is give some idea of what might go into a political constitutional project when the 




Parameters of Pragmatic Republicanism 
 
The foregoing discussion in two preceding chapters has noted a range of problems 
in recent imagination of constitutional regimes and some ways of how that needs to be 
done properly. Some of the key features of a properly political conception of constitution 
were highlighted in the few preceding pages: a conception which this study holds as a 
more accurate orientation for constitutional thinking in general. What follows next – in 
two chapters – is an attempt to elaborate, as it were, this conception of constitution, to 
spell it out more substantively – albeit, consciously maintaining a level of generality and 
incompleteness, as a generic constitutionalist perspective requires. The proposal is called 
‘pragmatic republicanism’ because these two terms describe the approach well and set up 
the discussion toward more specificity; however, this conceptual term should not be 
taken as strictly definitive – it could just as well be called ‘political constitutionalism’ if 
not for its breadth.  
Before entering the outlining of the idea of pragmatic republic per se, there is need 
to pause on one issue that has been implied throughout t e preceding pages and now 
requires to be faced explicitly. That is the idea of incompleteness, or relative open-
endedness, which is argued to be a necessary characteristi  of the conception of political 
constitution defended here. With this discussion at hand, it will be possible to commence 
the outline of the idea of pragmatic republicanism – to formulate the several components 
of it. That begins by proposing a brief and moderately permissive sketch of good polity 
toward which political constitution – and pragmatic republicanism in particular – is 
oriented. The sketch is a realistic vision of a desirable good polity that is derived based 
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on actually existing or previously observed examples of good polity whose main 
constitutional features have by now acquired a more or less universal approval. After 
outlining this realistic sketch, the chapter moves on to considering three thin-normative 
orientations of pragmatic republicanism – the key procedural norms or principles that 
must be followed in a constitutional project. Importantly, these are not mere means to an 
envisioned end, but rather formative thin-normative procedural principles which realize 
the end while the project proceeds. The last third of the chapter elaborates what has been 
called the basic empirical conditions of constitution. These conditions are where the 
constituting takes place; they are not fixed empirical data only relevant for some putative 
beginning point, but are dynamic, evolving conditions – their evolution is how the 
attainment of a constitutional order happens. In the next chapter, the fourth and last main 
component of pragmatic republicanism is discussed. Constitutional crafting is tantamount 
to ‘constitution’ in its verb meaning; by calling it ‘crafting’, the idea is to refer to a 
special, particular kind of political activity that takes place amongst the three other 
components of pragmatic republicanism – its parameters, as it were – to ever so gradually 
approximate the envisioned good polity. To avoid any misleading, it should be reminded 
that the sketch of a good polity that follows is not by itself a complete argument – it is not 
a theory or a fully-formed conception of constitutionalism. That is what many works in 
constitutional theory tend to do: outline highly detailed sketches of constitutional order. 
The complete argument of this work (for an incomplete constitutional conception of 
pragmatic republicanism) is represented only in the combination of the sketch, the 




The incompleteness of pragmatic republicanism 
One way to address the issue of incompleteness is situating the idea of pragmatic 
republicanism in this regard vis-à-vis an exchange between Michael Walzer and Agnes 
Heller in a pair of very succinct and rich essays. Since that exchange is very well-fit for 
the present purpose, it may be allowed to dwell on them somewhat lengthily.   
In a reaction to Heller’s book, Beyond Justice (1987), Walzer picks up on a theme 
in it that he thought of great importance and not fully abided by the author who explicitly 
avowed it – the theme of theoretical incompleteness. He defines: “[C]ompleteness means 
a closed system, an account of the single best regime, a ‘whole’ that can be rationally 
discovered or invented but not rationally contested or revised.” Viewed against such a 
‘closed system’, “[I]ncompleteness is a virtue… for it leaves room for local self-
determination and cultural diversity; but it is a hrd virtue, more problematic than Heller 
admits,” he writes, (Walzer 1990: 225). He contends that Heller’s argument, claiming to 
expound an incomplete theory of justice focused on procedure (‘real discourse’) and not 
outcomes, comes “dangerously close to the completion she means to avoid,” (ibid). That 
is because “the decision procedure, the constitutional mode, is given, and it already is a 
way of life. How could it not be? Free and equal speakers, committed to life and liberty, 
practicing the virtues of tolerance and mutual respect don’t leap from the philosophers 
mind… They are historical creatures; […]; and they inhabit a society that ‘fits’ their 
qualities and so supports, reinforces, and reproduces people like themselves,” (227-228). 
Since “incompletion doubles here for pluralism” (226), Heller’s nearly closed just 
discursive procedure “suggests a (limited) set of variations on a theme but not anything 
like a genuine multiplicity of themes,” (228). After thus taking issue with Heller’s near-
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completion, Walzer admits that the variety in a more genuine multiplicity can include, 
historically, many options that cannot patently be palatable: various tyrannies, despotism, 
autocracies, and so on; but if incompletion is to be truly abided, the philosopher must 
forego judgment of bad alternatives – something Heller is not ready to do, he concludes. 
Heller’s brief answer is very ‘simple’. “We live in the modern world. […] We need 
to extrapolate the situation called ‘modernity’ into our close future, and if this is so, we 
can also extrapolate the main values of modernity io this future,” and the values of 
freedom and life are “actually universalized” in modern world, she writes (Heller 1990: 
231). She objects to Walzer’s suggestion “that no real, authentic pluralism of forms of 
life is possible” within the values of modernity, (232). With a brief elaboration, she 
concludes that the diversity within modern ways of life is as much as “the way of life of a 
Fiji fisherman [in nineteenth century] is different from the way of life of the Homeric 
heroes”. The only difference between those older times and (our) modern times is that 
their forms excluded “generalized pattern of symmetric reciprocity” whereas our forms 
exclude “asymmetric reciprocity”, the reason for this difference being that pre-modern 
societies did not know what values and forms of life would follow in their posterity, 
whereas modern society does know what preceded it in pre-modern times and thus is 
better informed, (233).       
The project of pragmatic republicanism is much closer in spirit to the “simple” and 
situated vantage point of Agnes Heller, (see also Heller 1996). Given Walzer’s own 
admission of what dangers the real diversity of ways of lives may elicit, it is hard to 
understand his demand that a philosopher pay the pric of not judging the bad-ness of bad 
forms of life – except if normative thought is completely extraneous to that philosopher’s 
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enterprise. Pragmatic republicanism, for all its criticism of manifestly “closed systems” in 
other literature, is very much grounded on normative judgment: its points of departure are 
some of the same ‘actually universalized’ modern values that Heller takes as hers, 
without, however, being dependent on such agreed values being universally held. Not 
being a philosophical inquiry, but political, pragmatic republicanism in fact rests on a 
wider scope of such broadly accepted and valued featur s of modern political society, 
including some institutional ones. It is an idea tht is consciously situated within the 
contemporary civilization the way it is; it is cognizant that some of the important values 
are principles are not universally shared. Each of t e features of modern political life held 
up in this work is only elaborated to an extent, and is capable of admitting a diversity of 
forms that is equal to, or wider than, Heller’s, because it is aware of non-universal status 
of many of those features while hoping they can become so.  
Pragmatic republicanism is decidedly an incomplete idea. It is more incomplete 
than Heller’s, because whereas her ‘incompletion’ is forfeited by her just procedure of 
‘real discourse’, as Walzer sees it, pragmatic republicanism does not outline any such 
strict procedural rule. It does include what is theclosest to a procedural principle – the 
orientation to the principle of moderation – but that element itself is very much, and 
consciously, incomplete. Walzer’s charge against Heller’s ‘incompletion’ in this regard is 
very well placed; and what is compromised by such a strict procedural rule is not only 
real diversity of outcomes, but – more importantly for the present discussion – also its 
empirical feasibility. The issue of this strict procedural rule is exacerbated by its 
methodological individualism – something Walzer does not explicitly point out. If a 
society should consist of individual men and women deliberating about the shared values 
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of liberty and life under Heller’s formula of ‘what I should do unto you and I can expect 
you doing unto me, should be decided by you and me’, (Heller 1990: 232-233), the 
outcome seems to be indeed a rather predictable form of life; and for far too many 
societies in (our) modern world, adherence to such procedure of discourse is very 
unrealistic, which is perhaps the much more urgent problem.  
So it may be argued that pragmatic republicanism is ore responsibly incomplete 
than Walzer imagines it ought to be, and it is more genuinely and realistically incomplete 
than Heller allows it to be. The way to this ‘middle ground’ lies in being even more 
accurately situated within the contemporary world than Heller’s work is; even with the 
ending of the  Cold War and most of communism since Heller wrote her book and her 
response to Walzer, the content of her situated-ness eems to be too optimistic. Pragmatic 
republicanism is situated within a world where there is still not a universal agreement on 
individual being the main political agent, on human rights being the moral code for all 
humanity, on deliberative consent of all individuals being the only admissible decision 
principle, and so on. It is, however, situated in a world where the best actual political 
orders do uphold these principles, and where such good orders also uphold a range of 
other principles: agreement about the people being the ultimate source of political 
authority under which they life, agreement in opposing abuse of political power, 
agreement on preferability of institutional stability, agreement on preferability of 
moderation over extremism, agreement on goodness of a mixed regime with separation of 
powers, and so on. Because contemporary political life does not know what our posterity 
holds in stock, and because the currently best poliical orders are characterized by these 
sets of key political and moral principles that arenot yet universally shared, pragmatic 
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republicanism comes from the perspective that it is prudent and responsible for the rest of 
the world, not yet sharing in these principles, ought to be oriented toward them. Its 
constitutional thrust is therefore beholden to a concern for the ways in which such an 
orientation might be actualized.  
This kind of incompleteness, as it should be clear by now, boils down to a 
recognition of political uncertainty much like it is defended, say, in Dewey (1954), and 
more recently, in Oakeshott (1969), Wolin (1969), and Barber (1988). It is an uncertainty 
situated within its historical context, and not in a a-historical cosmos. Because of this 
situated-ness, despite the richness of the discouraging variety of political circumstances, 
pragmatic republicanism can be a carefully hopeful idea: the societies hitherto 
unsuccessful in constituting themselves into good plitical orders have nonetheless pre-
existed within some sort of a status quo, even if barely bearable, and have sustained some 
degree of stability of social relation, on which they are able to build. The hope, then, is 
tied to incremental social malleability – be it through narratives, discourse, education, 
laws, institutions, as well as pressure, protests, and necessity – whereby the existing 
unsatisfying status quo can be made ever more satisfying. Because of all this, it is 
rightfully identified as an idea of political constitution. 
 
A sketch of a good polity 
We start the outline of the idea of pragmatic republicanism by sketching some 
general and central substantive elements of a good p lity – something in the order of a 
slightly blurred black-and-white portrait by an artist. The sketch is a logical step in a 
work purporting to tackle the question of constitution of a good polity. This sketch of a 
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desirable polity is decidedly slim and its exposition short, which may quickly under-
whelm an audience used to being treated to very rich descriptions and specifications of 
such political orders, the tallest contemporary example being Rawls’ Political Liberalism 
(1993). Rather, this sketch is more akin to Stephen Elkin’s use – and limited elaboration 
– of the idea of ‘liberal justice’ needed for a commercial republic (2006: pp), only 
perhaps both more general and more specific, in line with the kind of incompleteness 
involved here as specified above. This is so because here the idea of a good polity is not a 
matter of speculation or abstract analysis; it is a practical concept meant to give direction 
to practical constitutional activity. That such a sketch is both necessary and sufficient is 
addressed once its substance has been laid out. 
At the top of Chapter One above, a brief description of a contemporary good polity 
was proposed. To repeat that passage, it was said th t “such a polity would be a stable 
political order animated by some [set of] values and spirations shared and pursued by 
(most of) its members, providing security – to its constituent public in their capacities as 
individuals and groups, and to their property – based on legal and legitimate authority 
that also guarantees broad but not unlimited freedoms and dignity of citizens and 
precludes arbitrary use of political power upon citizenry; the polity is of the citizen body 
as a whole, a ‘body politic’, and as such, in maintenance of such an order, the 
participation of all citizens would be expected, although not absolutely, directly or in any 
dogmatic sense,”. That description was a generalization based on broadly accepted 




The following sketch elaborates that brief description, expressing it in terms of a 
slightly more formal set of good polity attributes. It has been noted in the preceding 
chapter that this work is not a contribution to thekind of conceptual political theory that 
focuses on distinctions between ideas such as republic, democracy, and liberalism; it has 
been suggested that any actually existing good regim  today would be some instantiation 
of a liberal democratic republic. That practical eclecticism of existing constitutional 
regimes is the main source for the idea of pragmatic republicanism, not the several clean 
theoretical conceptions. The thin sketch of good polity here can therefore be viewed as a 
generic image of such a liberal democratic republic, and each of the five criteria that 
make up the sketch as an element more or less identif able with liberalism, democracy, or 
republicanism.    
Pragmatic republic, thus, is not the name of a particular political system; it is not 
identifiable and distinguishable from others by a peculiar arrangement of its institutions. 
Rather, it is a fairly generic reference that may encompass almost any modern good 
regime, including most variety of what are now called iberal and democratic and some 
variations of socialist systems, but excluding bad regimes, such as dictatorships of 
various kinds - or tyrannies, as Walter Murphy chose to refer (2007: 16). In this generic 
usage, the term republic is applicable to nearly any good regime found in modern world: 
as long as the regime is not hegemonic but mixed, its authority and legitimacy emanate 
from its citizenry which is itself politically diverse, it serves the good of all its 
constituents in their diversity, including their freedoms and well-being, and it is a stable 
political order. The term pragmatic captures both the conceptual flexibility that attends 
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‘liberal and/or social and/or democratic republic’ and the practical dynamic quality 
attending the compliance with these several qualities of a good polity.   
To state these criteria very clearly: the generic ‘l beral democratic republic’ 
envisioned here is defined by five key criteria – commitment to public good, maintenance 
of a mixed regime, preservation of social pluralism, adherence to popular sovereignty, 
and securing of constitutional resilience. Commitment to public good is normally 
considered to be a classical republican idea of Machiavelli and earlier; mixed regime is 
among key concepts of both (more modern) republicanism of Montesquieu and (classic) 
liberalism of Lockean mold; social pluralism is probably best at home under modern 
liberalism of, for example, John Stuart Mill; popular sovereignty is the main criterion of 
democracy, for which the most eloquent if in parts extreme articulation came from 
Rousseau; and constitutional stability is a logically necessary concern for all of them, 
albeit rarely stressed in any body of thought on its own terms. Each of these 
identifications will be readily contested from all sides; the simple point here is that the 
idea of a good polity in early twenty-first century has come to include all of these 
elements – liberal, democratic, and republican.59  
This is not a dreamy eclecticism that simply imagines an impossible amalgam of 
everything good; it is not even decisive that each of these elements are actually 
universally agreed to be ‘everything good’, albeit it is plausible to assert that they are 
more or less universally accepted to be good. It is more relevant here that they are met in 
this amalgamation – either attained to a good degree o  explicitly aspired – in actually 
                                                
59 To stress this: the ‘casting’ of each of liberalism, democracy and republicanism in a composite idea of 
good polity is not a conscious theoretical principle heeded here – rather, these rough linkages are only to 
suggest the obvious amalgamation across these three ideas, in an extension of the discussion earlier 
(Chapter 3).  
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existing regimes that are generally recognized as good, or better, regimes. Thus, either 
attained or veritably aspired, these five criteria can undoubtedly be said to describe, say, 
Britain, Canada, the United States, Germany, and Norway. The scopes and degrees of 
realization of these criteria in every actual constitution are of course always open to 
revision and to being settled through debates – especially considering that each of these 
criteria is a continuum rather than a singular condition. Whether a particular regime 
would therefore deserve to be called a good polity vis-à-vis these qualities, obviously, 
may not be decided a priori. For all these reasons – theoretically muddled eclecti ism, 
incomplete articulation, and principled reliance on practical contextual realization – the 
conception of the good polity is called pragmatic. Let us elaborate each of the five 
criteria a bit more.     
The first criterion concerns the objective of a republic. A republic must hold as its 
raison d’etre the objective of serving the public good – the good that all of its 
constituents share and desire. It would be corrupt if it served the good of only part of its 
constituents or the good of some group or people outside the given public – that is, after 
all, Aristotle’s benchmark definition of a corrupt constitution. What that good means can 
be imagined by reference to certain common values: it would include general human 
welfare – health, education, security, as well as bodily and economic safety (against 
predation and crime); it would encompass more non-material goods, such as respect for 
the dignity of a person and groups of people, recognition of their identities and ways of 
life – and maybe summarily understand it under the name of happiness. The risk of 
engaging in any serious specification is that it would soon need to be embedded within a 
particular society – or, of a number of such societies, leading to a very long list of 
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specific goods that is both not very useful and potentially rather parochial (see Elkin’s 
quite specific elaboration of public interest politics for the American republic: 2006). At 
the same time, it is difficult to discuss public good in a thoroughly defensible way in
abstracto for reasons of its situated-ness within practical ontexts as noted already. 
Therefore, this central condition of a republic will have to be only introduced in this 
limited, general form. 
The second criterion concerns the republican institutional regime: it would need to 
be a mixed regime. Without the heavy emphasis on the mixing of social classes, as found 
in Aristotle, the ‘mixed regime’ here refers more to the divisions and balances in the 
institutional structure. No single locus of state power may be allowed to so dominate over 
all others – and over the society at large – as to be able single-handedly to decide on 
matters of general public importance. The main concern here then is with separation of 
powers, although it includes more than that. The idea, as already noted, was particularly 
well formulated by Montesquieu (Bk 11, Ch 6) and in the Federalist Papers (esp. No. 10 
& No. 51), but it is a common notion running all the way from Aristotle to Locke, to J. S. 
Mill, to the present (for a careful discussion, see Vil  1998; for a recent rethinking of 
separation of powers, consider Carolan 2009). The specific content of a mixed regime is a 
matter of practice, not of theory. Achieving a workable mixed system is not a trivial 
matter, and error is possible in both directions – not having enough of a mixed regime, 
opening it to abuse, or having too much of it, leading to institutional impotence, a 
complaint raised by McIlwain (1947: Ch 6). Hence, again, the real arrangement here will 
need to be left to the practical constitutional process.   
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The third criterion is about the republican society. Concomitant to the preceding 
point, and importantly balancing the first point, it holds that the envisioned republic will 
house a viable degree of social pluralism. A highly homogeneous society that elicits very 
little to no diversity of opinions, outlooks, cultures – that is, no basis for meaningful 
social debate – would inevitably be en route to self-d struction. Pluralism within society 
is essential for many reasons, including security of citizen liberties60, maintenance of 
social criticism, enabling a moderate political culture (Soltan 2010), and hence, a hedge 
against pursuing any extremist political projects. It is essential for social balance, broadly 
construed. Practically, pluralism would be represented in the plurality of public opinion 
on policy and values, plurality of cultural or identity groups, and on the political arena 
per se – access to the public sphere through multiple channels of organization and 
articulation, be it multiple parties, plural independ nt media, and a wide variety of forms 
of civic association. Some prominent theorists have made the case for pluralism, 
including Isaiah Berlin, Michael Walzer (1983) and William Galston (e.g. 2002; 2011).    
The fourth criterion concerns sovereignty: the republic would be based on popular 
sovereignty – that is, the highest constituent authority would belong to the whole of the 
citizenry. What sovereignty practically means – for every citizen regarding various issues 
– is hardly possible, and not helpful, to spell outin general, except, maybe, to say that it 
is the basis on which office-holders can be asked to vacate their seats, by expiration of 
terms or by impeachment, and on which more generally the demand for political 
accountability is made. Further concretization of the notion normally evolves in 
constitutional process and policy-making in a given polity. The security or stolen-ness of 
                                                
6060 So pluralism is a constitutional need for safeguarding individual liberty the way John Stuart Mill spoke 
of it – although individual liberty is not the only concern of a pragmatic republic in this regard. 
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sovereignty at any given point is a difficult thing to detect – especially in the modern 
societies of generally multi-million populations and complex bureaucracies. Often, an 
eruption of mass political action – revolution – would suggest usurpation of popular 
sovereignty post factum. One major safeguard of people’s sovereignty, withou  it being 
wholly reliable, is a robust system of political participation and especially representation.  
Popular sovereignty, especially if likened to Rousseau’s concept of ‘the general 
will’, is possibly the most contentious idea, and is very difficult to define in a strict, 
thoroughly unambiguous way. It does not need to be necessarily associated with ‘general 
will’; it may be conceived ‘as procedure’, as Habermas has argued (1998), or viewed as 
the equivalent of ‘consultation’ (Tilly 2007). Difficulties of the concept are real, but still 
it is an essential normative foundation of any republic that must be explicit and 
recognized. In asserting this principle, the idea is not to see literal or concrete 
manifestations of popular sovereignty in a good polity at any time. It may be more 
symbolic most of the time, and may not require to be ascertained constantly. In everyday 
life of a polity, this concept resolves itself in more mundane and less ceremonial 
workings of institutions. But there are times and moments, when political authority and 
order itself may be tested, and in such times, popular sovereignty must come out to be the 
ultimate point of reference. So, Soltan’s rejection of the idea of popular sovereignty – 
especially by citing Riker (1982), whose critique of ‘the general will’ is arguably based 
on strictures that Rousseau did not intend (see, rather, Neidleman 2000) – seems too 
hurried; he claims the idea is “built on an illusion” (1993b: 92-93). But so are the ideas of 
liberty, equality, justice – none of these can be imagined to exist in any society in a literal 
sense. His alternative of ‘limited sovereignty’ must still be vested in the people, the 
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populus, if it is to be vested anywhere: that ‘anywhere’ in a constitutional polity cannot 
be law by itself, or courts behind it, or a Constitution, and certainly not a Leviathan. The 
recognition of this ultimate source, even if it is symbolic, has important normative weight 
wanted in a constitutional polity. 
The fifth criterion is about the republic’s viability. The good polity will require a 
certain measure of constitutional resilience, or robustness.61 This is an obvious thing to 
say. However, beyond simply saying that a good regim  is only good if it is able to last, 
the issue here is that such a regime needs to include certain ways, mechanisms, 
institutions that make it resilient – without thereby becoming static. Any political regime 
is to some degree a modus vivendi or equilibrium – it holds while it holds, and there is no 
necessary assurance that it will remain the same way as designed and desired (on modus 
vivendi political theory, see Horton 2010). There are always sources of potential tilting of 
the equilibrium – disagreements, discoveries, shift o  numeric balances, and if nothing 
else, some calamity beyond human control. A good regim , then, will need to have 
provisions that make it less volatile, less vulnerable to both internal and external shocks, 
without making it impervious to any impulse. All ofthe above criteria, of course, can be 
mechanisms of resilience – and they can be exactly the opposite, too. Some other 
resilience mechanisms might be the idea of ‘constitutional precommitments’ (Holmes 
1988; Sunstein 1991), the realization of the dual role of citizenry as both subjects and 
authors of constitution (Habermas 2001), more generally the authority of a written 
Constitution (and a respected Court behind it), but most importantly, resilience would 
                                                
61 As noted earlier, ‘resilience’ is used in Polity IV vocabulary as the opposite of ‘state fragility’, quite 
consonant with the present use. ‘Resilience’ has also been taken up in some of republican political theory, 
although not necessarily as applying to political regime (and more often as ‘resilient liberty’); see 
Haakonssen (2012), Pettit (2007).   
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depend on a vigilant citizenry – the institutional resilience mechanisms depend on 
presence of a requisite political culture (pace, e.g., Weingast 1997: see in Ch 6).   
These five elements are both sufficient and necessary to depict a republic‘s 
essentials. First, let us take up why these five are “necessary”. Then we will take up why 
they are “sufficient” – that leading us toward elaborating on the ‘reluctance and caution’ 
accompanying this exercise to begin with. 
The five criteria are all necessary in a polity to recognize it as constitutional and a 
republic. When any of these five is missing – or more realistically, found to be in severe 
deficit – the republic will be in risk of becoming something else, something categorically 
different. The non-satisfaction of any of the first four criteria precipitates the emergence 
of some sort of a tyrannical regime (again, in a general sense employed by Murphy, 
2007). The sense of republic not serving the public good indicates severe corruption of 
the polity; absence of a meaningfully mixed regime suggests reliance on the goodwill of a 
hegemonic power; lack of social pluralism opens theway to intolerance, coercive 
conformism, and immoderate political life; and loss of popular sovereignty suggests the 
turning of citizens into subjects – an usurpation by which the collective constituent body 
loses any claim over what they have constituted themselves into. The fifth criterion 
concerns the very viability of the constitution – arepublic that lacks resilience in the face 
of daily challenges is one that soon does not exist: it either devolves into tyranny or first 
plunges into chaos, then producing a tyranny.  
All of these five criteria are of course closely interconnected – in the absence or 
weakness of one element, the presence or strength of e rest is endangered. Such 
interdependence may suggest that – by the logic of correlative or spurious relationships – 
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perhaps the really important criteria are some subset of the five and not all of them. Such 
a claim seems impossible to substantiate on logical grounds, let alone practical. While 
each criterion is closely tied to the rest, no single criterion is able to supplant the other. 
That said, it may be plausible to distinguish betwen a theory (or a sketch, as here) and 
political reality. Within a theory, it may be acceptable to suggest that some of the five 
criteria – say, popular sovereignty – would be satisfied, even if not mentioned, if the rest 
of the criteria are observed. That is different from saying that an actual good polity, 
lacking on any of the five criteria – say, a meaningful degree of popular sovereignty – is 
able to remain intact. Only all of them together produce what this project is concerned 
with: a good polity.    
But why are these five criteria – especially at this low level of specification – 
sufficient? Why not more criteria, and why not greater specification? To both questions, 
the answer lies in the conception of constitution as crafting. The five criteria set out, in 
very general terms, the core dimensions of a good polity. There can and probably will be 
more dimensions to any actual constitutional polity that will be considered important – 
although, probably any such dimension would be closely related to, or a sub-dimension 
of, one of the five. Most definitely all of the components of a republic will acquire much 
more detailed expression and practice – albeit much less amenable to singling out any of 
it – in an actual process of constitution. All of the content of a republic beyond the 
‘sufficient’ is left to be fulfilled in the crafting process. 
This is an important part of the overall argument in his work. Given the extremely 
encompassing range of issues that constitution implicates, straddling between normative 
and empirical arenas, too often political theory ends up reducing the complexity of the 
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subject matter in pursuit of intelligibility, or rather more accurately, amenability to 
political science. Some of the results of such reduction have been observed in the 
chapters above. Constitution is a holistic and practic l enterprise, and intellectual 
comprehension of it must take it as such if the hope is to understand and speak to it 
accurately. This practical holism of constitution, then, is also the reason why a theory 
ought not to engage in excessive elaboration of the contents of constitution. Engaging in 
such an exercise would be a priori theorizing. 
John Dewey may have addressed this concern as well as anyone. In his The Public 
and Its Problems (1954), Dewey points out the flaws of a priori political theory – the 
inevitable foundation of such theory on some formulations of human nature and human 
needs, which are themselves necessarily speculative, and the proceeding from such 
speculative foundations down (or up) to speculating about the observable (i.e. expected) 
political outcomes. The more reasonable way to proceed, for Dewey, is a posteriori, or 
depending on the consequences of actual political arr ngements. (This point is not to be 
confused with utilitarian consequentialism.) This is a key point of pragmatism.  
A contemporary pragmatic thinker, Roberto Unger hasargued for a comparable 
perspective contra ‘a priori’ philosophic thinking in a more radical language. He writes: 
“[T]he dominant styles of normative political philos phy today, particularly in the 
English-speaking countries, treat the formulation of ormative principles and ideals as an 
activity separate from, and prior to, the design of institutional arrangements,” and 
“suppose that the separation of institutional design from prescriptive principles, on one 
side, and from raw wants and intuitions, on the other, is necessary to ensure the 
transcendence of normative theory over historical context,” (1998: 17). He argues instead 
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that the transcending of context can only happen from being grounded in that context, by 
practical and institutional experimentation that takes place within the context just as it 
aims to transcend it. “We must win our independence from the context, not assume it by a 
conceptual sleight-of-hand,” and we need to realize that “institutional debates and 
experiments are not a separate and subsidiary exercise; they represent our most important 
way of defining and redefining the content of our ideals and interests,” (ibid: 18; italic 
added). Here, then, again is a strong statement for limits to theoretical elaboration in 
abstraction from context and practice.    
Not the least, this slim sketch of a good polity can be placed within Aristotle’s 
distinctions between political theory’s interests that can be expressed as being about a) 
the absolutely best constitution, b) the best generally possible constitution, and c) the best 
constitution possible for a given polity (Politics Bk 4, Ch 1). The present work is an 
exercise of the second kind (b). It is concerned with the best polity that is actually 
possible and is generally accepted as such in the contemporary world. Providing more 
specific elaboration of the constitution would lead this work in either direction on 
Aristotle’s ‘taxonomy’.  
 
Qualified and defined in these ways, then, is the empirically-based, realistic vision 
of a good polity that constitutional projects of today need to be oriented to. This vision 
being only a sketch, any particular constitutional case will very likely modify, 
‘customize’ the specific fit of all five elements of a good polity, and fill them with 
substance depending on its particular conditions. That takes the discussion to the next 
step. Consistent with the view of constitution as crafting, it is time now to consider some 
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practical elements, or aspects, of constituting that attend such crafting. Awareness of 
such elements is crucial in order to have the right idea of what constitutional crafting is, 
and why, for example, it is to be distinguished from constitutional choice, engineering, or 
design. To consideration of those elements we turn next.  
 
Three thin normative orientations 
Three of the elements concern the normative-procedural imension of a pragmatic 
republic, and are referred to as the ‘thin normative orientations’, or thin normative 
procedural principles. They are: pursuit of overlapping common goods; minimization of 
arbitrary use of political power; and adherence to a culture and principle of political 
moderation. They are ‘normative orientations’ in the sense of precipitating the political 
objectives, the wished-for goods that a republic might aim at. They are not by themselves 
concrete objectives or finite normative goods: they are imprecise for such a status, and 
only represent orientations toward more concrete – and always re-negotiable – goods that 
a public can pursue as a constitutional polity.  
Said otherwise, these orientations are thin-normative in the sense that they are 
relatively open-ended, not predefined philosophically before the act of constitution. In 
being thin normative orientations, what these three constitutional aspects introduce are 
the normative parameters within which, in the practice of constitution, the publics are 
able – intersubjectively, through negotiations, compromises, and debates – to specify 
more concrete – thicker, that is – normative content of their constitutionalism. In this 
crucial role, then, these normative orientations represent a bridge – or cover a gap – 
between, on the one hand, leaving the project fully open-ended, as exemplified in 
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Griffith’s phrase, “constitution is what happens”, where obviously the idea of 
constitutionalism itself would remain up in the air, and on the other hand, theoretically 
predefining the normative content of envisioned constitutionalism to a degree that 
forecloses the possibility of the relevant public debating on their values – ‘possibility’ 
which is generally more of a ‘factuality’ in the real world. In trying to define these 
orientations more clearly, it may be helpful to call them procedural principles – they refer 
to the procedural norms of constitutional crafting, without themselves being the 
objectives of crafting per se. But they are substantive procedural principles (much like the 
notion of ‘substantive due process’ in the United States constitutional jurisprudence) in 
that by following them, the constituent public alredy starts approaching the envisioned 
good polity. Let us consider each of these three principles.  
 
1. Pursuit of common goods  
A well-ordered political union of a people is first and foremost an undertaking in 
common interest. Be it in the fable of a social contract, in the practices of constitutional 
conventions, or in the actually existing and functioning polities, it is a valid and necessary 
assumption that the project is expected to serve interests and pursue goods that all of its 
participants consider applicable to them. It is quite obvious that such a union cannot be 
conceived as being opposed to the interests of its constituents – a public cannot be 
assumed to unite in order to hurt itself. But, less obviously but equally importantly, such 
an endeavor is intentional and purposive – people do not come together in a constitutional 
project ‘for no reason’, or ‘simply because’; nor can constitution be defended on purely 
deontological grounds – good political order is not an independent good, but a good 
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because it promises good life to its members. This po nt is ultimately Aristotelian in the 
sense that ‘all human beings aim at their good’ andthat good is happiness. Political 
constitution is the highest level of human organization, and so it promises the attainment 
of the human good to the highest level.  
Having said so, there are two important caveats that qu lify this point. First, it 
would be misleading to suggest that constitution is always and evenly animated – let 
alone ought to be so animated – by some unitary and highest-level visions of common 
good. While things like happiness, freedom, justice, and equality are all very attractive 
and always have gained public approval, they are so general that beyond being rallying 
cries, their utility in the constitutional process i  rather limited. They can, of course, be 
asserted as more than just battle cries, but that road would lead down radical ideologies of 
Marxist or fascist mold, producing regimes like those of the Soviet Union, Hitler’s 
Germany, or Mussolini’s Italy. Therefore, the normative constitutional orientation toward 
common goods is, on the one hand, just that, an orientation, and on the other hand, an 
opening to further and more concrete public goods and interests that can be culled out of 
this general orientation. 
The second related caveat concerns the plurality of common goods. Because the 
singular common good is mostly only an idea in a constitutional project, and because the 
practice of constitution – as long as non-totalitarian – tends to produce less teleological 
and singular conceptions of it, the plurality of it is inevitable. Just as the goods of liberty, 
equality, and justice are already plural, the more practical constitutional 
conceptualizations of these goods would be even more s . Because of that inevitable 
plurality of common goods and interests, this normative orientation is a source of 
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permanent public debating, negotiation, compromises, and settlements. Moreover, this 
plurality always features multiple levels and occasion  of overlaps: it is nearly 
unthinkable that discrete groups within a public will stably pursue their own distinct and 
discrete sets of goods. Distinct ethnic communities, interested in the good of their identity 
recognition, would overlap with others in their economic interests, and with still others in 
party alignments, and so on. This fact was argued very ably by Michael Walzer in his 
Spheres of Justice (1983), (see also Sen’s idea of plurality of legitimate claims to justice, 
2009: Introduction).  
Between these two caveats, an observation becomes relevant: in speaking of pursuit 
of common goods, two constitutive elements are involved: the subject (the public behind 
the pursuit) and the object (the common goods). Or, the publica and the res. Both these 
components are plural, complex, and evolving. For all these reasons, goal-setting or 
definition of constitutional common goods is not a one-time exercise dealt with by 
drafting caucuses (pace Murphy 2007) but necessarily  continuous and moving target, 
thus making the United States, post-2011 Egypt, and the post-Taleban Afghanistan all 
engaged in this pursuit, with or without understanding.    
What results from these observations – that orientation to common goods is not 
absolute,  and is not the hegemonic motivation for people, and that the actual realization 
process of those goods reveals unlimited plurality of more or less widely shared goods – 
is that common goods is always a subject of public deliberation, debating, and reaching 
agreements. That much was already proposed in the first element of the sketch of a good 
polity. What is of particular importance for this normative orientation is that it actually 
does remain a stable orientation toward common goods, that the public and its members 
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can – and do – regularly ascertain that debate is indeed geared toward common goods, 
that persuasive reasons are given why that is or isnot the case by protagonists, and that 
implementation of particular settlements can – and does – get appraised on its merits of 
serving common interests. It is that kind of a debat  that, for example, the United States 
has been having over healthcare reform and tax break extension in recent years. These 
examples readily alert one to dangers of subverting the debate, to the possibility of 
disingenuous factional interests coming to dominate or significantly skew the outcomes. 
The answer to such suspicions is, first, to sigh “alas, such dangers are ever the 
possibility”, and second, to point to the interdepend nce of all aspects of constitution, 
where checks upon the quality of deliberation on common goods are – as far as possible – 
to be provided by the remaining aspects below: limits on arbitrary use of power, political 
moderation, civic capabilities, and so on. In recognizing the inevitability of impairments 
in public deliberation, Cass Sunstein offers a good argument that one of the most 
important rationales for a system of separation of powers is precisely to mitigate such 
impairments (2001). Here, the remedies are suggested to reside both in institutions and in 
culture.        
 
2. Minimization of arbitrary use of political power 
Often, a constitutional order – and especially, a republican regime – are defined 
essentially by limitations on the power of governmet, another common term for which – 
not being synonymous with it – is rule of law62. When ‘limited government’ is 
                                                
62 But see Shannon Stimson (2008) for a broad overview of the concept of rule of law, its legalism and 




understood more politically, the doctrines of separation of powers, and of checks and 
balances are used. Constitutional theorists, as has been suggested in the earlier pages, 
tend to imply that they are clear, known with good certainty, and elicit some uniformity 
in terms of institutional apparatus. In truth, each and all of these several concepts are 
contested, have acquired wide-ranging meanings, and h ve been put under criticism in 
theoretical debates. They are ambiguous, widely varing, and caught in gaps between 
theories and practices of constitution, just like th erms citizen, nation, people, identity, 
and so on (cf. Tully 1995).  
Still, despite such contested and ambiguous status of this terminology, these ideas 
have firmly become the accepted vocabulary of the modern constitutionalism and sine 
qua non of constitutionalism in practice – albeit too often at the level of declarations. The 
realization long since made has been that when entrusted to single hands, power tends to 
be abused, absolute power being abused absolutely, to use Lord Acton’s quip. Regarding 
abuse of political power, perhaps Montesquieu reasoned very clearly: “[Political liberty] 
is there only when there is no abuse of power. But constant experience shows as that 
every man invested with power as apt to abuse it, and c rry his authority as far as it will 
go. […] To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power 
should be a check to power,” (Bk 11, Ch 4:150). Thus, the importance of this set of 
concepts is beyond question, and they are what comprise the intentionally broadly put 
normative orientation toward minimization of arbitrary use of power. Several points need 
to be noted here. 
First, by referring to minimization as opposed to prevention of such abuse, it is 
maintained that in a realistic constitutional project, what is important is a stable 
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orientation rather than a terminal achievement. Political power granted to, and wielded 
by, formal (as well as less formal, such as political parties and factions) institutions of 
governance is a dynamic and continuous phenomenon that precludes any resolution ‘once 
and forever’. The best hope for avoiding institutional power abuse that a constitutional 
project can be oriented to is ‘institutional design writ small’ (Vermeule 2007). More 
generally said, this constitutional desiderata encompasses too many relevant actors and 
processes, too many potential sources of abuse and of guarding against abuse, that it is 
not entirely meaningful to try to secure it solely or even mainly by ‘institutional design 
write large’. 
One problem especially illustrative of the potential futility of preventing abuse 
through institutional design is the phenomenon of emergency powers, usually granted to 
the executive in times of war and other special circumstances, (see Schlesinger 1973; 
also, Mansfield 1993; for a less usual, ‘non-panicky’ argument, see Vermeule 2006, and 
Posner and Vermeule 2007). Many examples of usurping such power are found in 
Machiavelli’s Discourses (1950: esp. 218-224, the case of Appius Claudius), usually 
corrected only with difficulty and losses. John Locke, a father of liberal 
constitutionalism, had little else to say on the danger of abuse of executive prerogatives 
except to moralize that such a thing would be wrong, and that the usurper would be 
referred to their own conscience and to higher authorities above earth (The Second 
Treatise: Ch XIV, §168). Thus, the limits of limiting power through institutional design 
lead to the next point.  
This second point is that the orientation to minimization of power abuse involves 
much more than resorts to institutional design at any level. Particularly, it raises the 
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relevance of civic society and, more generally, a political culture that both populates the 
constitution with all its power distributions and guards its working in the day-to-day 
political life. Absent a relevant and capable culture of vigilance within the society against 
such abuse, no formal institutional contrivance of balances and checks is able to last. The 
upshot of this is to join the arguments for viewing state (and politics) as integrally parts 
of society, as opposed to viewing them as two separate realms, (e.g. Migdal 2001, 1988; 
Eckstein et al 1998). Therefore, it is plausible to speak, at a general level, not so much (or 
at least, as much) of ‘limited government’ – the outc me that is aimed – as of political 
culture of vigilance – the mode of civic life that secures and guards that outcome. 
A third point raised here, related to the first and especially second point above, is 
the broadening of focus in pursuing proper use of pwer. By speaking of ‘limited 
government’, and by invoking the common concepts like separation of powers, the 
automatic tendency is to think of the higher level, c ntral institutions of government in a 
polity. However, the loci of authority, and hence, of chances of abusing entrusted power, 
are multiple, (see, e.g., Eckstein 1998: 5). Within subunits of a state and its government, 
various social and political organizations, political parties, trade unions, down to 
universities and schools, there are ‘patterns of authority’ (Eckstein and Gurr 1975), and 
therein,  venues for potential abuse of authoritative power which are generally just as 
unwelcome as abuse at high levels of government. A political culture of vigilance can be 
the general bulwark against all levels of abuse, whereas preoccupation with ‘limited 
government’ leaves out too much relevant space.     
A last point concerning minimization of power abuse i  the fluidity of the very 
problem itself. It is never quite measurable and knowable with certainty. Rather, any 
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occasion or pattern of abuse is determined ultimately by a ‘thermometer’ of public 
perceptions, understood much more broadly than the ‘thermometers’ of attitudinal survey 
methodologists. Democratic politics are almost guaranteed to always have some parts of 
a public crying out “SOS”. For some people, President Obama’s forging of the healthcare 
law is an instance of abuse, whereas for some European olities it is only a weak act 
proposed by an embattled president; and in a ‘democracy’ like Kyrgyzstan, an abuse of 
power is noted by the general public at a much later s age when it starts to involve 
physical victims.63 Because of this fluid and floating nature of power abuse, it is all the 
more important that a respective culture of vigilance is stressed, and that institutional 
design measures – particularly at the level of constitutional theory – be regarded within a 
broader context.   
 
3. Adherence to a culture of political moderation 
Having spoken of a culture of vigilance as essential to minimizing the arbitrary uses 
of power, the next topic, a culture of political moderation, may sound rather contradictory 
at first: the two cultural outlooks seem to point i opposing directions. But that is not so, 
as will become clear. In fact, as will be shown, the wo require each other in order to be 
sustainable.  
Moderation is one of the key moral virtues taken up from the very beginning of 
political thought – depicted by its lack in the ancie t Greek tragedies and comedies, 
stressed for the mishaps that its absence creates in Thucydides’ History, and discussed as 
a virtue (more often as temperance) in Plato and Aristotle. In a more clearly political 
                                                
63 Both of Kyrgyzstan’s recent revolutions, 2005 and 2006, had as their precursors increasingly violent 
tactics of securing power by the respectively incumbent presidents. 
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application, moderation runs through the constitutional teaching of The Spirit of Laws 
and defined, therein, as the political principle of republican government.64 Presently, too, 
moderation is invoked more in its political relevance, less as a purely moral virtue, while 
recognizing the ultimate fogginess of the division between morality and politics, (for an 
illustration, see Murphy 2007: Ch. 1; see also Craiutu 2012 on moderation’s movement 
from morality into politics).  
A modern republic, being a composite public – even if not a ‘compound republic’ 
(see Ostrom 2008), is only able to survive when there is an overarching adherence to the 
principle of moderation. Allowing immoderation opens doors to various kinds of 
generally unacceptable propositions, to introduction of intolerant and radical demands 
amongst public, to political behavior that disregards its political environment, and 
generally, to instability of the constitutional orde . It is, however, easier in this manner to 
come up with what moderation is not; it is much more difficult define what moderation 
is. Political moderation cannot be defined a priori in a specific way. It is something like 
temperature and air conditioning. While there is a common acceptance that somewhere 
between 65 and 75 degrees of Fahrenheit is a ‘good temperature’, there is no specific 
single level which can be defined as ‘The good temprature’. That temperature shifts 
within a certain range depending on the time of the day, season of year, climatic range 
around the world, and the goodness of a given temperatur  is determined by perception. 
Similarly, moderation is a matter of perception and good sense. It is possibly because of 
this “mushiness” that moderation has not been a popular theme in recent times, with 
                                                
64 Montesquieu (1949) writes of aristocratic republic: “Moderation is therefore the very soul of this 
government; a moderation, I mean, founded on virtue, not that which proceeds from indolence and 
pusillanimity” (Bk 3, Ch 4: 23). Later he writes: “Democratic and aristocratic states are not in their own 
nature free. Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments. … It is only there when there is 
no abuse of power,” (Bk 11, Ch 4: 150), thereby leading into the discussion of separation of powers. 
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recent exceptions being introduced by Craiutu (2001; 2012) and Soltan (2010; 2008a; 
2008b) among few others. 
There have been, however, some other ways of talking about moderation without 
using the word itself. One is John Rawls’s criterion f ‘reasonability’ which is, 
ultimately, called upon to carry out the same task that moderation is asked to do 
presently, only ‘the reasonable’ is more specific and thus narrower. Something close to a 
definition is offered by Rawls. “Rather than define th  reasonable directly, I specify two 
of its basic aspects as virtues of persons,” (1993: 48; see also fn. 1 in the same page). 
“Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to 
propose principles and standards as fair terms of co peration and to abide by them 
willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so,” (ibid: 49). “The second 
basic aspect … is the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept 
their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the legitimate exercise of 
political power in a constitutional regime,” (ibid: 54). This is very close to a principle of 
moderation but it fails seriously as a substitute for it: moderation is far more of a practical 
virtue than intellectual, whereas reasonability has a strong affinity to intellectual virtues.  
Another alternative, much closer to moderation, is civility (see, e.g. Boyd 2004), a 
term for an appropriate, civil behavior for members of a good society. Toleration is yet 
another concept close in meaning to moderation but coming from (and often still staying 
in) religious discourse (for its broader political application, see Walzer, On Toleration 
1990; for religious toleration, see Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration). One more 
interesting concept of relevance, needing more elaboration, is the idea of ‘political 
sobriety’ that Margaret Canovan finds in Hannah Arendt’s works (cited in Boyte 2011: 
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91-92). The list could go on. Political moderation may have been an inconvenient topic to 
discuss for contemporary political theory – as opposed to, say, Montesquieu – but its 
import has nonetheless been tackled from various angles rather richly. It is necessary, 
however, for constitutional theory to put political moderation – not its substitutes – in the 
center.  
The difficulty of having a clear measurement or definition of moderation was 
already noted in Aristotle’s work. The concept of the ‘mean’ is quite precisely the term 
for moderation in general. The mean was Aristotle’s criterion of virtue: being placed 
between too much and too little (or any other range of xtremes), virtue was none other 
than the mean level of any such range. Aristotle went on to highlight that mean was not 
the same as ‘middle’, and that it often tended to be closer to one extreme than to another 
– all due to the absence of any acceptable metric and the infinite complexity of situations 
and themes where the mean would apply. The real solution to defining moderation, then, 
is left to political life where it applies. It is an orientative concept that acquires its 
meaning within the particular context, in accordance with the social norms that inform 
the context and form the basis of judgment. Most of B ok I of Ethics elaborates on this 
theme. Political moderation is something that can be concretized only within the political 
setting where it is raised – and Aristotle had enough to say about imprecision of politics 
itself as a subject of inquiry (see, e.g., Ethics: Bk. 1, Ch3; Bk. 2, Ch. 2).65  
This leads to the solution of that seeming contradiction between moderation and the 
culture of vigilance mentioned earlier. If moderation is the mean, then any departure to 
                                                
65 For a broad-ranging discussion of Aristotle’s political philosophy – including its elements referred to 
presently – and its import for modern social theory and for liberal democracy, see Stephen Salkever, 
Finding the Mean (1990). By Salkever’s understanding of Aristotle, he present work can be generally 
described as Aristotelian.  
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extremes is by definition a violation of the principle of moderation. Political life, 
obviously, is a dynamic and continuous flow that does not automatically stay on a set 
course, and is constantly pushed and pulled to extremes. At every moment that politics 
moves to extremes, moderation has been compromised. If that happens often, moderation 
does not exist. Therefore, moderation needs to be ro ust, resilient, vigilant. Vigilant 
moderation, perhaps, is semantically somewhat less contradictory than ‘militant 
moderation’ of which Soltan writes (2008), but the id a is the same: moderation must be 
able to meet immoderation, and to prevail in such an encounter. The dependence applies 
in the other direction as well. Insofar as vigilance is needed to guard against abuses of 
power, immoderate vigilance would clearly fail that t sk. Hence, there is no contradiction 
but, conversely, interdependence between the two requirements. 
These three encompassing aspects of constitution – c mmitment to common goods, 
political vigilance, and a culture of moderation – make up the core normative orientations 
of a republic. They are thin normative, again, in being orientations or procedural 
principles rather than substantive values or dicta; they direct toward the kinds of norms 
that are necessary for a republic’s emergence and sustainability – in other words, for 
meeting the criteria of a republic sketched at the top of the chapter. The more specific, 
thick normative content of a republic is the product of political life: it is both futile and 







Three basic empirical conditions 
There are, now, three more aspects in a constitutional endeavor to which pragmatic 
republicanism requires heeding. They may be called th  three basic empirical conditions 
of constitution: civic capabilities, constitutional context, and continuity. A short foreword 
on what these basic conditions do for constitution is pertinent: they are a crucial element 
that brings the political-ness of constitution home. 
The above thin normative orientations channel constitutional crafting toward what 
is aimed at, a good republic. It has been stressed how important it is to keep these 
orientations thin normative – giving a more complete, stronger definitio  to the aimed 
polity would be equal to assuming the role of Rousseau’s mythical Lawgiver, or even 
better, usurpation of the General Will, or – more generally and familiarly – repeating the 
mistakes of much of ‘ideal’ political theory. That may be argued to produce good 
political theory, but it certainly would be bad constitutional thinking. Stressing the 
importance of this incompleteness is a way of stresing the role left to the concerned 
public.66 The substantive normative details of the polity being constituted must be filled 
out by the public: not at once, not forever, but in a continual constitutional process of 
testing, negotiating, and settling. This automatically turns attention to the public itself, the 
public in res publica. The possible constitution is the one attainable for the given public 
with its incumbent make-up, context, history, and more – and hence, the basic empirical 
conditions. This tight-knit interconnection between the normative orientations and the 
basic conditions constitutes a serious corrective on ideal theory (as criticized in Elkin 
2004), and on modern constitutionalism (as criticized in Tully 1995). The corrective’s 
                                                
66 Again, consider the illuminating if ultimately not wholly agreeable exchange about “the virtue of 
incompletion” between Walzer (1990) and Heller (1990). 
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bottom line is, indeed, to retain the political-ness of constitution – the thrust of the 
argument being proposed in this work.  
Having thus stressed the centrality and consequentiality of these basic empirical 
conditions, it is now time to consider each of these three aspects in turns. As these 
outlines proceed, it should also become clear in what status, or relation, each stands vis-à-
vis the other two. They are closely intertwined. The chief aspect of interest is civic 
capabilities: the success or failure of any constitutional project, to the extent that 
‘constitution’ entails human activity or performance, is squarely determined by the 
availability of corresponding capabilities. However, a pragmatic understanding of 
capabilities requires awareness of two circumstances of capabilities: their situation within 
a political context, and their existence within a condition of continuity. Neither context 
nor continuity is to be taken as a static given. Context is a given at any concrete moment 
but it is changeable, and not in the least – by application of capabilities. Continuity, too, 
is not an assertion of some unbent line in the historicist (as opposed to historical) manner. 
Rather, it is an ontological concept denoting un-interruptibility of social life, within 
which both context and capabilities evolve in interaction with each other. For 
constitutional thought, continuity might be said to be a ‘disciplining’ condition; it rejects 
as unsustainable any discontinuous projects, be they messianic visions (e.g., see Aron 
2001), engineering of a Huxley-an mold, or, closer to home, constitutional designing in 
abstraction from capabilities and contexts. While hstory has witnessed not a few of such 
discontinuous projects, pragmatic republicanism advises that such projects were never 




In an ideal world of expressive (linguistic) capability, these three concepts would 
have been discussed in a seamlessly flowing single text. Lacking that capability, the next 
good trick of analytic writing is to divide the discussion into a section on each; that is 
because the third thinkable strategy – speaking of only one concept instead of three (if 
they are effectively one thing), say, of only capabilities – is too often used, and too often 
it leads eventually to neglect of components that happened to be ‘incorporated’ into one. 
 
1. Civic capabilities – the basic condition of constitutional possibility 
‘Civic capabilities’ is, thus, the first of the three aspects to be taken up. When we 
think about constitution of a good polity – that is, when we imagine a desirable end 
product of constitution – we are hostage first and foremost to the capabilities of the 
human society under question. There is no way out of this reliance on extant and potential 
capabilities of people. The moment a constitutional thinker drops that factor out of her 
view, the work is dead; the moment a constitutional thinker adopts some operationalized, 
simplified, uniform assumption about such capabilities, the theory is flawed. So, the 
foremost concern of any constitutional thinker needs to be with the political, or civic, 
capabilities actually found and realistically attainable among the people. 
Civic capabilities are the general capabilities of the people in question for coming 
together for sustained periods of time in productive (not destructive) relationships to 
achieve for themselves a condition of governance that precludes anarchy and provides 
reasonable levels of general predictability and security. This suggests, just as was 
suggested earlier, there is an unbroken link between capabilities and institutions: civic 
capabilities are capabilities for instituting stable public relations. Civic capabilities are by 
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definition capabilities for collective undertakings or collective engagements; moreover, 
they are capabilities pertaining to the question of collective order and governance, and 
not just any human capabilities. 
To the question of ‘whose capabilities?’, it is obviously not fully satisfactory to say 
‘people’, or even ‘citizens’: in a practical constitu onal project, every person’s 
capabilities as a citizen cannot be the same as every other person’s. There will always be 
those who exhibit and employ greater and more sophiticated capabilities. In 
constitutional development, such citizens and groups – who are normally known as the as 
political elites, leaders, and civic activists – will be the vanguards, and will lead other 
citizens in enhancing their capabilities as constitutional partakers. However, in 
recognizing this practical and inevitable inequality n capability attainment, it is 
important not to fall in the trap of incidentally reifying narrow elitism and crude classism. 
While these latter phenomena are empirically possible, they are not so common, and in 
reality, any ‘elite’ is itself a pluralistic category, containing the seeds of its internal self-
control and of the need to appeal to the broader public anyway. Strictly equal civic 
capabilities across a whole citizenry would inevitably mean rather mediocre if not worse 
capabilities of all; however, overly insulated capability inequalities are neither very 
realistic, nor a good thing constitutionally. It with this recognition that, here, civic 
capabilities are said to be those of citizens, withou  distinctions and categorizations.       
Today it is almost impossible to speak of capabilities without invoking the names of 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Their works have richly defined and set up a broad 
agenda for the concept of capabilities; an agenda that, now called ‘the capabilities 
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approach’, has been picked up by numerous followers and some critics.67 The present 
reference to capabilities does not go counter to the thrust of the arguments of these 
theorists; it is particularly congenial to the criti al – or rather, corrective – contributions 
of both regarding John Rawls’s project (Sen 2009; Nussbaum 2006). What they offer in 
these respective works is a reworking of the idea of social justice that is more properly fit 
for the actually existing world of widely varying human capabilities. They bring, in other 
words, the Rawlsian ideal theory down to the realiti s of contemporary societies: a 
perspective shared in this work. Needless to say, Nussbaum and Sen are unequalled in 
providing the philosophic foundations of their concept of capabilities – something this 
work humbly leaves alone.  
But there is a difference of application of the idea of capabilities. The difference 
here is dictated, obviously, by the fact that this is an engagement in constitutional 
thought: civic capabilities are what determine the possibilities of a constitutional project. 
In the Sen-Nussbaum capabilities approach, the application is more often of a diagnostic 
kind: it is interested in evaluating development projects, national policies, theories of 
justice, or constitutions by asking to what extent a y of these increases and/or upholds 
human capabilities (or functionings, as it is also referred). For pragmatic republicanism, 
civic capabilities are rather the main agency factor determining the nature and the 
outlines of a constitutional endeavor. That is, instead of capabilities being dependent on 
good policies, theories and constitutions, here the capabilities are seen as defining the 
constitution and corresponding policies and so on. To be especially stressed: here, the 
public of whose capabilities we are speaking is the author (or maker, designer) of 
                                                
67 See Martha Nussbaum’s Creating Capabilities (2011), for a long but admittedly still incomplete 
bibliography of works both by Nussbaum and Sen, and by other ‘capabilities approach’ writers. 
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constitution as well as the user or consumer of it. In much of the capabilities approach 
works, the emphasis is on the latter.  
Regardless of which angle it is viewed from, the ida of capabilities as they relate to 
social and political life certainly owes much to Aristotle – the key inspiration for 
Nussbaum in particular. In Politics, Aristotle makes numerous references to the 
importance or relevance of capabilities – in constitutional change and preservation, in 
issues of citizenship and especially good citizenship, and on fit between peoples and 
constitutions, to name a few. There are, however, some other later thinkers equally 
eloquent on the decisive factor of citizens’ capabilities, and possibly more direct than 
Aristotle. Among such works, one must include Montesquieu – his discussion of the 
customs and norms of a people, of the various historical evidence from various parts of 
the world (he spends especially much ink on China), and how all of these inform ‘the 
spirit of laws’ appropriate for each people: these parts of L’Esprit de Lois are about the 
capabilities that we are interested in.  
Thus, civic capabilities is a fundamental concern that constitutional thinking cannot 
avoid or take easy – these capabilities are what make constitution, just as constitution 
nurtures them. Capabilities, lacking any corporal dimension, are evidenced by the 
presence and shape of civic institutions, such that lack of institutions – which would 
suggest disorder, anarchy, absence of governance – indicates weakness of civic 
capabilities. Capabilities are not abstract or universally homogeneous goods; they exist 
and are cultivated or suppressed in the particular environment and history of a given case. 




2. Constitutional context - situating civic capabilities 
The civic capabilities, as already noted, are not about some universal capabilities, 
such as human rationality, human gregariousness, human selfishness, and so on – that is, 
not about any of these in the abstract. Rather, the concept is here employed within the 
broader engagement of the question of real, possible political constitution. If so, then the 
concern is with empirically observed, uneven, multi-level, and variable capabilities; in a 
word, situated capabilities. Hence, the attention needs to also turn to the constitutional 
context: the ‘situation’ where capabilities are found. One could easily apply here the old 
language of agency and structure – our two concepts are almost precisely a variation of 
that, it seems. However, that conceptual dualism is very problematic, tending – as it does 
– to over-define two very distinct universes that always compete as much as they interact, 
making it nearly impossible to bridge the problem back together, (see Mahoney and 
Snyder 1999). Instead, capabilities and context, at le st in thinking about constitution, 
must be viewed as inseparably inhering in each other. They are in a co-creative 
relationship to each other, and as such, they create constitutional order.    
Context may be understood as the given but changeable environment of capabilities 
at any given time. In a constitutional process, civic capabilities always deal with the 
given constitutional context with a view to transgressing its limitations – to making it 
ever more congenial to the desired constitutional order. With every ‘unit’ of successful 
transgression, the context will become different from before, and correspondingly, 
capabilities become different, because capabilities are shaped by context all the while 
aiming to transgress it. In this manner, the context acts as both a constraining and an 
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enabling environment: capabilities are gained and tested generally in that process of 
facing up to context, in the process of transgressing it.   
Saying ‘constitutional context’ does not imply, in general, any limits on where that 
context ends: such limits will need to be ‘felt’ and faced in the practice of constitution, 
and even at that, never be settled conclusively. Potentially, the limit is the whole world. 
To the extent that a global consensus on relevant constitutional issues has any effect on a 
particular case – be it consensus on goodness of democracy over autocracy, on necessity 
of separation of powers, or on the validity of the claim for human dignity – these 
considerations certainly fall within the limits of pertinent constitutional context. This is 
how the arguments about universal civilization being the ultimate criterion of ‘global 
constitutionalism’ can make sense, (Soltan 2008a and 2010; Kumm 2009; see also 
Ferrajoli 1996). More often and more effectively, however, the context of a constitutional 
project is still centered on the limits of a nation-state: occasionally its outer 
neighborhood, occasionally its subunits, but mostly the whole of a state.           
Not to leave this discussion too unspecific, three spheres of relevant context may be 
marked out. The division into three is only nominal, nd is for the facility of 
understanding the possible scope of relevant contextual conditions. Thus, one may speak 
of a geopolitical- geoeconomic (or, simply geopolitical) sphere as the general macro-
context surrounding the state under constitution. It is about what influential, 
consequential relations with the outside world the polity has – with the understanding that 
some of those relations would have encouraging effect or constitutional development, 
some will have deleterious effect, and some may even be neutral. In contemporary world, 
where the term ‘interdependency’ is the sine qua non of international relations, this is 
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crucial for the chances of any constitutional project. In this regard, one might argue that 
the neighborhood of the post-communist East-Central European states was a crucial 
positive factor for democratization (e.g. Tudoroiu 2010), whereas a country like 
Kyrgyzstan needs to transgress its geopolitical context en route to democratization.  The 
historic-cultural sphere would refer to the cultural, value, identity characteristics of the 
given community, or its make-up, as developed over time. It may include such factors as 
mono- or inter- or multi-cultural population, the ways in which such cultural make-up has 
appeared and conditioned the society. A brilliant discussion of constitutionally central 
historic-cultural context is the already cited work by James Tully, Strange Multiplicity 
(1995). Among other things, the emphasis on this contextual aspect is as a cautionary 
sign for those who have championed unrealistic, imag nary tales of multiculturalism – a 
deep problem now faced by even such supposedly established societies as Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, let alone less established ones (see, 
generally, Choudhry 2008). Lastly, the socio-economic sphere draws focus upon issues of 
class divisions and differences, economic welfare disparities, educational hardships and 
inequality, gender inequality, and so on. This set of contextual problems is the most 
common concern of Nussbaum’s and Sen’s works about problems skewing human 
capabilities; a very relevant argument about capabilities from this angle is that by James 
Bohman (1998) in a critique of mostly Rawlsian delib rative theory. 
 
Thus, constitutional context is the environment within which capabilities are found 
and which these capabilities shape, change, transgres , or rely on, in turn. Civic 
capabilities in present usage are not about natural and universal capacities of speech, 
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reproduction, or even reasoning. The concern here is with the highly varied and 
changeable capabilities for participation in the constitutional process, capabilities to build 
and sustain institutions of public governance. For an appropriate understanding of 
capabilities, then, it is indispensable to be aware of the relevant context. Context can 
itself include institutions – each of the suggested hree spheres of context have 
institutional elements in them – but it comprises more than just institutions. In fact, in 
certain severely problematic constitutional sites, he very absence or persistent failures of 
sustaining any institutions – the condition of anarchy, chaos, day-to-day instability – is 
the relevant context in its constraining function.   
 
3. Continuity – the basic empirical accountability condition 
Both capabilities and context occur within an ontological condition of continuity; 
constitution as a whole takes places within continuity. At the most general level, 
becoming tautological, time as such is continuous, and hence, anything that happens 
across time happens under continuity. But the point here is not to press such tautologies. 
In political thought as well as practice, the condition of continuity is disregarded rather 
often: when done in thought, it produces utopia, when disregarded in practice – it is often 
human disaster. For a political endeavor that aims at producing a sustainable and good 
political order, given the rather manifest limits of human achievement over recent 
centuries, continuity must be abided by. It may therefore be called a ‘disciplining’ 




 At one level, there is little novelty in invoking continuity – political scientists 
constantly talk of continuity (and change), (e.g. many IR and CP textbooks; more 
relevantly, Luong 2002), by which they usually mean a persistence of certain political 
phenomena, their refusal to easily change. But while t at general idea in such usage is not 
contrary to the one here, it tends to be either too narrowly construed or left too oblique. 
The more elaborate discussion of political continuies under the theme of path 
dependence also fails to deliver the whole of its import by downplaying the role of civic 
capabilities and tending instead toward a form of structural determinism (see Pierson 
2000). To do its ‘disciplining’ job in crafting, continuity therefore needs to be explicitly 
specified in its constitutionally relevant meaning. 
 Continuity means that a constitutional project, insofar as it is a transformation of 
one state of political life into another, must be aware that both the initial and the 
subsequent state are but instantiations of an actually continuous lived experience. Civic 
capabilities do not suddenly materialize from nowhere into the present, and cannot 
suddenly become different tomorrow from what they are now; the relevant context does 
not come into being out of previous non-being, only to suddenly fall into yet another 
different state of being. By stressing these, continuity does not require tracing the origins 
of the current state into an indefinite past, or tracing the possibilities of the present into an 
indefinite future – that is just impossible. What it requires is adherence to a level of 
political sobriety concerning what is possible how and when. Constitution takes place not 
only in media res, but in continuous media res. 
 In more concrete terms, continuity advises against revolutionary approach to 
constituting better orders; it advises instead gradual, steadier paced proceeding. 
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Revolutions are the closest to ‘suddenly falling into a different state’ in politics: they are 
by definition disruptive, spontaneous, unpredictable. Because of these all, revolutions 
tend to be weak on keeping their achievements, tend to end up where nobody wanted or 
expected, and tend to cause unwelcome and un-consented suffering to the public – none 
of these conform to the idea of constituting a good r er. It also advises against taking 
the best known models as blueprint for constitutional crafting at early stages of the 
project. Taking Switzerland, or Austria, or even Sigapore as models for emulating by 
Kyrgyzstan, for example – models that were entertained indeed – would predictably not 
work. Edmund Burke makes the point well in extolling the greatness of the long tradition 
of inheritance of both the Crown and the public liberties in Britain. He writes: “This 
policy appears to me to be the result of profound reflection, or rather the happy effect of 
following nature, which is wisdom without reflection, and above it.” And he goes on: “A 
spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views,” (Burke 
1987: 29). 
 Not to mislead, the idea of continuity here is notan argument for shunning change 
and embracing an unchanging preservation, as sometimes erroneously Burkean 
conservatism gets construed based on his notions of constitutional inheritance and 
prescription (ibid; see Jacobsohn 2006 for intelligent discussion of Burke on these). 
Change is possible and welcome under the condition of continuity. Burke himself clearly 
says: “the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation and a sure 
principle of transmission, without at all excluding a principle of improvement,” (Burke, 
ibid; italics added).  
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 Famously, Burke intimated these ideas in reflecting o  the Revolution in France. 
He was exceedingly eloquent in pointing out the calamities that the revolution had given 
rise to. But was the French Revolution, even at the price of such calamities, able to 
disregard continuity and build a Novus Ordo? Some half a century after the revolution, 
Tocqueville would conduct some serious research to conclude that there were principal 
continuities running from before the revolution through its posterity, rendering the French 
Revolution essentially a short-run disruption at best and a costly enterprise more 
generally, (Tocqueville 2008). A more positive continuity before and after revolution is 
observed in the case of America in an essay by Jacob Levy; he argues that the American 
Republic was “not so novus an order” but rather a continuation of constitutionalism 
found in the preexisting state constitutional orders, in the pre-Union America, and further 
back, in the European political heritage (Levy 2009).  
 Thus, an accounting for the ontological inevitability of continuity in constitution 
introduces discipline, a political sobriety. In doing so, it not only renders constitutional 
endeavors more realistic and more capable of succeeding, but also makes them more 
aware of costs involved in deviating from it. More specifically, “the convention” of 
continuity secures the health of cultural ways and lives of involved peoples, as opposed 
to disruption, violence, and domination that discontinuity gives rise to, as Tully points out 
(1995: esp. 124ff). Machiavelli advised a new prince, upon conquering a city – if he did 
“not wish to establish there either a monarchy or a republic” – that “the best means for 
holding that principality” would be “to organize the government entirely anew”, that is, 
to entirely discontinue its preceding order, (1950: 183-184, italic added). Establishing a 
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republic being precisely the objective, a pragmatic republican constitutional project 
requires exactly the opposite: working within continuity.       
 
Conclusion 
This sketch of a desirable polity – republic – and these six aspects of a pragmatic 
constitutional endeavor make up the guiding parameters of constitution. The sketch is the 
general vision of what would define a possible republic – a vision based on already 
known and generally agreed features that modern constitutional orders carry. The three 
thin normative orientations describe the necessary no mative directions that a particular 
constitutional project requires to abide by. The three basic empirical conditions guide 
such a project to the general constitutional ‘givens’ that will keep the effort always 
grounded in its reality. How are these several elemnts to be put together to produce a 
constitutional whole? Theory by itself cannot propose that final operation, just as it 
cannot concretize even these elements beyond the general outlines just presented. Putting 
them all together into a moving, lived whole, filling them with more specific content, is 
the task that must be left to constitutional action itself. What is possible to propose at this 
stage, short of plunging into such constitutional action, is to consider the likely nature of 
that action. In pragmatic republican view, constitutional action is best conceived as 
crafting.  
 Crafting can be thought of as the action of constitution. It is the whole process 
where all the above elements become engaged. What is observable with any clarity in the 
actual constitutional process is crafting, but not the several elements that go into it. The 
normative orientations and the empirical conditions do not appear, one after another, in 
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clear, distinguishable shapes. They come all mixed together in an organic process. 















































This chapter is an attempt to explain and give more sp cificity to the idea of 
constitution as crafting. In the unfolding discussion to this point, the recurring idea has 
been that constitution (the activity) requires a pers ctive that is practical, capable of 
imagining the possible political development from the actual historical context of a given 
society. In such an approach, constitutional thought must not be tied to purity of logic, 
must not depend on the feasibility of distilling away all the inconveniences of political 
life that defy theoretical control or parsimony, and should be able to accompany the 
practice of a constitutional project beyond providing detached intellectual blueprints. 
Constitutional crafting is proposed as such a perspective.  
Below is an attempt to articulate this perspective. As said in the chapter conclusion 
above, the several elements of constitution in pragmatic republican view are not generally 
to be observed in an actual political process. While they could be described for the 
present purposes as if they were discrete, that would nly apply for a conceptual 
discussion. Constitutional crafting, as the political process as it actually unfolds, features 
all of those several elements in an organic mix – in their ‘natural habitat’, as it were. How 
does one explain this fluid ‘bricolage’ of many elements? It is a challenging order. In the 
following, besides more strictly conceptual propositi ns about crafting, resort will be 
made to the example of the craft of saddle-making, to selective critical remarks on some 
non-crafting approaches to constitution, and to an example of well-crafted constitution – 




On the Craft of Saddle-Making 
For a start, depiction of a more mundane instance of rafting may be helpful. There 
is an old and very interesting craft of saddle-making.68 The best and most expensive 
saddles are products of craftsmanship, not of assembly-line factory production. So what 
is involved in crafting a saddle? Let us imagine a possible history of this craft. A saddle is 
a necessary practical convenience; without it, it is almost impossible to ride a horse 
which for some people and at some periods is an indispensable activity for livelihood. It 
is probably unknown now when exactly saddles started to appear – mass use of them was 
not known to the armies of Alexander the Great, some sources say. At the very 
beginning, the first saddle-makers must have been rathe  amateurish, inexperienced (how 
could they be?) dilettantes who just thought that having a comfortable seat on the horse 
would be good. So, they must have produced what their imagination was capable of. 
Soon – probably as soon as the first saddle was mounted on a horse – they must 
have realized that their saddle did not fit the horse very well and was inconvenient for the 
rider to sit on; and when they decided to take it for a test ride anyway, within the first few 
seconds of galloping the saddle must have either come l ose, taking the rider down with 
it, or more likely, it must have broken. The saddle-makers may not have rushed 
immediately back to their workshop, but soon enough the continued inconvenience of 
riding without a seat, coupled with the clarity of what was missing in the first saddle, 
must have led the craftsmen back to work. Most likely, they did not succeed in resolving 
all of the probable mistakes in one try; but also likely, with every new trial, the saddle 
was lasting slightly longer, was slightly more conve ient for the rider and less painful for 
                                                
68 This imagined history of saddle-making is just imagined, not based on a research into the subject. 
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the horse (we, of course, omitted the concurrent challenge of taming the horse to agree to 
be saddled).  
As the improvement continued, more and more novices mu t have gotten interested 
in the craft and wished to learn it. The original sddle-makers, gaining ever more 
experience and seeing fast growing demand, and thus needing helpers, should have then 
admitted some of those people to apprenticeship – of course not just anybody, but their 
friends, sons, relatives, or neighbors’ sons who shwed promise. A few of those 
apprentices were probably especially gifted, suggesting new ideas that the masters had 
not thought of. With each new and improved saddle, th  craftsmen probably received 
more and more positive feedback, praise, and reputation. As they did so, incidentally, 
they probably started to live better lives than befor , too.  
 
With ever growing demand for this invention, there of course must have been an 
ever growing number of saddle-makers, or now – saddle-making workshops. Some of 
those were probably completely new starts by novices who were good at making things 
(‘handymen’) but who had never made a saddle – had only seen and used them. Some 
others, very likely, were those apprentices of original saddlers who were especially gifted 
and eventually branched off to be on their own. As the business grew, of course, 
competition must have started, with the best saddle-makers getting the best orders from 
the richest and most thankful horse riders. And as a particular workshop excelled more 
than others, those others probably took close looks n their excellent saddles, and tried to 
do their own in the same ways. Alas, some of the best workshops may have even been 
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looted and destroyed some nights, destroying some craftsmen’s lives and raising much 
public consternation against the dishonest play. But crafting saddles continued on.  
At some point in its history, saddle-making probably reached a slowing level of 
improvement – most of the essential elements of the saddle were now known. However, 
every saddle-maker must have continued seeking improvement with every saddle – made 
it smoother, padded it better, chose better lining material, decorated it with fine 
engraving, and so on. Especially, the good saddle-maker must have sought consistency 
from one piece to another, because given the kind of work it is, most likely every saddle 
ended up just a bit different from every other. Now and then, perhaps, even some 
breakthroughs happened, such as finding a dramatically stronger kind of wood for the 
frame, or a dramatically faster way of carving the wood. But for the most part, it must 
have been a steady work, with saddle-makers ever in search of perfection, with riders 
generally quite satisfied, and new saddle-makers joining the ranks, as older ones retired 
to horse-riding.  
Then, of course, the Industrial Revolution must have hit saddle-making as well, and 
mass production of precision-cut, perfectly look-ali e saddles must have started by some 
entrepreneurial money-maker. What probably ensued for most of the involved was some 
level of alienation from the pleasure of this work.69 But true lovers of horse-riding 
probably never switched to factory saddles, and remained loyal patrons of the few 
remaining hard-working craftsmen who loved their craft. Alas, because they so loved 
their work, and because they needed to maintain a livelihood, some of the saddle-makers 
continued to make ever more beautiful though not necessarily better saddles for some 
                                                




conspicuous consumers who simply collected expensiv hand-made saddles or gave them 
as presents to no less conspicuous gift-takers – none of them much of horse-riders.  
There are a number of properties of the craft of saddle-making that can be 
highlighted here. First of all, it has a long history, the beginning of which is impossible to 
pinpoint. It is a history of continual improvement – sometimes fast, sometimes slow, and 
especially steady once it reached a level of perfection. Second, it is a useful craft, one that 
could not have emerged except as remedy for a practical need – so, it could not have 
emerged before human beings learned to ride horses. All of the essential steps of its 
improvement – thus excluding, say, the fine engraving - were the result of perceived 
need, realization of something missing and needed. Third, saddle-making was a collective 
undertaking, even though it could have been started by an individual, and even though 
individual masters must have guided the groups of apprentices and whole workshops. It 
was also collective on account of the input from horses and their riders, and especially the 
competing saddle-makers. Fourth, the craft of saddle-making in this probabilistic account 
was not a scientific work in a serious sense – no saddle-maker could have put the craft in 
the language of generalized equations, measurements, numbers, and so on, although it is 
quite possible that some sketching was done, some writing down of best practice took 
place. But most essentially, the craft must have developed by doing it, by trying and 
erring and improving, and then by passing it on to physically attending new craftsmen.     
All of these and some more properties of the saddle-making craft apply to the 
crafting of good polities, the political, constitutonal craft. One good reason to start with 
saddle-making – the kind of a craft that comes to mind much more naturally – is really to 
stress some characteristics of the political craft tha are common with saddle craft, and so, 
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to get started on the right foot, as it were. It is all too easy to give a word meanings that 
seem to fit its environment. For example, when ‘constitutional crafting’ is mentioned to a 
political scientist, the meaning of crafting is immediately made dependent on the word 
constitutional. See that happening in Di Palma’s otherwise highly interesting book, To 
Craft Democracies (1990).70 
 
Constitutional Crafting: A Preliminary Outline 
So, then, what does crafting add to our understanding of political constitution? A 
number of attributes can be suggested. First, constitution is a dynamic process, an active 
concept as opposed to a thing, or a constant state. Not  here the avoidance of the word 
‘craftsmanship’, a noun that suggests a state or vocation, and not a process. Second, 
constitution is collective, requiring the participation of numerous – but never 
dogmatically prescribed numbers of – participant craftspeople in its evolution; it is 
collective in the broad sense of including cooperative, critical, competitive, and even 
conflictual manners of input by its indeterminate numbers. Complementing this property 
is the third, that constitution is a pluralistic process. The participants in constitution vary 
widely in their roles: leaders and their opponents, supporters and followers, core and 
marginal contributors, passive and mobilized masses, providers and recipients, makers 
and users, and the list can go on. Constitution is never unanimous, never a single body or 
a monolithic process moving in one step and breath. This plurality itself is not a constant, 
but it is never gone.  
                                                
70 Di Palma argues for a much more contextually-informed, dynamic view of democratization; the only 
slight issue is that for him, crafting is after all bout democratic institutional design most importantly. 
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Fourth and fifth, constitution is practical and concrete; it does not and cannot take 
place at a detached theoretical level, and it is meaningless in the abstract. It is to be 
reminded that ‘constitution’ here is predominantly used in its meaning of an activity, as 
in ‘constituting’. Sixth and seventh, constitution is a continuous and iterative process, not 
a one-off, single-event happening; to speak of constitution properly, one need to speak of 
an ongoing, continuous process. It is also iterative in the sense that constitution’s 
continuity is rarely an unbroken linear progression; rather, it is checkered with trying, 
erring, correcting, and renewals. Eighth, constitution is a useful endeavor, complementing 
its practicality – it happens because of a felt need or even urgency, and is not an optional 
pastime engagement. Ninth, constitution is an evolving process, becoming ever more 
complex and better through continual iteration, through trials, failures, reflection, and 
correction. It is not revolutionary, except in a limited and figurative sense in some 
particular instances in its continual process. Tenth, constitution is a purposive process in 
a qualified sense. It proceeds toward solution of actual problems, toward achieving real 
objectives, but rarely beholden to some distant, ultimate and singular purpose, except in a 
very general sense like desire of a just and happy life.71 Accompanying this ‘qualified 
purposive’ property of crafting is the eleventh important property of being an imaginative 
process: while not purposive in that ultimate and terminal way, it nonetheless needs an 
element of imagination, an envisioning of something desired. That imagination coupled 
with the felt need is probably what gives constitution its reason for taking place at all.    
                                                
71 Purposive politics in a more ultimate sense would risk leading in the paths of messianic ideologies seen 
in the long mid-twentieth century, depicted most forcefully by Arendt (The Origins of Totalitarianism) and 
Raymond Aron (Opium of Intellectuals), among others. Republican constitutional process, in tead, 
proceeds in the day-to-day political life of the society, and is normally animated by more ‘mid-range’ 
objectives: attainment of equal treatment of all under the law, guarantees of decent health, education nd 
life conditions for the least well off, security ofprivate property and sustainability of common property, fair 
distribution of tax burden and transparent and justified use of public monies, and so on. 
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Twelfth and most importantly, constitution is political. In this property, all of the 
above listed properties are brought together; and it stresses the agency that does the 
constituting throughout – the ‘political animals’. ‘Constitution’ as such is devoid of 
agency or ‘self’, and it is only due to linguistic constraints that one might speak of it 
being or doing things.72 Properly if somewhat awkwardly said, constitution s the sum of 
political agents’ engagement in the activity that defines them – politics. Understood as 
comprising all of the above properties, constitutional politics is an encompassing concept 
that includes much beyond the common meaning attached to politics, that is, essentially, 
power struggle. So, it could have been enough to point out this last property of crafting 
and omit all the rest, but the preceding qualities – and the list is certainly not exhaustive – 
underscore this otherwise too often short-cut scope of the constitutional political. 
Having listed these numerous attributes of constitutional crafting, and having 
suggested that the list could easily be longer, one is bound to get the ‘so what?’ question. 
Anyone with any bit of interest is capable of coming up with a comparable – or an 
alternative – list of qualities of constitution: onwhat does any such definition of crafting 
rest? Why does it have to include this set of qualities and not a wholly different other 
set?73  
The qualities of crafting as proposed here acquire their grounding in the several 
elements of the idea of constitution related in the pr ceding chapter, the loose sketch of 
an envisioned republic and the six aspects of constituting such a republic. As argued 
there, constitution never happens in the open space or a tabula rasa; it is a process that 
                                                
72 So when some speak of constitution as being ‘self-enforcing’, such statements need to be taken with care
(e.g. Weingast 1997; Ordeshook 1992). 
73 This is, to be sure, a rhetorical posing: it is unlikely, given the idea of constitution being defendd here, 
that ‘just any other list’ of attributes of crafting is composable.  
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happens in media res. The sketch and the six broad aspects of constitution are the outlines 
of the media res; they direct attention to where the constitutional process comes from, 
where it may be headed, in what manner, and why. Said otherwise, the combination of all 
these elements makes up the particular ‘constitutional environment’ where crafting, made 
up of the given attributes, takes place.    
Thus, crafting should be the way it has been described above because it is guided by 
the imagination of a better republic, represented in the sketch – just like saddle-making 
must have envisioned a likeness of a comfortable chair on the horseback. Crafting is an 
oriented, purposive process because it proceeds toward certain mid-range objectives as 
related in the three thin-normative orientations – just as saddle-making should have been 
guided by concerns for the ever greater comfort of he horse riders and the horses. 
Crafting has the many empirical properties because it happens within the given basic 
empirical conditions – just like the evolving mastery of saddle-making happens thanks to 
evolving feedback from all relevant people and under th  evolving supply of materials, 
tools, and demand. 
 
‘Drawing some perforated lines in the sand’ 
Saying the constitutional crafting is characterized by such and such a list of 
properties, and takes place within such and such a ‘ onstitutional environment’ is not to 
claim in a categorical way that the missing of any of these particular properties or 
elements would preclude the possibility of success in constitution. The description of 
crafting above clearly excludes any suggestion of pre-scriptedness, but rather stresses its 
openness to further properties, to un-charted turns and twists. The suggestion is that these 
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proposed sets of qualities and elements are what normally obtain in a constitutional 
process. They need not be heeded consciously and may often figure in the process only in 
an unconscious way. However, when a constitutional process does go against the grain of 
any of the aspects of constitution, or in departure from some essential qualities of crafting 
that reflect those aspects, the quality of constitutional process is likely to be very 
different, and chances for its succeeding may also differ starkly. And then such a 
proceeding may not be constitutional crafting, but some or another of alternatives that are 
current: constitutional choice, engineering, design, creation, and so on.    
It is relevant now, having invoked some of those alt rnatives, to briefly ponder on 
what constitutional crafting is not. A good example to entertain is an impressive work by 
one of the patriarchs of constitutional theory, thelate Walter Murphy, Constitutional 
Democracy (2007). The following picks on the book may be a bit unfair to its author, 
given his occasional caveats (such as that the order f the book is not meant to suggest 
that constitutional process should follow the same order: ibid: 18). With due apologies, 
however, these critical remarks are justified by many ttributes of the book, as well as on 
the grounds of heuristic use: the point is not, ultima ely, to sit in judgment of Murphy’s 
theory, but to highlight on his example some ways of n t abiding by constitutional 
crafting. Plus, it is just a too well-told story to pass by.
 
In the imaginary country of Nusquam, after seven deca s (!)74 of a junta rule, a 
military coup takes place led by a good Colonel Martin, who immediately after the 
takeover calls together a constitutional caucus, inviting to it an excellent and diverse 
                                                
74 See Barbara Geddes (2006) on how long authoritarian regimes have tended to last in modern history: up 
to 30 years, roughly. For a society that did go thrugh 70 years of authoritarianism – such as some of the 
peoples of former USSR – the Nusquam template of constituting is very unreal.  
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group of twenty-five Nusquam citizens that any real country could envy.  In a process of 
deliberation that reveals erudition of each participant that could put many constitutional 
theorists to shame, the caucus goes through questions such as where to start, what values 
to adopt or not to adopt, what alternative constitutional order to opt for, and, of course, 
what to include in the Constitution that they decid to write. In this beginning lies the 
first problem. Murphy has the caucus – as hilarious as it is to read – to really think up a 
constitutional order from nearly a t bula rasa. Even with the wide diversity of opinions 
he provides for, that diversity operates at such a level of sophistication that no real 
country could hope for. With such intellectual sophistication, the caucus indeed seems to 
successfully proceed with ‘creating’ a people out of a junta-dominated mob. Thus, the 
first departure of Murphy’s tale from constitutional crafting is that – mostly due to its 
genre and the difficulty of proceeding otherwise – it is very organized, all problems and 
nuances of the society are raised and discussed (and for their purposes, resolved) by the 
twenty-five intelligent people, and the best answers to all relevant conundrums are 
reached within minutes or at most days of discussion. A more accurate term for this 
process is ‘designing’, not crafting or even ‘creating’ – because, after all, the caucus does 
not really create any order or society: it only design  a neat program for creating one.  
The caucus, having began as it did after the coup and by active cooperation of the 
ideally well-disposed military, is engaged in coming up with a new society. The novelty 
is already suggested at a semantic level by the activity of designing, because such an 
activity is normally applied to new things, not to preexisting or continuing matters (albeit 
less obviously than ‘inventing’ would be). What is happening through the work of the 
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caucus is the birthing of a new nation as such. Sage Professor Deukalion’s invited speech 
is especially indicative of this creationism. He says:  
I concede that some eminent scholars believe that passive popular acquiescence is 
sufficient. For long-established and successful constitutional orders that may well be so. 
You, however, are creating a new constitutional order. […]. You need ‘positive consent’, 
because you will ask your people to stop being mere subjects and become citizens, [...]. 
That is a transformation that neither force nor mere acquiescence can accomplish. […] 
… [T]he goal of a constitutional text must be not simply to outline governmental 
structures and processes but also to help construct a new ‘way of life’,” (ibid: 197; italics 
added).  
 
Such an engagement in creation of a new people is an important departure from 
crafting; it is an ‘intellecting’, as it were, of a new people. Crafting directs us to long-
term, gradual appearance – or rather, cultivation – f a constitutional people; imagining a 
‘transformation’ of a whole people, a ‘new way of life’, a ‘becoming of citizens out of 
yesterdays subjects’ – past all the complications raised by all the caucus members – is not 
a proceeding in the manner of ‘crafting’. The stark juxtaposition of ‘long-established 
successful constitutional orders’ to ‘a new constitutional order’, is therefore misleading – 
a good intellectual maneuver, not a prudent constitutional advice; its upshot, to be sure, is 
very different from the distinction between the established and the only aspiring cases 
proposed in the present discussion. 
Having ‘created’ a constitutional order, Murphy exits the dialogic genre and 
discusses issues of constitutional maintenance and change in normal academic prose – 
and again, impressively well. But here is a pick. Once the constitution is created, he takes 
up the question of “creating citizens”. He begins the chapter: “Even a small group of men 
and women can, if they control enough physical and fiscal power, create a constitutional 
democracy. But to preserve such a system, they must convince the mass of the population 
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to become constitutional democrats,” (ibid: 342). The first wonderment is the very 
meaning of ‘create a constitutional democracy’: how much meaning is in it, if it can be 
done by a small group of people for one day? Can, then, a constitutional theorist sitting in 
her study, and without any notable physical or fiscal power, create a constitution, if 
‘creation’ can have a meaning apart from its chances of preservation and acceptance by 
the relevant people? The second wonderment is about ‘c nvincing the mass to become 
constitutional democrats’. Murphy offers a careful and lengthy discussion of the 
complications involved in such ‘convincing’, but the proposition at its face is a wondrous 
one. If it is about convincing, why not instead tryand convince the masses to become, 
say, angels (what Madison had wishfully fretted about). Third, Murphy suggests there are 
three ways of fitting citizens and constitutions: one – make the constitution fit the 
existing culture, another – make the culture change and fit to the demands of a 
constitution, and third – some mix of the first two. He is quick to doubt the third option, 
suspecting “the philosopher’s middle” of being “mushy”, (ibid: 345). But realistically 
speaking, it is hard to imagine any constitutional c se not being of the third kind: the 
former two are but intellectualized formulations and cannot much more. So, that opening 
sentence, ordered as it looks according to Murphy’s second model of fitting, is where the 
third wonderment lies. 
One last point from this rich book, possibly the most symptomatic of constitutional 
scholarship, concerns the issue of constitutional choice. “Constitutional democracy” is a 
particular form of constitutional regime that Nusquam chooses from a “long menu” of 
options that initially included “all fascist systems”, “Marxism”, and “plebiscitary 
democracy”, but was shortened down to “constitutional democracy, representative 
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democracy, consociational democracy, coercive capitalism, and a perfectionist state”, 
(ibid: 67). Of this strange menu for choice, the semingly common-sense “constitutional 
democracy” was elaborated by Murphy in an earlier, much-cited essay (1993), where he 
found a nearly forbidding antagonism between democracy and constitutionalism, making 
it sound like a very strange creature.75 In truth, it seems, constitutional democracy is a 
rather generic concept allowing serious configurative variation within, and just as 
‘antagonistic’ internally as human beings’ antagonistic desire of both freedom and 
equality. This curious menu of constitutional forms thus proposed is a good illustration of 
‘constitutional choice’ rhetoric more generally – something very common and possibly 
traceable to Aristotle himself, if only in an insufficiently careful reading of him.  
 
One such instance of ‘constitutional choice’ by inspiration from Aristotle occurs in 
an essay by James Ceaser, a champion of what he calls ‘traditional’ or ‘constitutional’ 
political science. He identifies the ‘choice of the form of government as the most 
important question’ for that tradition (Ceaser 1993: 57). An alternative route to stressing 
constitutional choice, even as the overall argument emphasizes constitution as 
artisanship, is found – as discussed at greater length i  Chapter 3 – in the Bloomington 
School, and in particular in Vincent Ostrom’s book (2008). One of the central chapters – 
very short, though – in this book is devoted simply to posing the question of 
‘constitutional choice’, (see also, more succinctly, Ostrom 1980).  
                                                
75 For an earlier excellent discussion of constitutionalism vs. democracy problem by a select group of 
constitutional scholars, with some constructive insights on the problem, see the edited volume by Elster and 
Slagstad, Constitutionalism and Democracy (1988). For another, non-antagonistic discussion of 
constitutional democracy, see Sunstein, Designing Democracy (2001). 
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‘Choice’, such as found in Ceaser and Murphy, and to a lesser extent in Ostrom – 
suggesting a rather crude idea of ‘picking and choosing’ – is a misleading term. To the 
extent that there is today any choice to be made at the level of general constitutional 
form, insofar as constitutional government is really wanted, the global consensus has 
more or less converged on some form of a republic – be it liberal democratic, social 
democratic, or maybe constitutional democratic, if it is any different from others. The real 
question is in the details of any republic – and in that question, the issue is not so much 
about choosing as it is about crafting. 
A position very akin to this has been argued by Karol Soltan, who proposes the 
concept of ‘generic constitutionalism’ – constitutionalism whose general and essential 
outlines have now gained a global consensus. His langu ge is very much one of 
constitutional crafting. “Institutions, personalities, characters, actions must all be seen as 
human artifacts (see Giddens 1984; Unger 1987) created by men and women, not 
products of some impersonal forces. From this perspective the human species would 
appear above all as a community of makers and design rs. Instead of predicting human 
behavior on the basis of external clues, we would try to give an account of human 
capacities to create or constitute. We are led along this path toward a form of 
constitutionalism,” (Soltan 1993b: 72). Aristotle himself, in criticizing some of his fellow 
theorists, found fault with those who searched for the absolutely best constitution, which 
is hardly attainable, and those who searched for “sme common constitution” while 
dismissing the constitutions that actually existed. “But what is needed is the introduction 
of a system which the people involved will be easily persuaded to accept, and will easily 
be able to bring in, starting from the system they actually have” (Politics: IV-1-1289a11; 
200 
 
italics added). This injunction takes the matter some way away from choosing in a direct 
sense and closer to crafting. A constitution that its constituents “[can easily accept, easily 
bring in, starting from the system they actually have],” begs that the involved people craft 
it themselves. 
 
It follows then that constitutional crafting is different from constitutional choice, as 
well as the associated operations of designing, creating, engineering, and so on. It is a 
broader concept that captures the whole of the process of constitutional development, as 
opposed to limited periods or phases of it that such terms suggest. In fact, the crafting 
process may certainly feature instances of choice, elements of design and engineering, 
thereby making up constitution whole, whereas the alt rnatives do not. Because of the 
limited spans of time and action that the alternative concepts indicate, they are relatively 
easier to illustrate by examples. That is harder to do with crafting. Nevertheless, an 
illustration is necessary and needs to be attempted. There is one constitutional polity that 
for many reasons promises to allow a rich and very r levant illustration of crafting, and 
that is Norway.  
 
The Crafting of Norway 
The Kingdom of Norway is a remarkable constitutional story. Despite the fact that 
it remains – still, after the classic inaugural study of it by Harry Eckstein (1966) – a rather 
understudied story, there are a number of reasons to take it up presently as an illustrative 
case. One good reason is probably the author’s impressions of it in the course of an 
election observation mission in 2005, a short but highly edifying experience with 
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exposure to electoral campaign, to the voting day procedures, to the diverse roster of 
political parties, to a good sampling of citizen participation, and more broadly, to 
Norway’s culture and history. Just as Gustav Vegeland’s sculpture park, and the open air 
folk museums on Bygdøy Island, the constitutional landscape of the country seemed to be 
just as lovingly tended, being a product of much more difficult craftsmanship.   
Methodologically, the choice of Norway is advised, in part, by a good degree of 
comparability with the country of Kyrgyzstan – the subject of the next chapter, and a case 
of more urgent interest.76 They are both small countries with about the same population 
living in very mountainous terrain of which some parts are very sparsely populated. 
Norway’s history, from the times Old Norse kingdoms to the Viking age, is reminiscent 
of the nomadic kinship organizations of the Kyrgyz. Norway’s long history of being a 
colony-like periphery of the Danish realm, and then a more liberal but still not-fully 
sovereign status under the union with the Swedish Crown, is comparable – but not similar 
– to the peripheral status of the Kyrgyz in the Kokand Khanate for about 150 years, a 
period of wars and suffering under the Czarist colonization for about 50 years, and then 
membership in the Soviet Union as union republic for another 70 years. Just as 
Norwegians’ sense of nationhood and claim for self-d termination matured under the 
Danish and Swedish influences, the Kyrgyz sense of nationhood and especially statehood 
can be said to have emerged by the influence of these subjections, the most important 
being that under the Soviet rule. Other similarities – such as egalitarianism and 
fragmentation – will become clear in their proper place. Norway today is dramatically 
                                                
76 But lest it be misunderstood, it bears stressing that this is not a comparative study of Norway and 
Kyrgyzstan. Norway is here an example to illustrate several prominent ways of constitutional crafting; it is 
an undisputed example of constitutionalism, and it is a simpler example than, say, the United States or 
Britain. Pointing out some of the similar experiencs of the two countries helps put Norway’s example in a 
more relatable perspective.   
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different from Kyrgyzstan, being among the leading models of constitutional democracy, 
as opposed to Kyrgyzstan’s persistent struggle at gettin  one started. Given this vast 
difference, it is certainly not the intention to conduct a close comparative study of the 
pair. Rather, Norway’s case is presented more as an illustration of constitutional crafting 
as conceived presently, so as both to explain this concept better and to set the tone for a 
subsequent discussion of Kyrgyzstan. 
Besides comparability to the case of Kyrgyzstan, Norway is also a more convenient 
case, if one may put so. Its history of political development is not as convoluted as those 
of, say, the United States or France or Britain; it never had major reversals of 
constitutionalism like Germany, Italy, or Austria hd; and Norway’s democracy in its 
overall institutional makeup  is not as sui generis as Switzerland’s is. With all that, 
however, Norway does present numerous interesting puzzles and counter-conventional 
features – so eloquently described by Eckstein (1966) – that constitutional crafting seems 
to be the most appropriate rubric to apply to it. So, for all these reasons, this case seems 
exceptionally well-positioned as a resource for illustrating the likely workings of 
constitutional crafting. Because of the particular pu pose for using this case, it is deemed 
not necessary to delve rigorously deep into historical studies. The discussion below is a 
fairly non-specialist one, and relies on a limited (but respectable) literature base.77 
 
                                                
77 In this section, I have especially relied on: Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A 
Study of Norway (1966); Knut Heidar, Norway: Elites on Trial (2001); T. K. Derry,  A History of Modern 
Norway: 1814-1972 (1973); and Rolf Danielsen et al, Norway: A History from the Vikings to Our Times 
(1995), as well as credible web sources, such as Norwegian governmental sites, for more factual and 
contemporary information. That some of this literatu e is rather old is not of serious concern since the 
present work is more interested in the patterns of political developments that they do discuss than in the 
exact accuracy of data that they may lack.  
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Knut Heidar, a Norwegian political scientist and historian, organizes a succinct but 
broad-ranged book on modern Norwegian development along ‘three themes and one 
proposition’ that he argues have characterized Norway’s political development all along, 
(Heidar 2001: 5-7). The themes are: Norway’s status of “a small state in the European 
periphery”, “the egalitarian culture”, and “the struggle between the center and the 
periphery”. These three themes, as they unfold and explain the main trajectories of 
Norwegian development, lead to the proposition about “the primacy of politics” in the 
country’s life, (ibid). These contours seem very well tapped, extending not only 
throughout Norway’s modern history starting in 1814, but also going back to the earliest 
recorded history of Old Norse communities (on the earli r history, see Helle 1995 and 
Dyrvik 1995; for very relevant thoughts on that history, see Eckstein 1966: Ch. 6). 
Heidar’s three themes and one proposition provide useful thematic guidelines for a 
consideration of the crafting of Norway’s constitutional order. Such a consideration, 
certainly, cannot in any way be a representative outline of the country’s political history 
as a whole. More relevantly, however, it can be an exercise in highlighting some select 
and instructive moments in its crafting process. The exercise would be one of looking a 
bit more closely at various historical periods in the country’s history. In that connection, 
to alert attention toward some appropriate directions, it is worth noting the need for 
‘zooming in’ on three particular historic periods tha  seem to be too often viewed from 
more of a ‘bird’s eye view’ perspective. The first concerns the status accorded to 
‘Europe’s longest surviving written constitution’: a closer look at the written 
constitution’s rather limited practical role and place in the political process, and closer 
attention to its symbolism and the circumstances of its emergence and functioning, stand 
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to open up a wealth of crafting experience that surrounds it. The second point is about 
extending the historical span of modern Norway’s political origin: contrary to the more 
usual dating of Norwegian democratic and constitutional experience by 1814, when 
Norway achieved ‘home rule’ and adopted its Constitution, there are serious reasons to 
look further back to see the seeds and even shape of the modern polity. And third: the 
prevailing ‘birds-eye’ view, especially by outside world, sees a very steady, stable 
constitutional order in Norway ever since 1814, with a landmark in 1905; it is highly 
rewarding for a student of constitutional crafting, however, to note a continual series of 
important transformations that the polity underwent throughout this period, some of the 
changes coming through very fierce political battles. Alerted to these points, a student of 
Norwegian constitutional path will notice the persistent playing out of the ‘primacy of 
politics’, and will see how these politics – contrary to the narrow conceptions discussed 
earlier – are almost vividly equivalent to the idea of constitutional crafting as presented 
here.    
 
Today Norway is a republic in everything but the name. Throughout its history of 
political development – especially starting from the late period of its union with Denmark 
– the country’s constitutional order has been crafted in instructive ways. As suggested 
above, it is now easy to compress Norway’s political history into a happy story of stable 
democracy, egalitarian economic wealth, and excellence of its long-running Constitution. 
But it must go without saying that the country’s current blessings were neither hard-wired 
into the genes of the people from its primeval exist nce, nor granted it by some higher or 
external powers. The ‘blessings’ are the result of able self-crafting of the polity, a process 
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not free from mistakes, crises, or conflicts. It is therefore of some interest to consider 
some particular examples and periods of Norwegian constitutional crafting that, in sum, 
have led to the country it is today. It should become clear from such a consideration that 
the overall shape and health of this polity cannot be described principally as an outcome 
of rational ‘choice’, of institutional ‘engineering’, of assertions of essentially given 
culture, of the excellence of legal codes or of their interpreters, or of terse political 
battles. Elements of any of these mechanisms may be present but only as partial elements 
in a complex fabric of constitutional politics, so that the more appropriate rubric for the 
whole process would be crafting.  
 
Four themes of constitutional crafting 
Under the four themes specified by Knut Heidar, with some revision and 
reordering, it is possible to speak of four themes of constitutional crafting that have taken 
place in Norway. Each of the themes reveals multiple topics and strategies of crafting 
that, put together, have produced – and continue to maintain – this remarkable 
constitutional story. In elaborating on each of themes, it will be interesting to note 
how they feed into the various elements of a good plity that have been specified in the 
sketch thereof in Chapter 4. Fulfilling all of those elements of the sketch for Norway, it 
will be noted, has been anything but a clean process of intellectual design or happy-ends 
by default, but one of crafting over a dynamic practical process set within empirical 
conditions. The four themes by themselves need not be thought to be unique for Norway; 
especially in the slightly revised form from Knut Heidar’s original four themes, they are 
very generic themes of crafting that could apply to many other cases, including the case 
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of Kyrgyzstan. The differences among cases are in the actual contents of the ‘dynamic 
practical processes set within their empirical conditions’. Lastly to note, the various 
concrete examples drawn to illustrate each of four themes of crafting should not be 
thought as exclusively relevant for a particular theme; the relevance of most of them 
clearly overlap across our four themes.   
 
Crafting vigilant patriotism. Heidar’s proposition that modern Norway elicits a 
persistent ‘primacy of politics’ is a very importan observation, but also a fairly broad 
one. More pointedly, this observation may be instead viewed as the crafting of a civic 
vigilance and care for the country, or of vigilant patriotism. That is, the substantive thrust 
of the primacy of politics for Norwegian citizens can be argued to have been their never-
dormant concern for the country. To see how the cultivation of vigilant patriotism has 
occurred, let us consider some episodes and examples under each of the ‘alerting points’ 
proposed above, about the Constitution, about the dating of modern Norway’s origin,  
and about the ‘bird’s eye view’ of Norwegian stable order.  
 In a remark related to the Constitution, Harry Eckstein wrote: “it is not apparently 
the formal institutional arrangements of [Norway’s] government that make the system 
successful”, contrary to the “attractive view” that “governments are mechanisms which 
properly work if properly constructed”, (Eckstein 1966: 20). Relatedly, Narud and Strom, 
documenting a recent shift in Norway away from Westminster-style parliamentary 
sovereignty toward more Madisonian-style separation of powers, advise: “The place to 
look for these important changes is rarely in the formal constitution itself. The Norwegian 
constitution has become an increasingly archaic and often ambiguous document,” (2011: 
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209). Making such observations, however, does not mean that the Constitution is 
irrelevant. “The primary importance of the Norwegian constitution lies in its symbolic 
value”, writes Heidar (2001: 34; italics added). Relevance of symbols for patriotic 
sentiments, of course, need not be stressed here, (s e, for example, see Bobbio and Viroli 
2003: 20; Anderson 2006 more generally and critically).   
The closer, more discerning look into the role and place of the written constitution, 
as advised above, reveals several symbols of importance for crafting vigilant patriotism. 
One is, of course, the very fact of adoption of the document under the highly charged 
political circumstances of 1814. Following the conclusion of the ‘personal union’ with 
the Swedish Crown that year, the Constitution was possibly the most central instrument 
for Norway’s leadership in persistently staving offthe advances of the Kind for more 
‘amalgamation’ of Norway with Sweden. Historian T. K. Derry describes that sustained 
period of resistance as one of ‘vigilant nationalism’ (Derry 1973: 64ff); that is, of 
jealousy with which the Norwegians defended their claim to self-determination and 
thereby ever strengthened that vigilant affection fr the country. 
The Constitution has some more specific provisions f great symbolic value which 
also contribute to vigilant patriotism, two of whic are the seemingly contradictory (re-
)institution of a monarchy and the provision for popular sovereignty through 
parliamentary representation. While it is a “limited, hereditary monarchy” with very little 
significance in governing the country, the symbolism of it derives, on the one hand, from 
it being a continuation of old Norwegian monarchy interrupted during the Danish rule. 
Tellingly, the first independent monarch of modern Norway in 1905 was named King 
Haakon VII, in view of six other kings named Haakon that lived before the Danish 
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period. The provision for popular sovereignty is contained in the part of Constitution of 
which Derry writes, “ ‘The rights of citizenship and the legislative power’ are 
significantly grouped together” (ibid: 10). Providing for a rather broad suffrage by those 
times, and later being one of the earliest constitutions to introduce universal suffrage, this 
unmistakable granting of sovereignty to the people – again, a result of various factors 
obtaining at the time of drafting – is a mighty symbol that kindled strong and especially 
vigilant patriotic sentiments then and continue to stand as the bedrock of popular 
sovereignty. 
In looking beyond the ‘start date’ of 1814, one learns of further processes of 
crafting, not so much by symbolism but by the practic l conditions that excited 
participation. While the prehistory beyond that date is very long, the particularly relevant 
shorter period is between 1807 and 1814, when the Danish Crown got involved in the 
Napoleonic war on the losing side, culminating in the breakup of the union. The period 
was a very costly and wholly unwanted adventure for the Norwegians and as such gave 
the spark of move for independence. Before the dismantling of Denmark-Norway union 
was concluded, the Norwegians had to go through intense hardships, experience the 
singular economic downturn that included hunger, and wake up to political thinking 
outside the frames of a union, in terms of Norway by itself. Sentiments for independence 
captured ever greater swaths of the people, and in the culminating year of 1814, engaged 
virtually the whole community in a highly charged avocacy for sovereignty through 
taking oaths of allegiance to Norway’s independence and electing a representative 
constituent assembly that drafted the Constitution. That period stands as a particularly 
illustrative case of crafting vigilant patriotism by participation.  
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Looking underneath the reputed Norwegian stability since 1814, one finds still 
more lessons of constitutional crafting. The period is again so rich, there is no possibility 
of being exhaustive. The most famous constitutional event in this period is possibly the 
long process that culminated in 1884, when the shift into the Westminster-style 
parliamentary sovereignty, of which Narud and Strom write (2011), took its definitive 
shape. While this was the culmination of an intra-Norwegian political struggle between 
the embettsmen aristocracy and the peasant-centered populist moveents, the outcome is 
probably more remarkable not for the victory of one part of society over another, but for 
the dramatic concretization of popular sovereignty foreshadowed in the Constitution. The 
effect of this shift for its posterity, one may argue, was bringing politics and government 
so much closer to the citizenry thereby heightening both their sense of political vigilance 
and that of belonging in a political community. 
A less famous but no less interesting episode of crafting a vigilant patriotism may 
be said to be the case of the Quisling regime. Norway as, like a number of other 
European countries, occupied by German army in World War II, and remained under 
Nazi control until the end of war in 1945. While Norwegian government took refuge in 
Britain, most of the population of course stayed in Norway. The governing of Norway 
was effectively the business of the German occupants, but they employed the service of 
the Norwegian collaborator, “Minister-President” Vidkun Quisling, whose fascist party 
Nasjonal Samling had seized power on the eve of German arrival. This was a puppet 
collaborating regime under the occupying power much like Petain’s Vichy regime in 
France. Quisling was put on trial after the war, found guilty of high treason and other 
crimes, and sentenced to execution by firing squad. This was a rare occasion of capital 
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punishment, which had been out of use in Norway already in XIX century. Quisling 
became an item of national memory of betrayal; his name became a word for national 
treachery, just like ‘xerox’ is a word for copy machine. Norwegian history does not 
provide any other known examples of high-level national betrayal, but in the aftermath of 
horrors of the war, the case of Quisling may be seen as crafting, by aversion, of vigilant 
patriotism through ‘judging of the political past’, in this case, of a person, his party, and 
his regime, (for a recent critical discussion, see Dahl 1999).  
These few examples suggest some of the variety of how a culture of vigilant 
patriotism – a more specific rubric for highlighting the primacy of politics – was crafted 
in Norway’s constitutional history. In that variety – featuring symbolic rhetoric, practical 
participation, realization of popular sovereignty, and political memory, to name a few – 
these aspects of constitutional process can be said to have been especially productive on 
such key elements of a good polity as assertion of popular sovereignty, orientation to 
common good, institution of a mixed regime, and strengthening constitutional resilience, 
(see Ch. 4).      
                
Crafting a pluralist political culture. The theme of vigilant patriotism may suggest 
the idea that Norwegians should have developed a very homogenizing, potentially 
intolerant political outlook. The second theme of crafting suggests how such an outcome 
need not have arisen. This theme is a broadening of one of Heidar’s themes, that of “the 
struggle between the center and the periphery”. While the particular ‘struggle’ he 
underscores may be factually the most prominent, it is certainly not the only line of 
political differences and struggles. There are many more of them, as Eckstein stresses 
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(1966: Ch. 3). But more important is not the presence and scope of such lines of struggle, 
but their constitutional upshot: the conditions of s cial diversity and the varieties of 
accommodating that diversity within a workable single polity. 
Possibly the most enlightening topic regarding the crafting of a pluralist outlook is 
that of Norway’s political parties. These institutions did not arise either suddenly or by 
some concrete instance of general design. While early p rty-like formations started to 
operate on a Left-Right principle soon after the ‘home rule’ began in early XIX century, 
the real development of parties occurred in the context of the constitutional upheaval that 
culminated in 1884. From then onwards, in the institutional setting of parliamentarism, 
political parties became almost naturally the main channels of political organization, 
mobilization, and competition. Today, an average of ten political parties can be said to 
have regular parliamentary representation in Norway. Unlike the dominant two-party 
systems of the United States and (to lesser degree) th  United Kingdom, the multi-party 
system of Norway does not feature any resemblance of a ‘catch-all’ party that tries to 
cater to virtually every cluster of electorate. The party that may be the closest to such a 
description is Labor (Arbeiderpartiet), and by any contemporary standard it is a left-
leaning social-democratic party with its base mostly among the working middle-class and 
left-liberals. Eckstein, speaking of an earlier period, recites the diversity of party 
platforms very lucidly (ibid: 53, 56). Thus, being rather specific and usually organized 
(by splitting from a larger party) in pursuit of specific political agenda, Norwegian 
parties, on the one hand, indicate the rich political diversity, and on the other hand, allow 
all that variety of interests to be represented.  
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The last point leads to an important observation about the accommodation of social 
pluralism in Norway, and that is a strong taste for institutionalism. The channeling of all 
the diversity of political interests through the institution of parties is just one ubiquitous 
example of that. Besides parties, the highly effectiv  system of local governance, adopted 
and increasingly strengthened from mid-1830’s on, is another strong institution of 
political articulation and representation. Before transportation and communication 
became unproblematic, the sparsely populated and distant communities in the north 
would have difficulty engaging in decisions being made in Oslo. The introduction of 
local governance system, where both administrators and representative councils are 
elected offices competed along party lines, do not simply facilitate engagement of distant 
peasant and fishing communities but itself cultivated an informed and engaged citizenry 
from local level up.  
Add to these the oft-cited large presence of the state as such – the anathema in 
current-day American conservative politics, – the highly developed and trusted institution 
of elections, and a high degree of ‘legalist culture’ (see Eckstein op cit: 26-27), and some 
of the key components of the institutionalist outlook would be accounted for. In 
particular, the size of the state, it seems, is not defended simply for the generous welfare 
and other means of social security it provides (that could have led to a rather passive 
consumerist citizenry), but rather for the kind of p litical playing field it represents. The 
state is an effective unifying system within which it is safe and healthy to have 
disagreements and differences by multiple party lines, and it is also the site where all 
have legitimate voice and pretentions and thus can affect most issues of common 
relevance – a possibility that is highly limited in a more libertarian system where most 
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socio-economic domains are left for private control. Elections and litigation are two other 
institutions by which Norwegians have habitually managed their political differences, 
peacefully and non-disruptively. 
Thus, a highly robust pluralist culture seems to have risen as a result of the 
historical development of Norway’s constitutional order. It is robust in particular by 
virtue of being expressed through effective institutional forms, where the rise of those 
institutions themselves is notably a product of practic l political development and in no 
way a thing of a priori designing. What this cluster of crafting mechanisms highlights 
vis-à-vis the elements of a good polity is, again, a reinforcement of a mixed regime, 
strengthening of constitutional resilience, but especially, securing a robust social 
pluralism.  
 
Crafting an egalitarian culture. The third theme of constitutional crafting is 
represented in Heidar’s ‘egalitarian culture’, in this case needing neither broadening nor 
narrowing of his theme. The implication here, not denied by either Heidar or any other 
source consulted here, is that this culture is not a  a-historical given but something in part 
rooted in the people’s earlier traditions of governance and in part cultivated in the 
political development of modern times. Constitutionally, the relevance of egalitarianism 
is very rich, from relating to moderation, tolerance, identification with a common 
political project, to sustenance of a ‘cohesive pluralism’, if one may say so. 
The possible earlier roots of Norwegian egalitarianism, going back to the Viking 
times, are considered very positively by Harry Ecktein, with due warnings about the 
inevitable speculative quality of such suggestions, (1966: Ch 6). He suggests that some of 
214 
 
the usual social requisites of such old societies, r presented under his rubric of 
‘primordialism’, would have been a strong focus on actual kin-based solidarity within 
limited groups, and consequently, a robust egalitarianism – not a strict equality, he notes 
(116-117) – in treatment of each other among members within such group. While he has 
little persuasive evidence of that old egalitarian culture having survived through ages into 
the modern society, there is also no reasonably conclusive argument for rejecting such a 
suggestion altogether.78 Under the circumstances when Norwegians were dominated by 
Denmark for over 300 years, during which the preexisting social structure would not have 
changed very seriously, and continued strength of a ‘parochialism’ of some sort until very 
late in Norway’s development, Eckstein’s suggestion is deserving of some probabilistic 
regard.  
There are, however, some more recent developments that should also explain this 
egalitarianism at least part. At the moment of achieving ‘home rule’ in 1814, there was 
almost no aristocracy in Norway in the usual sense; that role was filled by the state 
apparatus, the mbettsmen, who by all evidence were predominantly driven notby class 
considerations but by a mix of political, patriotic, and even altruistic motives, especially 
in the early period. In the gradual development of he struggle between them and the 
populist-peasant mobilization toward late century, there again much evidence of 
orientation toward ever greater inclusion rather than distinction and exclusion. Thus, the 
latter movement, eventually coming out victorious in 1884, were led by a diverse set of 
intellectuals, poets, radicals, occasional leaders from among the landholders, all of whom, 
                                                
78 Note that, contrary to ‘essentialist culturalism’ discussed in Chapter 2 above, Eckstein’s reference to 
Viking culture is, for one thing, very aware of itsspeculative-ness, and for another thing, concerned with 
actual social-political processes and relations of th se times – and the possibility of current relations being 
informed by those older patterns – as opposed to reifying a static cultural essence.  
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obviously, were champions of empowering the peasantry, the peripheries, and soon 
enough, the working class. The empowering of these strata encompassed not just getting 
them to participate in competitive politics, but also – and more importantly – their 
education. Education was an important issue on Norway’s agenda from early on, 
underscored by previous reliance for higher education on Copenhagen until opening the 
University of Oslo in 1811. This latter event was an achievement not for a select elite, but 
for the people of Norway in general. Enrollment at the university was open to, and 
increasingly included, youth representative of all strata of the population, and eventually, 
this inclusiveness was reinforced by making primary – and equal – education available 
across the country. Thus, the culture of egalitarianism would have had a strong basis on 
which to bud.  
Today, that egalitarianism is reinforced by the aforementioned large state sector. 
The provision of a generous and not very discriminating welfare is a potent equalizer that 
raises the floor for ‘the least advantaged’, whereas the high tax assessment would at least 
partially redistribute the wealth of the most advantaged downward. But it is not only 
about the redistributive effect of the large state. More generally, as Eckstein posits, 
Norwegian culture is characterized by non-competitiveness, which is possibly most 
evident in the economic sphere. A trivial recent fact is that in Norway, one of top five 
countries by GDP per capita, there were only five billionaires as reported in Forbes 
magazine (about 1000 worldwide), the richest man’s worth estimated at just US$ 5 
billion, and four others situated closer to the end of the world list. The moral of this all 
being that, indeed, egalitarianism is not a superficial idea encouraged by the state, but a 
much stronger culture upheld by the citizenry themslves.  
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As noted above, the culture of egalitarianism would have a wide-ranging relevance 
for making a good constitutional order viable. It is capable of entrenching the idea of a 
res publica – the common good, of supporting social pluralism, of enabling the sense as 
well as exercise of popular sovereignty, and further cementing constitutional resilience. 
Norway’s experience suggests a wide variety of ways in which this culture can develop, 
from the effect of older popular traditions, to the role of national leadership, to the place 
of education, to self-reinforcing general popular climate of egalitarianism.      
 
Crafting in the midst of historical and geopolitical setting. While the broader 
context of Norway’s constitution has already been appe ring, it will not be superfluous to 
consider this as a separate theme. This fourth theme in Norwegian crafting is again a 
broadened derivation from Heidar’s last theme (first in his ordering), “a small state in the 
European periphery”. Where a country is located geopolitically and when its 
constitutional process is taking place at a given moment historically, are another rich 
facet of crafting.  In several episodes of Norway’s development, these external 
circumstances stood in such prominence as to significa tly modulate the manner of 
politics of the country.   
The long period of the Denmark-Norway union, and then another incomplete 
century of a much more liberal ‘personal union’ with Sweden’s monarchy are the very 
obvious two large historical-geopolitical contexts. Norwegian self-awareness as a nation, 
and then development as a constitutional polity, were very significantly shaped by the 
circumstance of having been under these two schemes. But there were several other 
contextual considerations prominently at play. 
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The late period of union with Denmark, 1807-1814, is especially illustrative of the 
impact of the external context on constitutional crafting. Of Danish decision to join the 
side of Napoleon in 1807, historian Dyrvik writes: “It was a fatal choice. For the first 
time in 300 years the foreign policy interests of Denmark and Norway came into direct 
conflict,” (Dyrvik 1995: 204). While there could be no Norwegian “foreign policy 
interest” in a strict sense up to that point, that raw deal gave a strong impetus for 
Norwegians’ consciousness of their own foreign interests distinct from Copenhagen’s. It 
was caught between Great Britain and Sweden – the former being economically 
extremely important for Norwegian trade and livelihood, and the latter being a long-time 
rival and now enemy sharing a long and difficult-to-guard overland border. An unwanted, 
economically and militarily distressing ordeal, the war particularly sensitized the 
Norwegians to their subject status, as they became  mute matter of bargain among 
sovereign powers, including in the end a humiliating betrayal by the Danish Crown. The 
humiliation was the Treaty of Kiel of January 1814 which the Danish King was 
compelled to sign, and according to which, Norway would be ceded to Sweden. This is a 
fine illustration of crafting under fortuitous contextual conditions – a crafting of a sense 
for independence that may not have succeeded under normal circumstances. 
As events progressed ever so fast toward 1814, the effect of the broader context 
seems to have been notable in another respect. As Crown Prince-cum-regent Christian 
Frederick assembled an elected group of representatives to draft a constitution in 1814, 
Norway’s founders found themselves in an opportune im for producing as progressive a 
constitution as they did. It was a time when they had good awareness of the American 
Constitution with its principles of separation of powers and especially the bill of rights. It 
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was also a time when the French Revolution had recently occurred, with both its positive 
and negative lessons, but especially heeded for its p oclamation of popular sovereignty. It 
was, not least, a time when the constituent assembly, and especially Prince Frederick, 
could have assumed a positive political climate in Europe for recognizing the self-
determination of a fellow European nation. Lastly, possibly unbeknownst to Norwegian 
founders, there must have been at least partial good fortune in having the French Marshal 
Bernadotte – an active participant of French revoluti nary developments of the time – as 
their ‘enemy’. As Derry relates, Bernadotte had serious liberal inklings, and – not of least 
interest – was advised in a letter by his friend, Madame de Stael, that “that enlightened 
people believe that it would be wise for you to accept the constitution which the 
Norwegians recently gave themselves,” (Derry 1973: 14).
The external context can and often does play a veryimportant role in shaping a 
country’s constitutional prospects. More recently, there has been much scholarship 
interested in the effect of regional patterns for a country’s democratization (Tudoroiu 
2010; Stokes 2009), the effect of earlier revolutions n the likelihood and mechanisms of 
later ones (e.g. Beissinger 2007); the ‘availability heuristic’ and ‘representativeness 
heuristic’ more generally of existing examples on institutional changes in a given case 
(see Weiland 2008: 291-293). There is developing research more relevantly on 
constitutional patterns in the second half of the XX century, specifically highlighting the 
rise of judicialization of politics (Hirschl 2007; Stone-Sweet 2000). In the above few 
examples, Norway’s example makes amply clear how the external conditions are able to 
shape constitutional crafting. If one is to think of the more specific areas where Norway’s 
context especially informed its building of a good polity, those are possibly – once again 
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– in strengthening the sentiments for popular sovereignty, in making a mixed regime 
attractive, and – by proceeding at odds with the dominant powers – in imbuing the project 
with strong resilience early on.    
 
This is only a limited, cursory consideration of Norway’s constitutional crafting. 
But even in this limited scope, this example shows a rich variety of ways in which 
crafting can occur. It illustrates the ways in which rafting is a situated and practical 
process, occurring within its concrete contexts, by virtue of the available civic 
capabilities and people’s constitutionally relevant sentiments. It suggests the various 
ways and mechanisms whereby the key generic properties of a good polity can be 
attained in a constitutional process. Norway today is a good polity, in fact, one of the best 
polities that are known. That is not to say that Norway does not have any more problems, 
or that its constitutional project is in some sense finished. The very poignant observations 
David Levy writes seem to be as pertinent to Norway as they are to Kyrgyzstan or any 
other case:  
“In light of the ontologically aware philosophical anthropology, there is a single 
fundamental problem of politics that is both perennial and inexhaustible. It is perennial 
because it is tied to the unchanging conditions of man’s being in the world. It is 
inexhaustible because, however humanly satisfying a given institutional order may be, its 
continuing existence remains dependent upon the sam hu an factors that first created it 
and that could at any moment, by ignorance, negligence, or design, destroy it. Nothing 
that results from human action can be maintained in bei g except by human care, and 
therefore no institutional order, however securely it may seem to be established, can ever 
attain the degree of ontological security…” (Levy 1987: ??, italics added).  
 
There is one point of slight concern in this quote: the author’s depiction of a 
universally common and constant human nature, apparently. Just as ontologically 
important, it seems, is the fact of human capacity to cultivate in its midst certain modes of 
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behavior – a culture – that can significantly affect the degree of fragility of institutional 
forms. But the author is prescient about the dependence of any institutional achievement 
on human care for its sustainability. That observation applies to Norway as well as to any 
other constitutional order. There are a number of issues that Norway will be facing, 
including a growing cultural heterogeneity of its population due to immigration, the 
sustainability of its primary sector economy as Norway loses competitiveness due to high 
labor costs, and at some point further down, the possibility of sustaining both economic 
health and especially the welfare system without reliance on natural resources. These and 
any other possible issues, quite likely, will be met with the strong resources of political 
culture as described in these pages. 
 
 Unlimited variety of crafting 
Constitutional crafting is a difficult matter for describing, let alone defining; but it 
is the manner of doing constitution in practice. There were a variety of strategies 
employed in this chapter to focus in progressively on how to understand crafting, from 
the example of saddle-making to brief conceptual delineation, to highlighting some 
opposites of crafting, to discussing the example of N rwegian constitutional crafting. 
Even after all this, however, crafting will remain incompletely explained. That is because, 
as indicated throughout, crafting is not something ever knowable completely, not 
something of which the details can ever be completely figured out.  
But a wide variety of approaches in crafting is outthere, and some of it has been 
depicted on the example of Norway. Some of the variety relate to the actors of crafting – 
the elites, the intellectuals, the masses (of peasants, workers, or parishioners); some relate 
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to sites of crafting – the institutions, the civic culture, the political economy; some are 
about the instruments of crafting – the Constitution, reforms, education; and some are the 
context of crafting – the neighboring states, the prevailing political mores, the particularly 
relevant personalities.  
With these and other possible aspects of crafting, o e may think of a wide variety of 
crafting strategies. One is crafting by use of symbols and exhortative rhetoric – 
something recognized long ago by Machiavelli, and more recently in following him, 
stressed by Viroli (2002: 18-19; 2003 more generally). Another is crafting through 
engagement and participation, claiming even more ancient ancestry in at least Aristotle, 
and more recently and famously, studied by Robert Putnam (both his 1994 and 2001). A 
third, related to previous, is crafting by institution-making, which may be most famously 
traced at least to the Publius and Tocqueville, and more recently elaborated much by the 
afore-discussed PEGS and Bloomington schools (Chapter 3). Another interesting avenue, 
of more recent origin and interest, is crafting by remembering and ‘judging the past’, 
most explicitly traceable to Karl Jaspers, but found i  a burgeoning literature more 
recently (see, e.g., Habermas 1988; McAdams 2001; Tismaneanu 2009).  
One more major mechanism of constitutional crafting should be mentioned: that of 
adopting, interpreting, and cherishing a written Constitution. The place of the Norwegian 
Constitution has been already observed. In a focal study of the ‘functionality’ of written 
constitutions, Beau Breslin offers a much wider variety of how these texts may help 
constitutional crafting, (2009). To appreciate this import of the ‘text’, Breslin’s argument 
needs to be put on its head: it is not the important roles that the text can play, but the 
important meanings it can be given by its authors – the constituent public – that he so 
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usefully elaborates. To use one of his favorite examples, when Nelson Mandela spoke in 
1996 so reverently about the new South African Constitution about to be adopted, the 
solemnity evident in the words of Mandela did not inhere in the Constitution – the 
solemnity was given to the Constitution by Mandela (see Breslin 2009: 5). Said 
otherwise, Mandela engaged in an act of constitutional crafting by endowing the 
Constitution, on which the ink was not yet dry, with so much meaning. Kim Lane 
Scheppele rightly highlights some similar potentialities that Constitutions can have in 
bridging the past to the future, in mending tragedies nto brighter hopes, forming 
important emotional and cognitive understandings among citizens in the very acts of 
Constitution-making, (Scheppele 2008; also 2003).    
This variety is vast, and the listing can be endless, to include crafting by prevailing 
public mores and standards, crafting by specifically designed political and civic 
education, both of which are prominent in Norway’s case. All of these are only a 
sampling of what constitutional crafting can encompass. 
Lest it be suggested here that crafting is only good for describing what has already 
happened. The more important point about crafting is to equip aspiring constitutional 
projects and their authors with helpful ideas about their envisioned task. The discussion 
in these pages should alert such aspirants to the peculiar issues that require attention – the 
continuity, the context, the capabilities, the collectiveness, and many more. It should 
suggest some of the ways in which not to approach the task, or at least to be especially 
careful in approaching so. Not least, it should suggest some actual strategies of crafting 
observed for their consideration and modified resort. If such constitutional aspirants 






Marquis D’Azeglio’s alleged words, “We have created Italy; now we must create 
Italians”, were an intelligent quip that sounded lucid but obfuscated much more. Italy 
could not have been created without Italians being there – the mere enclosing of a piece 
of territory and claiming it is a certain country is far from making it a country. 
Conversely and more probably, when Italy was declard s created, it already had Italians 
– just the way they were at the time. Said otherwise, there is no way to meaningfully 
separate one from the other, country from its people, constitution from citizens. 
Today’s constitution of Kyrgyzstan is what its citizenry has been capable of 
creating and maintaining under its circumstances. The evidence suggests that there has 
been a shortage of constitutional capabilities to create and maintain a good order. What 
may be made of Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional pursuits so far and what may be proposed for 
a more productive constitutional project from now on from the pragmatic republican 
perspective? This chapter is an attempt to apply the perspective and conceptual ensemble 
of pragmatic republicanism to an actual case. The application is not a straightforward 
matching of the several key concepts elaborated in the preceding chapters to several 
discrete constitutional problems and elements in Kyrgyzstan. As remarked above in 
several places, while the concepts are elaborated in a seemingly clear, orderly and 
discrete manner, their actual working in a constitutional process is simultaneous, 
intermixed, and far from each of them being neatly observable. Below, in discussing the 
case of Kyrgyzstan, those several concepts do not pop u  one after another in a clear 
sequence. A more appropriate procedure has been thought to discuss the case in a free 
224 
 
format, let its main themes and problems lead the story, and let the import of the 
pragmatic republican concepts enter the story as it proceeds. We will then return for a 
review of the application of pragmatic republicanism at the end of the chapter. 
 
This dissertation, in Chapter One, began with an outline of Kyrgyzstan’s 
‘constitutional malaise’. A number of general political problems were described in a 
survey of the country’s recent political trajectory. In talking of constitutional 
predicament, Kyrgyzstan was presented as  a case in point: a chronically unstable 
constitutional project, the country has elicited numerous ways in which the project has 
been compromised, even though it has also seemed to return to the constitutional 
aspiration each time. Commentators on Kyrgyzstan’s case included both those who saw it 
as a glass half full and those who saw it as half empty – the greater numbers joining the 
latter view.   
   Is the idea of political constitution as re-conceived in this work, and specifically 
the idea of pragmatic republicanism, able to suggest ways of overcoming the stagnant 
constitutional project of Kyrgyzstan? The following discussion elaborates on the 
prospects of Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional predicament. It approaches the case with a 
critical as well as constructive analytic lens of pragmatic republicanism. The chapter is 
divided into three parts.  The first part briefly discusses some of the constitutionally 
relevant recent literature about Kyrgyzstan, highliting several prominent themes that 
this scholarship has raised. The second part, based on the reviewed literature, engages in 
a stylized ‘diagnostic’ analysis of this case of constitutional malaise, where a nuanced, 
both more fundamental and more promising, conceptualization of this malaise is 
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proposed: one based on three constitutional ‘impedim nts’ – socio-political 
fragmentation, institutional subversions, and a badform of egalitarianism. With that 
diagnosis in hand, the third part of the chapter elaborates some strategies – or simply, 
activities – that Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional crafting could feature. These activities are 
essentially practical speculations about possible transformations of problems identified as 
the three ‘impediments’ into more constitutionally conducive phenomena; speculations 
that adhere to the thin-normative orientations and basic empirical conditions that 
pragmatic republicanism stresses.  
 
‘Searching Where the Light Shines’ 
In an article with this title, Lisa Anderson once wrote a critique of Middle East 
political scholarship for being so preoccupied with dominant themes that apply to 
Western political life, such as civil society, various attributes of democracy, and more 
(Anderson 2006). Thus, in searching for the familiar, Western-like attributes in the 
societies of the Middle East, this scholarship consistently overlooked phenomena that did 
take place and were no less important to political development, phenomena that may hold 
peculiar potentials for leading to better governance if noted properly. It searched where 
the light tended to shine, in other words. 
Something like that can be claimed to be happening in Kyrgyzstan as well, 
especially when it concerns matters of constitutional relevance: too often, scholars have 
focused on popular research themes (such as ‘clans’, i formal politics, transitional 
politics, state capacity/weakness, etc.), failing to see the overall working of politics and 
constitution as it all fits together. At times, such popular themes may have gone in a 
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different direction than Anderson’s critique, tendig to essentialize particular local 
phenomena – such as ‘clans’ – investing them with overly peculiar, if not mystical, 
meanings in the life of Central Asian societies.79In the following few pages, some of the 
recent and representative literature on politics in Kyrgyzstan is surveyed. This discussion 
of literature reflects both the wide variety of constitutionally relevant and salient 
problems that the country is beholden to and – in amore critical vein – the want of a 
more comprehensive constitutional perspective in the discussion of these problems by the 
scholarship. On the basis of the highlighted themes in these works, and some of the 
arguments on such themes, it is possible to formulate such a comprehensive 
constitutional view of the case. That comes in the two sections that follow after this.  
 
Strictly speaking, there is very little consciously constitutional scholarship about 
Kyrgyzstan so far. A few exceptions may be mentioned. The one work most squarely 
dealing with issues of constitutional design is a book by a Kyrgyz legal scholar, Gulnara 
Iskakova on constitutional design of presidential-prliamentary relations in Kyrgyzstan 
(2003). The book, a rare achievement among the country’s recent political scholarship, 
blends elements of legal and institutional constitutional approaches that were discussed 
earlier. Critical of prevailing institutions ‘writ large’, Iskakova fails to go far beyond an 
institutional critique. Another work, by Pauline Jones Luong, is a comparative study of 
three transitional countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, nd Uzbekistan, on post-Soviet 
design of respective electoral systems (2002). Luong’s work is a theoretical contribution 
to ‘new institutionalism’ in comparative politics, proposing a dynamic blend of rational-
                                                




choice and historical institutionalism (and leaning more toward the former). Her 
argument is essentially that elites make rational bargains given the prevailing political 
context and the opening for institutional changes. Fascinating as such, the study is rather 
limited by its focus (on elite bargains over electoral design) and is not really a study of 
constitutional development as such.  
More recently, an article by Henry Hale compared the role of formal constitutions 
in the context of informal politics following the color revolutions in Ukraine (2004) and 
Kyrgyzstan (2005), (Hale 2011). He argued that because Ukraine had adopted a 
decentralized, parliamentary form of rule in a new constitution prior to revolution, 
democratization had better chances there compared to Kyrgyzstan, where reform of a 
highly centralized constitutional system was left for after the revolution – which the new 
Kyrgyz leadership predictably postponed and ultimately never carried out. Note that 
Ukrainian democracy started to crumble just as Hale had drafted his article – and 
Kyrgyzstan went through another revolution and then adopted a much-more 
parliamentary leaning constitution, before the article was published. The events, in 
general, seem to have belied Hale’s argument about the role formal constitutions can play 
in structuring informal politics. 
Perhaps the most interesting recent work from the perspective of the present 
argument is that of Johan Engvall (2011a; 2011b). In a research culminating in his 
doctoral dissertation, Engvall has argued for a revision of how Kyrgyzstan’s political 
development is understood, taking issue with approaches based on Weberian-style 
assumptions of what political development ought to include, and calling instead to look 
into how this state actually works. In what starts out as a refreshingly new kind of a 
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constitutional study, the argument eventually boils down to highlighting what the author 
considers the more accurate working of clientelist politics, a regime based on thorough 
corruption that has turned the state as such into a market with the greatest margins of 
profit in the whole economy. The argument ends with conclusions that generally 
foreclose the possibility – let alone specific ways - of effecting positive constitutional 
change. That said, Engvall offers an insightful analysis of how the country has evolved so 
far.  
The greater majority of social science scholarship on Kyrgyzstan is less concerned 
with constitutional matters explicitly, even when they deal with unmistakably 
constitutional kinds of problems. All of them, as well as the above works, can contribute 
to grappling with the constitutional predicament if heir often narrower and sometimes 
misleading arguments are relieved and instead their observations are heeded to.  
One of the recently prolific students of Kyrgyzstan, Scott Radnitz, has argued in 
several works about a phenomenon he called initially ‘localism’ (2006) and then 
developed, focusing more on how it functioned, into ‘subversive clientelism’ (2009). It is 
the idea that the Kyrgyz society has been organized and mobilized in small locally-
centered communities each led by a person who is a native of the community, but often a 
successful businessman and/or politician with clout beyond the community. When 
pressed in Bishkek (the capital, political and economic hub), such a leader is able to 
mobilize community support (vertical mobilization), and when many such pressured 
leaders join forces (horizontal mobilization), a revolutionary mobilization is born. The 
“subversiveness” of such clientelism is that, instead of being a sustainable democratizing 
force, the mobilization is both short-lived, ideologically thin or empty, and soon turns 
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into ‘dividing the pie’. In Radnitz’ assessment, because both of Kyrgyzstan’s recent 
revolutions happened by this mechanism, neither gave much hope for real 
democratization.  
Studies focusing on similar or slightly different mechanisms of socio-political 
fragmentation are many. Somewhat close to Radnitz’ analysis, but focusing on 
government-opposition relations and on opposition development, are a pair of recent 
articles by Huskey and Iskakova (2011, 2010). Based on personal interview-based 
research, they find that Kyrgyzstan’s opposition forces – as persistent as they have been – 
faced multi-layered difficulties, only part of whic were hurdles put up by the group in 
power, and several other reasons lying in intra-opposition relations and, as in Radnitz’s 
observation, in structural conditions of contemporary society in Kyrgyzstan. A study of 
mechanisms of electoral support and mobilization under ‘competitive authoritarianism’ 
(Sjoberg 2011) is another recent addition to findings about localist and clientelist 
mobilization.  
A popular theme for some time, now somewhat ‘out of fashion’ for methodological 
as well as normative dissensions, has been clan politics. Possibly the most important 
contributor here is Kathleen Collins’ work (2006; 2002), arguing that in Kyrgyzstan, as 
well as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, there exists a somewhat fuzzy phenomenon of clans 
which provided a definitive ‘logic’ to politics in these countries. For Kyrgyzstan, ‘clan’ 
has been in essence (with inessential nuances) another term for tribalism – a term 
problematic in Western academe although very current in late-Soviet and early post-
Soviet Russophone discussions. Another work on clans, focusing on Kazakhstan but 
applying to Kyrgyzstan as well, is a more constructivist take by Edward Schatz, who 
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argues that clans – without denying their presence historically – have been another 
political instrument, consciously deployed in shaping lines of loyalty and support by the 
ruling elite (2004). While providing a strong start for further research into the broader 
concept of ‘informal politics’ in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia, the clan theme itself soon 
came to be rejected by many. One such critique, especially conscious of ‘orientalist’ 
connotations of the concept, came from David Gullette (2007).  
Following the March 2005 ‘Tulip Revolution’, a number of scholars have looked at 
this event and its implications in making sense of Kyrgyzstan’s politics. A special 
double-issue of Central Asian Survey (v. 27, no. 3-4, 2008), a prime academic journal on 
the region, was devoted to analyzing multiple facets and implications of the event, 
examining its relations to regional cleavages (Ryabkov), state building (Lewis, Juraev), 
informal politics (Juraev, Temirkulov), crime (Kupatadze), and the working of 
mobilization and demonstration effects (Ortmann, Tursunkulova), among other themes. 
The overall assessment shared by these authors was, all things said, that the revolution 
did not have any far-reaching effect on the democratic chances of Kyrgyzstan 
(Cummings). That revolution was also included in several comparative studies (e.g. 
Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Tucker 2007), where the respective authors did not have 
sustained conclusions to make on Kyrgyzstan’s politica  development in particular. More 
recently, the second revolution was commented on by Kathleen Collins (2011) in a 
notably more hopeful light, described as an event tha united the democratic politicians 
and civil society of the country in opposing a dictatorship, and thus ushered onto a path 




One more theme that is of relevance here, and related to many of the above themes, 
has been the idea of ‘state capacity’ (Cummings and Norgaard 2004; Schatz 2009). In 
this regard, Kyrgyzstan has always been described, predictably, as a weak state: relative 
to other cases – often compared to its northern neighbor, Kazakhstan – this state has 
consistently been poorer in its capacity to get policies carried out throughout the country, 
its authority has almost continually been contested, significantly uneven across regions, 
and of course, weak in delivering basic state servic s to the population. Explanations 
ranged from the obvious, such as lack of economic resources that Kazakhstan had – 
plentiful oil endowments – and weak industrialization n the wake of independence, to the 
less obvious but arguably more important, such as erly decentralization and 
liberalization of both the economy and political life (as opposed to Kazakhstan’s and 
especially Uzbekistan’s more gradual and sequenced movement), subsequent lack of 
political resources to maintain a sustainable statu q o, and the more pronounced 
preexisting regional and inter-ethnic cleavages against the backdrop of economically 
weak state. Radnitz’ argument about ‘subversive clintelism’ feeds into weak state 
capacity, ‘clans’ are able to compete with the state, nd more generally, the supposed 
tension between formal and informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Grzymala-
Busse 2010) plays in favor of the latter, and hence, against state capacity. 
 
All of the above are very much constitutional themes. In their midst, they create a 
complex picture of where the country’s problems have been in its persisting failures in 
the constitutional project. The most general theme uniting the threads of all arguments is 
a high level of fragmentation of the polity, the numerous lines of cleavage that build up 
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one upon the other, making an ultimate settlement of all the differences a nearly 
impossible predicament. An accompanying key theme is that Kyrgyzstan elicits a highly 
problematic imbrication of formal institutions and informal ones, where the latter – 
widely varying as such – consistently succeed in subverting formal institutions. A third, 
much less consciously apparent but closely related th me, is that of a problematic kind of 
egalitarianism that constantly pushes different politica  groups, competing alignments, 
and even individual citizens, against each other, against recognizing each other’s deserts, 
precluding chances of any cooperation across the various division lines.  
Such disheartening conclusions on each of these thre  t emes would only hold in a 
certain reading: one that views all of the division and subversions as essentially 
detrimental and in need of repair, and even suggesting that any such repair is likely to be 
futile. This reading comes with an implicit background narrative that a workable polity 
needs to settle any such differences, that the acceptabl  differences need to be only about 
policies, about the right or left persuasions. If dif erences are somehow made benign in 
that way, then only can a constitutional democratic order take root – and that would 
essentially come in the form of adopting the right formal institutional arrangements (such 
as a parliamentary system), the entrenchment of normal political contestation by means 
of political parties, and the establishment of a working, stable and legitimate rule of law – 
meaning, a good judiciary system. In a word, constitutional order requires compliance 
with the institutional and cultural profile of a modern European or ‘Weberian style’ state. 
That kind of a reading is what the great majority of Kyrgyzstan literature seems to imply. 
To put it in a risky metaphor, a constitutionalism is possible when the donkey becomes 
more like a horse (or vice versa).  
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Any such prescription is unacceptable. It is probably the seriously problematic 
shape of Kyrgyzstan’s – and similar societies’ – politics that invites such preclusive 
prescriptions. Indeed, the problem of constitution is a somber predicament. But if good 
constitution is a practically impossible concept, it would be worthless. The problem must 
be with the particular concept of constitution, and not with constitution itself. This work, 
therefore, has been an attempt to rethink the concept to allow thinking about constitution 
in a possibilistic and pragmatic way.       
  In such thinking, constitutional success in Kyrgyzstan need not require a magical 
disappearance of the country’s problems. The high level of social and political 
fragmentation in Kyrgyzstan is, by any sober assessm nt, here to stay. And more 
importantly, the fragmentation, insofar as it means diversity and competition of interests, 
is in general a necessary condition for viability of a constitutional order, and ought not to 
be ‘harmonized’, (if such harmonization is even thinkable).80 Similarly, overcoming the 
streak of problems arising from the cleavage-driven formal-informal institutional clashes 
cannot be sought by aiming at normalization of politics in the manner of established 
Western polities. A workable, sustainable institutional capacity needs to, and can, 
emanate from within the Kyrgyzstani polity, from the nascent political culture. Effecting 
such an outcome is a long-term and complex process, obviously, but it is the only option 
available. That is what has been called here constitutional crafting, a pragmatic quest in 
the midst of the given context. 
 
 
                                                
80 There is of course the large of body conflict theory. See the classic by Georg Simmel (1955) and Stuart 
Hampshire (2001) for a sociological and a philosophical argument, respectively, for the irreducible and 
even positive place of conflict in human society.  
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Tapping the basic empirical conditions of Kyrgyzstan’s constitution 
Problems of coordination, difficulties of modeling 
In a much-cited article, Barry Weingast proposes to look at constitutionalism (stable 
democracy and rule of law) as a problem of coordinatio  (1997). His model – developed 
in two stages – posits a ‘sovereign’ and two groups of ‘citizens’, A and B. The sovereign 
is willing to transgress limits on his power, and thus violate citizens’ rights, if he can go 
unpunished for that. But citizens can punish him for transgressing by putting him out of 
office. Sovereign sees such punishment as much moreserious than any gain he can have 
by transgressing, so that if punishment is more or less certain, he would clearly refrain 
from transgressing. Since citizens are divided intotw  groups, only a concerted challenge 
can have effect; a single group’s challenge will not suffice. Challenging does have a cost 
to citizens even if successful (Weingast’s numeric weights for costs and gains in the 
model are quite random and potentially problematic). The sovereign can be smart and 
only transgress against one group and then share the spoils with the other, thus making 
acquiescence the dominant strategy for one group. Only in a reiterated coordination 
model, where each citizen group risks being retaliated against by the other for prior 
transgression, is here a hope for cooperation. In such a scenario, Weingast proposes, a 
constitution (or treaty, or elite pact) can play the role of a coordinating device, letting all 
citizen groups clearly see their stakes in the long run, giving them clear inducements to 
cooperate and thus to prevent the sovereign from transgressing. If such a mechanism 
works, he suggests, a constitution can become self-enforcing. In this suggestion, he 
should probably have meant ‘constitutional order’, o  simply, cooperation, to be self-
enforcing; for surely the formal provisions of a constitutional document, which is what he 
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clearly means to start with, cannot be said to be self-enforcing – that would be quite 
meaningless.81 
Weingast’s argument is a useful point of departure fo  understanding the case of 
Kyrgyzstan. Here, too, the problem is essentially that of inter-group coordination – or 
more accurately, of difficulty of cooperation, of competing and antagonistic agendas 
among the numerous groups. But his argument is particularly interesting for the reasons 
for which it cannot work in Kyrgyzstan; or to put more carefully, it can only work if 
seriously expanded and revised – which is to say, if parsimony of the model is sacrificed. 
Weingast offers a ‘test’ of the theory using the example of Britain’s Glorious Revolution, 
with the King facing the Tories and the Whigs in late XVII century. Without trying to get 
into details of that history – which may be a rather w ll-picked case for demonstration – 
it might be suggested that another, possibly more nuanced, period spanning mid-XVIII to 
mid-XIX centuries, as discussed brilliantly in an essay by Charles Tilly, elicits a much 
richer, complex development of constitutional cooperation in Britain (Tilly 1997; 
especially, see figures in 230 and 231). The point being that, just as that later British 
episode, Kyrgyzstan’s present situation posits a picture of much more plural, unequal and 
indiscrete divisions among the citizenry, much less clear stakes for each actor, less 
discrete separation between the sovereign and the citiz ns, and as a result of all this, such 
                                                
81 This point is indeed of interest. Weingast writes, “limits become self-enforcing when citizens hold these 
limits in high enough esteem that they are willing to defend them... To survive, a constitution must have 
more than philosophical or logical appeal; citizens must be willing to defend it,” (1997: 251). The second 
half of this quote could not be more agreeable. However, it seems to contradict the first part: if citizens are 
defending the limits, then the limits are not self-en orcing, they are enforced by the citizens. Neither does it 
help if “self-enforcing limits” mean “it must be inthe interest of the sovereign to abide by them” (ibid). 
The interest of the sovereign is not to be punished but to be rewarded by the citizens, and that hovering 
promise of punishment is what enforces limits. A pact or a constitution is only an instrument that helps the 
coordination game by letting all relevant parties know what those limits are. ‘Self-enforcing limits’ i  a 
misleading myth.   
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a heavy discounting of any future payoffs that the game looks more like a series of one-
off games rather than a continual, reiterated one.  
If Kyrgyzstan’s situation can be expressed in a model, it may be something like the 
following. It is a rather different setup from Weingast’s, and very simple, and the order of 
payoffs is based on the story of recent Kyrgyz political life as related in the preceding 
pages. To note right away, the model is extremely simple, does not suggest its own 
resolution, and is intended more to help discuss problems attending any such modeling 
than to find solutions within its terms.  
                  Sovereign  
   Not transgress  Transgress 
 
 
            Reward 
Citizens 
               Punish 
 
In this payoff matrix, with A being the best payoff for both the sovereign and 
citizens, there are two Pareto optimal outcomes: [not transgress + reward] and [transgress 
+ reward]. The first of these outcomes should be obviously what everyone wants: for the 
sovereign to work well, and for citizens to reward the good work. But this outcome 
suffers from being not a Nash equilibrium one, because the sovereign would be tempted 
to transgress. The second Pareto optimal outcome, [transgress + reward], is similarly 
unstable because the citizens would be always tempted to punish. So neither Pareto 
optimal outcome is stable. There is an outcome which holds the Nash equilibrium, 
[transgress + punish], which is not Pareto optimal. The outlook in this model is that the 
            B 
A 
              A 
C 
              D 
C 




sovereign – who moves first but without certainty of citizens’ move – will consistently 
choose to transgress, and the most likely citizen strategy would be to punish.  
Now on to some issues involved. What do ‘transgress’ and ‘not transgress’ mean in 
practical sense? In Kyrgyzstan, transgressing means ngaging in illegal and corrupt uses 
of public authority: from straightforward embezzlemnt of funds, to diverting public 
resources for private gain, to applying clan or other favoritism in making appointments – 
hence, accumulate wealth and power beyond what office could legally offer. Not 
transgressing, correspondingly, means not engaging in any of these activities but to serve 
the public interests as expected from the office, and being satisfied with what the position 
offers. A public position in Kyrgyzstan offers rather limited material rewards – salaries 
are rather low, and other perks are insubstantial. ‘Transgressing’ is clearly worth a lot. As 
Johan Engvall has argued, public offices, especially at the higher ends, are much like 
business, and even the most lucrative of them all (Engvall 2011b: esp 36 ff.). The 
differences between the two strategies are further highlighted by the actual meaning of 
the citizen strategies. 
The ‘reward’ strategy, just like the reward that Weingast’s sovereign gets for not 
transgressing, means keeping the sovereign in office – or reelecting, when time comes. 
Other, less substantial rewards can be some public awards, public esteem, not much else. 
The ‘punish’ strategy means, correspondingly, not granting reelection, toppling even 





Now on to how it has worked in Kyrgyzstan so far, in accord with above 
discussions. The citizens have rarely failed to deny r election to an incumbent president – 
in fact, never; it has also granted reelection to most members of parliament when single-
member district system was in place – the much more decisive power for MP (re-
)elections was always exercised by higher authorities, the president, and not by the 
citizens. At the same time, the alarmingly fast public servant rotations at the ministerial 
and other high and middle level administrative leves have been well beyond citizen’s 
efficacy, and so, visited upon public servants by the president mostly regardless of 
‘transgressing’ or ‘not transgressing’. That is, an honest minister has had about the same 
chances, or possibly worse, as a corrupt one of being replaced within a year or two at 
most – as a result, ‘punishment’ generally has lost its weight as such. Add to this the fact 
that very few public servants have ever been punished by law for transgression crimes, 
and also the very high probability that any public official, in office once, would be 
returning to similarly high offices repeatedly after dismissals, and ‘punishment’ as a 
strategy becomes a very immaterial thing.  
Complicate the picture further by adding that ‘citizens’ is a highly divided bunch – 
as shown in so much of the literature discussed above. They are rarely broadly in 
agreement about punishing or rewarding an official, let alone in what way to punish or 
reward. Add also that the ‘sovereign’ is not a unitary actor but a changing set of 
alignments, mostly centered around the president’s office – which effectively does the 
punishing or rewarding of ministers and others – and sometimes around the prime 
minister, especially in the last year. Add another aspect: instead of referring to 
‘sovereign’ and ‘citizens’, one could simply say ‘agent’ and ‘principal’ and thereby mean 
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that a great many coordination games take place in various settings: within political 
parties, within regional and local administrative units, within large organizations, and so 
on. This multiplicity means that any choice situation for any actor is highly complicated, 
multi-layered, and messy.  
While these complications are numerous enough, there is one more set that needs to 
be noted. Namely, some episodes of successful, coordinated punishment of the sovereign 
did take place in Kyrgyzstan. The most obvious examples are the two ‘revolutions’ 
within five years when large enough mobilization could happen to oust two presidents 
when they became blatantly transgressive. Smaller scale successfully coordinated 
challenges of authority do happen rather routinely, sometimes reversing bad policies, 
more often at least keeping authorities on alert. However, more importantly, such 
challenges have not been sustained, have not deterred further governmental 
transgressions, and have failed to generate lasting citizen cooperation, contrary to what 
Weingast’s argument seems to expect.     
The point of all this is that Kyrgyzstan’s is a higly complicated 
coordination/cooperation problem where nearly every lement of an imagined game 
model is bound to be too fuzzy, fragmented, and ultimately preclusive of a neat and 
sustainable resolution. Weingast suggests that his model provides an answer to three 
puzzles related to the working of democracy, of which one is particularly relevant here. It 
is the puzzle of whether an accommodating democratic civic culture makes stable 
democracy possible – attributed to Almond and Verba – or, conversely, stable democratic 
governance leads to rise of such a culture – attribu ed to Brian Barry. Weingast argues 
that it is the successful resolution of the coordination problem that gives rise to both 
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democratic culture and democratic governance (1997: 253). On the basis of Kyrgyzstan’s 
case, it appears that all three answers can only partially be correct, and that the actual 
development and stability of democracy is a process that makes it impossible to separate 
the problem into two or three or more discrete parts of which some are clearly the cause 
and some clearly the effect. And contrary to what the title of Weingast’s article 
suggests82, the entire complex of a democratic society is political, not just its 
‘foundational’ moment of solving the coordination puzzle.   
 
Three themes of contemporary Kyrgyz ‘modus vivendi’  
The predicament facing the case of Kyrgyzstan, as far as constitution is concerned, 
is to grasp the source of its persisting failures without overly simplifying its reality, in a 
way that does not reduce the problem to some singular causal mechanism, and also so 
that any hope for constitutional development need not become lost in essentialist, static 
concepts. The many competing explanatory arguments, such as those concerning 
informal institutions (Temirkulov 2008; Hale 2011), systems of clientelism and patronage 
(Sjoberg 2011; Engvall 2011b) or ‘strongman’ politics (Sjoberg 2011), clan politics 
(Collins 2006, Schatz 2004), localism (Radnitz 2005, 2009; Huskey and Iskakova 2010), 
institutional instability (Huskey and Iskakova 2011) or weakness (Cummings and 
Norgaard 2004; Schatz 2009), competing identity claims and frames (Murzakulova and 
Schoeberlein 2009; Marat 2009) and so on, are all effectively some partial aspects of a 
whole. On the basis of these findings, as it were, th  need is to articulate the problem in a 
more general and more constitutionally helpful manner.  
                                                
82 “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law” 
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One overarching theme that appears to unite most of these themes is the fact of high 
social fragmentation. In place of trying to pin down the precise single cause of it and 
refute others, especially if the point of interest is not detached social scientific analysis 
but a practically-attuned constitutional quest, it is of some value to retain this conclusion 
– high social fragmentation – despite its seeming generality. The fragmentation is highly 
multidimensional – economic, kinship, professional, ‘clan’, ethnic, regional. The lines of 
fragmentation are relatively dynamic, not set at a constant, more so in some respects than 
others: party affiliations and allegiances shift all the time, loyalties to particular leaders 
often change (when leaders change), intensity of differences rise and fall, albeit, for 
example, regionalist fragmentation is rather stable, tribe/clan-centered loyalties are 
relatively also stable, as are the localist networks of which Radnitz speaks. Not least, the 
fragmentation is very multi-layered, with partial overlaps, so that, for example, the North 
and the South are made up of several layers of sub-divisions, but not all those 
subdivisions are either cooperative with each other on all issues, nor are many of them 
strictly northern or southern. Given this, the question remains as to whether this 
fragmentation is capable of sustaining in its midst a workable polity, one that is not in 
danger of falling apart and not wholly incapable of pursuing a common political project. 
The answer, of course, cannot be an automatic negativ . 
The various nuances of social fragmentation suggest ano her general observation 
that concerns the theme of informal institutions and the formal-informal institutional 
dichotomy; let us call it the problem of informal-formal fusion. What one learns from 
most of the recent literature about Kyrgyzstan, considered all together, is the ubiquity of 
so-called informal institutions per se and of supposed tensions and points of juncture 
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between them and formal institutions. The conclusion that offers itself, again if the 
concern is not with ‘scientific’ analysis, is that this dichotomy is not helpful because it 
tries to see discretely two worlds of institutions where no such discrete division exists in 
practice. Thus, there are no ‘elections’ in a pure and formal condition separate from local 
and regional allegiances, no formal ‘institutional authorities’ separable from the person 
who occupies the office and uses authority, and no formal, legal idea of ‘citizen’ 
separable from family, kin-based, ethnic-based, and/or religion-based identities of a 
person. Instead of speaking about informal institutions (as the problem) and formal 
institutions (as the abused ideal), it is necessary to see more simply the many ways of 
actual social governance that fuse together all available institutional devices to produce 
networks of communication, languages of cooperation, a d capabilities for solving 
common problems. The point in recognizing this informal-formal fusion, at least in the 
first move, is not to judge it normatively, certainly not to suggest it to be an unmixed 
blessing, but rather to stress its almost organic mixing that makes it meaningless to speak 
of its one half being infected by its other half.   
A third related general theme that recent Kyrgyzstan scholarship taken collectively 
suggests, but never quite recognizes, is a kind of an egalitarian attitude among the 
society. This is not the same as a fact of equality; there is actually a growing degree of 
inequality, albeit not quite at the level of some other societies. It is also not a mainly 
individualist attitude; while such an individualist-egalitarian attitude is present, it is 
common to observe rather hierarchical cooperative networks where leaders lead and 
followers support them rather uncritically. It is also not clearly distinguishable along the 
egalitarianism of opportunity vs. that of outcome. Instead, this somewhat latent attitude is 
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amorphous, existing at very different levels and sites, and manifested in the playing out 
of the phenomena of social fragmentation and informal-formal governance. This attitude 
seems to lie behind across-the-board claims people make for jobs, education, awards83, 
and ranks84, for recognition of one of their own, for appointments of their own to 
positions that ‘others have got’. This egalitarianism attends political processes more 
specifically, such as starting an own political party by hundreds of politicians instead of 
joining together, or for over eighty persons to self-nominate or be nominated by their 
communities to run for the country’s presidency (in 2011), or for the notable absence of 
any case when a politician would praise one of their colleagues as particularly good and 
deserving of praise. Egalitarianism is also seen among communities, where each ‘tribe’ or 
region, or the northern and southern halves of the country, claims an equal share of any 
national-level common good, the most important of which being positions in state power.    
Exploring the origins and working of this phenomenon would be a fascinating 
subject for a separate research. It may only be suggested here that it is probably not a 
recent thing. Old Kyrgyz epic tales, from the world’s longest orally transmitted tale of 
Hero Manas to more junior ones, are filled with episodes that elicit egalitarian mores, 
from shared authority, to contestation of leadership, to factionalism in war strategies, to 
women-heroes often standing up against and standing alongside men-heroes. The 
historical novel The Broken Sword by the late Tologon Kassymbekov, one of the better 
                                                
83 There is an interesting institution of state awards and recognition that remains from the Soviet system 
and has spread so widely as to become meaningless. Thu , handing out of state awards such as 
‘Distinguished Professional’ (otlichnik) of education, culture, medicine, science, law enforcement, and so 
on, or ‘Recognized Leader, or Worker’ (zasluzhennyi deyatel’, or rabotnik) of the same spheres, or of 
metallurgy, or sports, or agriculture, and so on, was one of the most visible work activity of ex-Presid nt 
Roza Otunbaeva. While excellence may deserve praise, decisions about such awards have become a matter 
of undisguised bargains and demands, and few people remain unawarded by state in some way or another.   
84 There is a ‘true-joke’ in Kyrgyzstan that by the number of generals (military rank) per capita, ‘we ar
number one in the world’.  
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works of modern Kyrgyz literature, is a rich showcase of such egalitarian – and mostly 
problematic – attitude, as it tells the story of the Kyrgyz under the Kokand Khanate up 
until the annexation of the region by imperial Russia. The culture of nomadic and semi-
nomadic life depicted in all this folk and modern literature, when the Kyrgyz lived in 
small, kin-based groups obeying no real higher authority, must have some bearing on 
contemporary outlooks, not unlike Eckstein’s suggestion of Viking cultural continuity in 
contemporary Norwegian culture. The experience under th  Soviet culture, with its 
cornerstone ideology of egalitarianism, which manifested itself in widespread hypocrisy 
and pretense, should certainly have entrenched this a titude further, if only in even more 
problematic ways. Thus, egalitarianism a la Kyrgyz is certainly not a clear blessing, if at 
all; it is a complex and ‘unbridled’ variety that now manifests itself in the phenomena of 
fragmentation and informal-formal institutions.   
These three general attributes of contemporary Kyrgyz society make up some of the 
main conditions facing a constitutional project. High social fragmentation is an important 
contextual category, representing in its multidimensio al makeup the human material that 
stands to be constituted into a common project. It suggests the presence of a potential for 
pluralism, even though that is only a potential so far hidden in many layers of 
divisiveness. The fusion of informal and formal inst tutions in the actual governance is 
especially directed to the question of civic capabilities. In the wide variety of such 
institutions, including resolutely criminal institutions in its most problematic parts, it is 
difficult to see much positive potential, looking as it does rather more dominated by 
capabilities for deceiving, obstructing, and short-sighted competition. But as suggested 
above, underneath this unpleasant thicket, there seem  to be present some real potential 
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of capabilities for self-governance, for social networking and cooperation. The attitude of 
egalitarianism, in its turn, seems to be directed – more than anything else – at potential 
normative orientations. It, too, is generally a problematic phenomenon, one that seems to 
lead to states of denial and to refusal of recognition o others, one that encourages envy 
and unfounded claims of entitlement. However, as a potentially transformable 
phenomenon, it may be hiding some weak beginnings of an orientation to shared goods, 
as well as a culture of vigilance, opposition to domination, and maybe even, given the 
close link of egalitarianism to an idea of balance, a potential for a moderate culture. In a 
word, then, the Kyrgyz society has not been ‘a system of fair cooperation’ of John Rawls, 
but neither has it entered the Hobbesian state of ‘war of all against all’. If human society 
is a dynamic, changeable bunch, it may as well have chances of moving farther from the 
latter and closer to the former.    
To avert misreading, the point here is not to draw clear-cut and necessary linkages 
between the particular conditions of the Kyrgyz society and some particular elements in 
the idea of pragmatic republicanism. Such linkages are not guaranteed, and if they 
materialize, they would appear in ways very far from clear-cut and discrete. Rather, the 
more important point here is to propose to see these obviously problematic phenomena, 
in line with Karol Soltan’s call, not as prohibitive “causal determinants but [as] 
impediments” capable of being transformed through imaginative constitutional 
engagement, (Soltan 2011: 117; italics added).        
A thirst for ‘res publica’ 
What is missing in Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional project, given these general socio-
political conditions, is an idea of res publica. That is, what obtains is a non-constitutional, 
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unconstructive kind of modus vivendi, a mode of life lacking a uniting political vision, or 
a sense of a common project. Transforming the three currently problematic general social 
characteristics into positive, enabling capabilities for constitution of a good polity 
requires an accepted, practical vision of such a polity.   
In this regard, Johan Engvall points to a very relevant problem in discussing Askar 
Akaev’s presidency, especially early on. He suggests that underneath the radical and 
widespread institutional and economic reforms, the question of state-building went 
missing (Engvall 2011b: 27). What he means by state-building is not fully clear, although 
one can imagine it to be about constitution in some sense.85 Unfortunately, he does not 
sustain that discussion to some conclusive, clear statement, letting his attention get 
diverted to – and end with – the themes of clientelism and corruption. Still, in the limited 
discussion that he opens up, in his critical remarks about the error of applying modern 
Weberian-style state criteria to a case like Kyrgyzstan, and in his suggestion that a better 
understanding of such cases requires a closer (and open-minded) ‘listening’ rather than 
speaking (from preset conceptions), there is a callfor a different, more nuanced 
understanding of constitutional development. In a comparable argument, John 
Heathershaw takes issue with the idea of ‘state failure’, offering a well-thought set of 
problems involved in this concept, and indicating the nuanced ways in which the state of 
Tajikistan, thought to have been ‘on the road to failure’86, has exhibited both a degree of 
robustness and peculiar ways of mal-governance (Heathershaw 2011). Engvall’s 
                                                
85 “[T]he functioning of the most basic components of the state” is his explanatory line, and not very 
precise, p. 27. 
86 A 2009 country report, “Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure”, by the International Crisis Group was the




somewhat similar conceptual criticism seems to be belied by the title of his work, 
“Flirting with State Failure” (Engvall 2011b).   
In that vein, Kyrgyzstan’s problem of the missing common political vision needs to 
be understood in its nuances. It is not a matter that could have been resolved by simple 
declarations. The constitution of the country, in all its versions, declares a rich set of 
political visionary commitments, from democratic government, to sanctity of human and 
citizen rights, to preservation of cultural and historic values, to upholding ethnic, 
religious and other manners of diversity, to securing a ‘social state’ that promises decent 
conditions of life to all. Moreover, some of these commitments, such as the idea of a 
‘social state’ in drafting the first independent constitution of 1993 (see Anderson 1999) 
and the concept of ‘secular state’ in one of the lat r drafting occasions, were adopted 
through lively debates. But as it often happens with such declarations – as in 
constitutional preambles, for example – they failed to command any sustained attention 
and heeding in later public life. 
If Engvall meant ‘nation-building’ or development of certain unifying cultural 
outlooks when he speaks of ‘state-building’, critiquing Akaev presidency for ignoring it, 
such a charge would not be entirely true. Two broad ideas of relevance in this respect 
were promoted by Akaev. One was the idea of ‘Kyrgyzstan – Our common house’, 
launched early on in his period, aiming at promoting ter-ethnic peace and tolerance, 
especially salient in the aftermath of 1990 Kyrgyz-U bek conflict but also encouraged by 
processes of mass emigration of Russians and other ‘non-titular’ groups from the country 
in the wake of independence, spurred on by awakened rh toric of Kyrgyz nationalism, 
248 
 
especially activated around the question of language.87 The other idea was that of 
celebrating the Manas epic as the highest cultural achievement of the Kyrgyz, practically 
turning it into a depositary of everything about the nation, from its history, to culture, to 
identity, to – ultimately – its state ideology. The igh point of this project was the 
celebration of the 1000th anniversary (of birth or death, or of composition of the epic – 
not known) of Manas in 1995 – historically, of course, a date of questionable truth but 
one that was aimed more to assert the age of the tale, thereby implying the long history of 
the Kyrgyz.  
Some other similar projects, although less sustained and ambitious, were launched 
during his presidency, all aimed at generating ideas and feelings of unity, national 
identity and pride.88 Some of these were apparently at odds: ‘Kyrgyzstan – our common 
house’, aiming at ethnic inclusion, seemed to conflict with projects centered on the 
Kyrgyz. But more than anything, and certainly more than these seeming contradictions, 
the reason for failure of all these initiatives to take hold on the imaginations and civic 
senses of Kyrgyzstanis was rather banal: they remained mere declarations, surreal 
festivals, and not credible against the backdrop of the actual life of the people. Thus, the 
celebrations of 2100 years of Kyrgyz statehood – prompted by discovery of a mention of 
probable Kyrgyz polity by an ancient Chinese historan – were empty sound in a situation 
                                                
87 The language issues still remains a point of painful contention. By the time of Soviet collapse, it was 
revealed that Kyrgyz language was a distant second to Russian, neglected in education, sciences, and 
media. Ethnically non-Kyrgyz peoples almost never spoke it, and a large percentage of ethnic Kyrgyz also 
did not. Against this background, more nationalistic groups saw the continued prevalence of Russian in 
many spheres of life as irresponsible and humiliating. More recently, within advocacy of spreading Kyrgyz 
language, some groups have been vocal in their opposition to use of Uzbek (such as offering SAT-like tests 
in that language). For Uzbeks, granting their language a constitutionally recognized ‘official status’ has 
been one key political demands. 
88 Those include celebrations of 2100 years of Kyrgyz statehood in 2001, 3000 years of the city of Osh in 
2002, anniversaries of numerous less famous (often pr viously not known) old Kyrgyz national and tribal 




where the state was weak, poor, and subject to vivid encroachments on its sovereignty by 
external powers. Similarly, celebrations of the 1000th anniversary of Manas did not 
resonate widely with a people who were mostly ignora t of the story, many not having 
read any of it, and – again – it being a story of greatness of an historic people that bore 
little relation to the same people now suffering and undignified. ‘Kyrgyzstan – our 
common house’ was soon mocked by nationalist opposition as Akaev’s invitation for 
non-Kyrgyz to rule the country, and the institution that it generated – the Assembly of the 
Peoples of Kyrgyzstan – became a weak , un-authoritative mouthpiece for the 
government when needed. 
In the period since the ‘Tulip Revolution’ of 2005, no comparable major ideological 
projects were undertaken. There have been a few projects of a different sort, albeit poorly 
conceived – celebrations of contemporary topics, such as the 2005 revolution itself 
(marking 24th of March a national holiday and non-working day), the introduction of 
parliamentary democracy (although that would be, strictly speaking, a misnomer so far), 
and the fact of people’s refusal to be dominated by ictators now proven twice – possibly 
the one topic in best position to carry the day, but overwhelmingly marred by that 
‘popular refusal’ soon turning into unruly anarchy, maraudery, and divisiveness.  
Thus, Kyrgyzstan stands in need of a common politica  idea. That is not to say that 
a full-blown theory of a good state is wanted, or an even better, detailed and aspirational 
Constitution is to be adopted. But some general idea of a good state that everyone wants, 
something like the generic sketch of a good polity proposed in Chapter 4, is in need of 
being articulated and broadly accepted. This is to ay that the people of this country lack 
a sense of being engaged in a common work, for a pupose shared by them all, and such a 
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sense is necessary for them to be oriented toward constitutionally sustainable, productive 
objectives. Articulation and acceptance of such a common vision will need to be done 
very differently from, say, a polite conference where someone makes a presentation and 
everyone in audience applauds and unanimously votes in it  favor. That common vision 
will need to arise from the midst of the actual life of the public. How to make that happen 
is the question now posed. What follows is an attempt to propose some practical, concrete 
activities that are realistic and would be clearly contributive to such a project. 
 
 
Toward transformative practices: constitutional crafting  
To begin, there is some good news, even if not resoundingly strong. The people of 
Kyrgyzstan in general do want democracy. That is what t e outcomes of a recent opinion 
poll show: to the question of whether they thought Kyrgyzstan needed democracy, almost 
80% of respondents replied positively.89 It is not a consensus of 100%, but most likely 
among the 20% there are many who have come to view democracy as synonymous with 
anarchy and ‘no limits’ (bespredel) based on what they have seen recently in the country. 
Such disenchanted people, it is credible to suppose, would quite probably want to have a 
functional democracy in the country. Besides the polls, the two occasions of revolution 
also suggest something quite positive: that people in Kyrgyzstan do not like tyranny and 
are capable of standing up against it once it hits a certain level. That is, one may safely 
assume that for this society the desirable polity would have to be a democratic state that 
secures their freedom from oppression and kleptocracy. The problem so far has been their 
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not taking this objective seriously, acting upon it in concert over sustained periods, and 
maintaining a regime of self-governance amongst them that does not fall into self-
destructiveness. In other words, this society is in need of uniting behind a common and 
general political objective, of becoming an actual body politic from its present condition 
of an unstable multiplicity of antagonistic and weakly cooperative relations. This is a task 
of political constitution par excellence. 
 
One way to imagine the task at hand is to think of the need to transform the 
normative thrust of the three general social conditions in Kyrgyzstan that have been 
specified above. That is, transforming social fragmentation from its prevailing thrust of 
divisiveness into one that embodies a constitutional pluralism; transforming the informal-
formal institutional fusion from being a word for corruption and subversion into an idea 
for civic creative capabilities and resourcefulness; and transforming the egalitarian 
attitude that now means mutual denials of recognitio , envy and narrow-mindedness, into 
an attitude guided by common purposes, vigilance against power abuse and of 
recognition of the role of all as co-creators in the common project, the res publica. This is 
very clearly a position that views problems such as the e three not as conclusive ‘causal 
determinants’ of fateful social outcomes, but as ‘impediments’ that can be overcome or 
changed by imaginative and practical engagement, (Soltan 2011). This view, in turn, 
makes the task – or predicament – at hand one that calls for a ‘civic studies’ approach: an 
approach to the question of constitution oriented to the potentialities of desirable change 
and to citizens’ possible role in effecting such change. This is the perspective of a co-
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creator, a ‘designer’s perspective’ (Soltan 1993a), or – as preferred presently – the 
perspective of crafting. 
To remind, the perspective of constitutional crafting stresses certain conditions and 
suppositions: the importance of taking the context seriously, the need to proceed from 
what is present to what is realistically possible, th  understanding of social dynamism as 
opposed to static views, and the disciplining condition of continuity. That means 
understanding that any social change is carried out by and with extant civic capabilities, 
where the effecting of change in turn must create still higher, stronger levels of 
capabilities to sustain the change.  
In the present case, that is to say that the project f transforming the constitutionally 
problematic conditions of fragmentation, informal-formal fusion and egalitarianism into 
good ones needs to be imagined and carried out from within Kyrgyzstan’s social context 
that contains them. Within that social context, there are those who are to imagine and 
carry out those transformations of the problems into constitutionally conducive processes. 
The impetus, the want of positive changes, will need to come from the public as a whole. 
The leadership in envisioning and actualizing those changes will come from various 
social leaders and activists: those in the relatively ibrant ‘civil society’ associations, 
leaders of some of the political parties, various public figures with renown and 
intellectual clout, the socially active leaders of the private sector, and some people among 
the political leadership. They all will need to be h lped by those intellectuals and 
academics who make understanding political life andits reform their occupation. There 
are, today, people fitting all of the above descriptions – people possessing the initial 
capabilities to launch a different constitutional story of Kyrgyzstan. What specific 
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activities and projects could these people imagine a d realize? Some such activities are 
suggested under the following three headings.        
From divisiveness to a pluralist social culture  
The multidimensional condition of social fragmentation in Kyrgyzstan is a ‘fact’ 
but it is a lived, continuous fact that need not remain constant. Contrary to the 
implications of much scholarship, which highlight a competing variety of divisions as 
‘causal determinants’ from a spectator’s perspectiv, there is no basis to claim that these 
divisions are permanently subversive and counter constitutional development. It is 
thinkable, and necessary to think, that the fact of high fragmentation is capable of 
changing into a positive condition. What this amounts to is exchanging the perspective of 
fatalism to that of possibilism. In their popular work Getting to Yes, Fisher and Uri 
diagnose some reasons for situations of protracted failures to agree, scenarios of zero-
sum interactions (Fisher and Uri 2001). One of their advices is to approach bargain 
situations not from ‘positions’ but from ‘interests’, and to consider what configurations of 
agreement are capable of advancing a party’s interests, (ibid: Ch 4). It stands to be 
objected that ‘positions’, too, need not be viewed as constant and therefore preclusive of 
agreement; however it is their broader invitation t think of more possibilistic strategies 
that is of the greatest import. As idealistic as the slogan ‘e pluribus unum’ may sound, it 
is not necessary for it to remain a utopia. A number of concrete projects are possible to 
breathe life to this changed, possibilistic perspectiv  in face of Kyrgyzstan’s social 
fragmentation.    
One very obvious thing in this regard is the need for much greater interaction of 
citizens across the country. The deeper-seated lines of cleavage, such as the North-South 
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divide and the tribal-regional lines are there in large part due to very limited physical 
interaction, not least because of lacking communications infrastructure until very recently 
across the formidable mountain ranges that divide the country horizontally into two 
halves. Given the recent positive changes in both infrastructure and economic life in 
general, a much higher level of mixing of citizens around the whole country is very 
apposite. This could include a wide variety of programs, from semester-long high school 
students and teachers exchanges, to shorter-term work experience exchange among 
professionals, farmers, to conference-style mixing events for larger groups of ordinary 
community members. Importantly, such a program would need to focus outside of the 
capital city, which is a mixing place by itself but very impersonal, and outside the hotels 
of lake Issyk-Kul, which has also become an impersonal conferencing routine. Exchanges 
among smaller urban and regional centers have been v ry rare, and that is where more 
genuine meeting of differences will be seen. 
A related and necessary facet of healing the divisiveness is design and 
implementation of special educational programs, especially at the high school level, but 
not to be only limited to there. Because high schools are located throughout the country 
and in rural, naturally more parochial communities, they stand to benefit from such 
curricula the most. An added possibility at such high school level education is 
involvement of parents and families. Such a special curriculum would be centered on 
learning the country, the larger society of fellow citizens and communities, and 
appreciation of the diversity contained in it. Such programs are generally absent today, 
and the somewhat related discipline of ‘Man and Society’ (Chelovek I Obschestvo) is a 
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dry course, based on outdated materials, mostly about public law. There is a rich and 
exciting array of themes and methods available for the proposed new program.   
On the topic of education more generally, a project of critical reevaluation of the 
society’s Soviet experience remains still on the agnda. Until now, every time the topic is 
raised, it has shown serious differences of opinion and general refusal to engage beyond 
one’s preconceived views. But as the older generation emotionally invested in the Soviet 
experience gradually exits the center stage, and a younger generation with little or no 
knowledge of that history comes to dominate, this extremely important formative age in 
the country’s history has the potential to introduce a common theme for all – not for 
unanimous agreement, but for critical reflection from diverse perspectives. In particular, 
examination of the Soviet experience can provide a we lth of more historically situated, 
constructed backgrounds to the social diversity that is too often thought of as static and 
age-old enmities and incompatibilities. 
While a reevaluation of the Soviet experience can be an exercise of somewhat 
distant and mostly depersonalized memory, there are several more recent and more 
painful experiences that Kyrgyzstani society has on its agenda, such as the two biggest 
Kyrgyz-Uzbek ethnic clashes in the city of Osh and its surroundings, in 1990 and in 
2010.90 The preferred approach of the government on the former instance, now being 
repeated after the second, has been to keep silence, not to discuss, and instead – with a 
good degree of disingenuous effort – to speak only f the bright sides and happy futures. 
The suppressed memories of losses and hurt, unresolved and unaccepted differences put 
on hold, have failed to magically disappear. Animosity, or at best always guarded 
                                                
90 On re-evaluating both the Soviet and the post-Soviet histories, or “pasts”, the idea here is that of “judging 
the past” or “coming to terms with the past”, referred as Vergangenheitsbewältingung in German. See, 
generally, Habermas (1988), James McAdams (2001); Tismaneanu (2009).  
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rapport, between the two sides has persisted. Kyrgyzstanis will need to face these 
experiences, to acknowledge the tragedies, and come t  t rms on which common life 
between the two communities can pick up on the basis of mutual respect and recognition. 
There are many ways and themes on which such a process of atonement may proceed, 
and it will have to be a work of sustained deliberation and reflection. Some stories of 
personal and family experiences, of members of one community helping and defending 
members of the other, of members of one side standing up in criticism of their own 
fellow members, have now and then appeared and never wid ly noted. Such stories are 
certain to be a cornerstone of any constructive ‘coming to terms’.       
These are only a few proposals for crafting a sustainable pluralistic society: they are 
concrete and practical, specifically arising out of the current life and condition of the 
society. To date, such activities have been neglected, either for being too costly, for 
lacking support, for being sensitive issues, but more generally, simply for not having 
been given a thought. What such activities – and more of them are possible to imagine – 
promise is to provide opportunities for members of the larger Kyrgyzstani society to learn 
about their many communities, to understand and recognize their differences, and acquire 
abilities to communicate across differences on sincere and respectful terms. In the 
language of ‘constitutional aspects’ of pragmatic republicanism, these activities are 
oriented to engendering a culture of moderation, of guarding against immoderation and 
intolerance, and also to people’s identification and pursuit of common, shared goods.   
From corrupt practices to institutional creativity 
The project of transforming the negative, counter-productive manifestations of so-
called informal institutions into positive, constructive practices, of grasping the possible 
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and benign continuities between formal and informal institutions is not easy. Informal 
institutions is an extremely broad category, from rather positive traditions of community 
self-governance and sources of moderate authority to more negative practices of 
nepotism, corruption, and, ultimately, criminal schemes. In considering the possibilities 
of positive transformation of the formal-informal nexus, it is not necessary to view the 
latter variety – objectively criminal practices – as candidates for betterment. The project 
of such transformation, instead, will have to directly target such negative phenomena, 
build civic capacity for opposing them, and thus, provide a strong citizen support for the 
legal means of countering them. Therefore, this project will need to be especially oriented 
toward developing a culture of vigilance, of alertnss to abuses of power and office. In 
the process of such development, the formal-informal nexus itself, whenever the two 
sides of it mesh together positively, can evolve into sui generis relations of effective 
governance. Again, a number of specific themes and activities can be proposed.        
One important and most immediately possible avenue for xploration is community 
involvement in local self-governance. Kyrgyzstan is still mostly a rural society (~60%), 
and even the urban centers outside of the capital city and a few larger towns are mostly 
rather close-knit, familiar communities. A package of administrative reforms now under 
way is directed to further empowering institutions of local governance, giving them 
greater leeway in managing their revenues, granting more authority in resolving local 
economic issues such as land distribution and rights, and cutting the layers of concentric 
subordination that have so far made accountability a difficult issue. The city mayors’ 
offices and village government offices (ayil okmotu) are administrative units covering an 
average of 5,000 to 10,000 (some are smaller or larger than this range) citizens. The 
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citizens in these units have real ability to engage in direct participation, and with family 
respect and reputation of governors and other office-holders directly involved, they have 
the capacity to enforce genuine accountability. What is needed is creating more chances 
for direct citizen participation, be it through public budget hearings, special open sessions 
of local councils, deliberation sessions on particular issues of local salience, and so on. 
Such engagement is capable both of directly affecting the quality of local governance and 
of being a training ground for community activists and citizens at large for higher level 
participation and vigilance.         
Participation of citizens at the higher, and especially national, level is certainly not 
possible in a direct format, and will require an effective system of representation. A 
practical development in this regard that is possible, and quite likely to appear soon, is a 
reform of national representation system. The present ystem of parliamentary elections 
is 100% proportional based on a single nation-wide electoral district. That is, each 
political party runs with a list of its proposed candidates throughout the country, and to be 
represented, must win at least 5% of vote nationwide and at least 0.5% of vote in each of 
nine territorial units (two cities and seven provinces). The nine units being much larger 
than the local self-government units, there is very weak incentive for parties to put up a 
cast of candidates that is locally representative. As a result, people end up voting based 
on the most famous candidates at the top of a party list, and with little hope that such 
candidates will ever come to meet them once elected. Once in parliament, the winning 
parties form each their own caucuses and speak – generally – in one party voice. Thus, 
communities vote and elect representatives who havelittle incentive to actually represent 
their views and concerns once in the parliament.  
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What seems to be developing, based on anecdotal evidence, is a move by parties 
toward recruiting locally known, representative lead rs to their ranks, in the hopes of 
securing more local-level support and votes. While t e move is good for party strategy, it 
is also capable of correcting the previous representatio  creep. Such a development 
would be a middle-course between the country’s rather impersonal current practice and 
the much more personal systems found in the United States and Britain. Besides 
improving representation, this process is also likely to improve parties which so far have 
been one of the weakest, least stable links in the political life of the country. 
There is yet another weak development under way, in da ger of being rendered 
another formality. It is the institution of kurultai – a nascent tradition of popular 
deliberation, much like the jirgas and shuras of Afghanistan. The formalization danger 
comes from advocacy by some groups to recognize kurultais by a formal law, and 
especially, to give it constitutional recognition ad powers. If that were to happen, this 
institution would quickly turn into another site ofnarrowly political abuse, aimed at 
exerting pressure on elected organs by factions that were not elected, as has been 
occasionally happening. The potential of kurultai for positive constitutional impact is 
highest if it remains an informal consultative forum, an institution of people meeting and 
deliberating on issues (or sets of issues) of enough importance to call a kurultai together. 
The effect of kurultai on immediate policies and behavior of government need not be the 
primary objective; it should remain a venue for expr ssing the consulted, considered 
opinions of people on relevant issues, and should be held at various levels, from villages 
to country-wide. That way, its greater benefit would be in forging (or resurrecting from 
old times) a tradition of civic mind-sharing, one tha  excludes intolerance or disrespect 
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and instead encourages moderation, listening, and reason-giving. This would be a potent 
avenue to meshing formal and informal civic consultation that is constitutionally 
productive in a broad sense.        
Besides the activities concerned more explicitly with public governance issues, 
there is one more very important area for exploratin. This is the community-business 
relationship. One of the worst sufferers from the negative informalities, from the culture 
of bribes, foul play, and nepotism, is the legitimate private business sector. With their 
property insecure, market subject to artificial monopolies and other manipulation, tax and 
regulatory system obscure and open to infinite abuse, and all this in a small economy 
where any business success is soon spotted by predators, private business has rarely 
breathed freely. A project of fostering stronger community-business relationship can be 
in direct interest of both sides, and open the way to appreciation and protection of good 
business by the citizenry. Many concrete activities can be envisioned, from celebrating 
the best entrepreneurs and companies, to regular repo ting of business achievements and 
performance, to funding (and actual participation in) community development projects by 
businesses, and more. At present, there is almost no awareness or any opinion among 
ordinary citizens, especially in rural areas, about b sinesses. A project in this regard is 
capable of introducing immense positive change in the political-economic climate of 
Kyrgyzstan, regarding not only the place of private business in society, but more broadly 
about property, market, and economy for a better polity.91 
Better community-business interaction, the kurultai, the improved system of 
national representation, the better formed politica p rties, and the stronger citizen 
                                                
91 See a brilliant critical discussion of the ignored place of property in recent ‘civic republican’ political 
theory of democracy in Erik Olsen, Civic Republicanism and the Properties of Democracy (2006). 
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participation in local governance, are some of the possible ways of engendering a climate 
of political transparency; their effects are compatible and complementary. Transparency 
is a key missing ingredient in Kyrgyzstan’s governance, and its lack is the best condition 
for proliferation of negative informalities. With greater transparency comes greater 
capability among citizens for demanding accountability, and when necessary, for 
challenging transgressors and even punishing them. When transparency is in deficit, a 
coordination model such as Weinstein’s is destined to be meaningless. 
 
From self-centered egalitarianism to recognition of c mmon membership 
The third aspect of Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional woes is the peculiar attitude of 
egalitarianism. As observed above, it is a probable basis of a wide variety of social ills, 
collectively leading to lack of a sense of sharing a common project. One of the main 
negative meanings of the concept of ‘kyrgyzchylyk’ (“Kyrgyz-ness”, or “Kyrgyz way of 
doing/being”) is this egalitarianism: its factor asn obstacle to recognition of others’ 
achievements, to respecting others’ interests and arguments, and to cooperation with 
one’s others, (e.g., Imanaliev 2009). Egalitarianism as a general concept is not a negative 
idea, but quite to the contrary, a key necessity for viability of democracy itself. The task 
here is to transform the presently mostly counter-productive, counter-constitutional civic 
attitude into one that can positively contribute to and support a common constitutional 
project. In other words, through this transformative project, constitutional crafting would 
aim at aligning the citizenry toward pursuit of shared, common goods and interests. It 
would, of course, also be majorly relevant to orienting civic capabilities toward a culture 
of vigilance and a culture of moderation.  
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One practical proposal, possibly somewhat strange, is about writing a public story 
of the country’s national flag. Of late, in a society that seems to have an allergy for 
anything long-standing, even this object has become a point of dispute and calls for 
replacement. The flag is in fact rich with positive interpretive meaning, and is fit for 
serving as the most vivid symbol of a common constitutional project that unites the 
diversity of Kyrgyzstan, that makes ‘e pluribus unum’. So, a crafting project in this case 




The flag is a red canvass, and originally the color was chosen because in the text of 
the aforementioned Manas epic, the color of Hero Manas’s flag was red. More 
contextually, however, the color appealed in part because it was continuous (familiar) 
with the Soviet flag, both of the union and of the republic, and in part because an 
alternative design that featured blue as the dominant hue was objected by southerners 
because for them it is the color of mourning. Regardless of the story of this choice, and 
without abandoning the link with Manas – which, as mentioned above, does not excite a 
universal allegiance due to lack of familiarity – it is possible to argue for still stronger 
and evocative meanings of the red. It can be the symbol of people’s hard, blood-won 
legacy, the color of more recent trials of its freedom, as well as the symbol of continuity 
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with Soviet as well as pre-Soviet (Manas) history – something that a people cannot erase 
but only carry into better futures. 
At the center of the flag, there is a golden (not yellow) sun with stylized ‘tunduk’ 
(sun/light inlet and smoke outlet of a yurt, the traditional Kyrgyz house) at its heart. From 
old times, tunduk has been a symbol of love of life – as long as it i open, it means the 
yurt has life in it, if smoke comes out of it, it means its occupants are warm and fed, and 
if sunlight is entering the yurt, there is light in l fe. The forty rays of sun around the circle 
represent the forty tribes that make up the Kyrgyz nation. The number is not exactly 
proven (the principle of counting the multi-layered tribes is never quite established), and 
its meaning is, of course, exclusive of the non-Kyrgyz. A better interpretation would be 
that these many rays represent all the various groups – tribes, ethnic groups, regions, 
religious groups – living in this country. All these groups are joined together in the 
common center of life, common project of securing ad keeping good, bright life in the 
country. For some reason, such imaginative interpretations of the flag have lacked, and its 
symbolic potential has never been seriously tapped. A project of spreading and 
highlighting this symbolism is very realistic, and is capable of infusing some level of 
belonging in a common project among all citizens. 
To go on with crafting through symbolic activities, a potentially very interesting 
project would be the writing and adoption of personal civic statements, or call it 
constitutions, by all citizens. These statements would have to include a number of 
sections, such as the author’s ambitions, regard for one’s family, the place of relatives 
and local community in one’s life, and the vision of the author for their country. With 
such channeling, a citizen-author would be induced to think directly and responsibly 
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about the society in which one lives, and about the bonds one has to the society. Further 
‘required’ sections may include an accounting of what t e person’s contribution would be 
to the welfare of family, community, and country. Another section may include the 
person’s expectations from the society. What makes such an exercise interesting is that 
each person would be reflecting and writing from their own personal position, from the 
basis of their knowledge and understandings; that would be very different from having 
someone else, such as John Rawls, imagine their life for them.  
In working on such personal civic statements, the authors would be induced to face 
the question of responsibility. A good citizen of a good society is a responsible one; she 
acts with an accounting for likely consequences of her actions, and acts with awareness 
that any other fellow citizen may act likewise, and therefore, acts well. On a related note, 
Karol Soltan recalls Vaclav Havel’s notion of ‘responsibility for the world’, which seems 
somewhat not fully clear (Soltan 2011: 104). But a li tle earlier, Jean-Paul Sartre – not as 
impeccable a person as Havel, but a grand intellectual of the twentieth century – wrote in 
a similar vein about a person’s responsibility befor  the world for every action and 
decision one takes, (Sartre 2001). In the [anti-essentialist] existentialism of life, what 
people do and how they act is all there is that makes a society – and if society is to be 
good and likeable, then each of its members must act in a manner that, if reproduced by 
all others, would produce that good and likeable social order. That is the meaning of 
existential sense of responsibility before the world. The relevance of Sartre’s idea is 
underscored by another of his writings, The Anti-Semite and Jew (Sartre 1976). There, in 
a polemic about the anatomy of French anti-Semitism, he depicts the anxieties, envies, 
and unfounded jealousies of lower middle-class French who found escape from their 
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unfortunate social status in vilifying the Jew. This story is quite reminiscent of the 
recognition-averse, envious egalitarianism that is ob ervable in Kyrgyzstan, where anti-
Semitism per se may not be notable because there ar not many Jews.92  
It is quite possible – especially in the possibilistic perspective of crafting – that the 
exercise of writing one’s civic statement is capable of awakening that sense of broader 
responsibility, the responsibility contained in the question “what would it be if everyone 
acted as I do?” There are many ways of organizing or targeting such a project. It could be 
done with all adult citizens who cared for it, could be done with just college students, or 
include grade school students for a simplified version of it. The subsequent use of such 
‘personal constitutions’ can also be imagined in a variety of different ways. The worst 
thing that can happen is that most people would not do it, and those who do it would 
forget about it the next day. But there can be some thousands who take it seriously, and 
now and then return to it.  
The family was mentioned here, and this is an important institution in its own right. 
For constitutional crafting in Kyrgyzstan, family deserves the most pointed attention both 
because it is traditionally one of the strongest organizing institutions in the society, and 
because recently, this institution has also been weakening. The Kyrgyz society, excepting 
some parts of the urban society, is very much family-centered and family-oriented; 
individualism in this society is very weak compared to Western societies. What family 
does is discipline a person’s moderation, develop her other-regarding attitudes such as 
caring, and makes her more careful in view of any possible consequences of her actions 
                                                
92 But on occasion, when certain persons of Jewish ident ty could be pointed out as culprits, anti-Semitic 
rhetoric has been quick to rise, and lacking the awareness of the stigma that such rhetoric now has around 
the world, such occasional bursts are generally allowed to enter the media without scorn. Recently, such 
rhetoric was observed when the son of the second runaway president, Maxim, was found to have dealt with 
several people of Jewish identity in his corruption schemes.  
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for the family. In an environment of economic hardship on the one hand and of Western 
pop-cultural influence on the other, the strength of family has been steadily waning. 
Constitutional crafting must make the family a pivotal theme of its focus, and promote 
civic valuation of it as central to the strength of g od constitution.  
Another traditional institution that is highly attractive for constitutional crafting is 
that of ‘ashar’ (collective work). Ashar is very akin to Harry Boyte’s idea of ‘public 
work’ (e.g. 2001) – engagement of members of a community in common projects – and is 
therefore capable of being tapped into without being a  alien idea by ‘some American’. 
Usually ashar means very concrete activities: residents of a vill ge will come to ashar to 
build a house for one of them, women-neighbors willhe p finish the carpet of one of 
them by ashar, the youth of neighboring houses will come for ashar to prepare wood and 
food at a house that is preparing to host a large event such as a wedding. But the concept 
has been already picked up in the name of a political party, which has now become 
extinct. It was the party of squatter settlers, young and mostly unemployed people who 
migrated to outskirts of Bishkek in search of better livelihood, illegally seized land plots 
and built themselves mud houses (by method of ashar, hence the name of the party), and 
when pushed around by authorities, organized into a party to defend their interests and 
make demands on government.  
The concept is pregnant with great potential for constitutional crafting. The literal 
meaning of the concept is precisely what is lacking in the country’s civic life: common 
purpose, common interest, common work. There are infinitely many concrete projects 
thinkable under the rubric of constitutional shar. One such concretization, albeit a 
symbolic one, might be mentioned: spreading the narrative of all citizens in their 
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everyday productive lives being involved in the greatest of ashars of all – the building of 
a country. Rarely does a person think in such terms when they do publicly relevant 
activities; their public relevance is not so readily vivid. But every instance of ‘doing the 
right thing’, such as caring for someone, doing one’s work better than expected, even 
keeping one’s own house repaired and clean, are the small things that contribute to a 
bigger thing – and when a person is aware of this, it  likely that she will be encouraged 
to do more, feel more dignified, and have a sense of b l nging in a larger project.      
Through these and many other thinkable avenues of crafting a better egalitarianism, 
the society is capable ever so slowly to identify with a constitutional project as both its 
authors and beneficiaries. Ever so gradually, the extant, unhealthy egalitarianism of zero-
sum perceptions can give way to what might be called a ‘value-added’ egalitarianism: the 
understanding that all the diverse members of the society, including oneself and one’s 
communities, are adding some positive value to the common project, to res publica. It 
need not, and even should not, be some singular and co crete goal that occupies the 
imaginations of all citizens and groups. It is sufficient that all citizens agree on some 
more general shared goods, such as democratic governance, absence of coercion, stability 
of government and laws, opportunities to work and excel without having to engage in 
corruption. All of these together can make up that re listic ideal that bonds the society 
together and orients it to collective strivings. 
 
By way of conclusion 
Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional story so far can be described as one of a malaise, a 
persisting condition of sickness, or more plainly, one of stable instability. It is easy to be 
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overtaken by the magnitude and multitude of problems that make up the amalgam of 
Kyrgyzstan’s problems and to fail to see anything constitutional in it. However, at every 
level of the country’s political activity – from presidential politics down to village-level 
mobilization – the question of constitution, and especially the idea of ‘constitutional 
reform’, has been all too persistent in people’s thinking. ‘Constitutional reform’ has been 
the constant but little-understood vague response of the government, the opposition, and 
the ordinary people in the civil society to the thicket of socio-economic-political 
problems facing the country. The concretization of constitutional reform has, then, all too 
often been too concrete: remaking of the country’s written Constitution, rewriting the 
authorities of the several governmental branches, rdesigning their structure, and then 
doing all of that yet again and again. These superficial constitutional reforms have been 
symptomatic of what some of the mainstream constitutional scholarship and policy 
circles have advocated.  
The more real arena for possible constitutional development has been elsewhere, in 
the midst of the thicket of problems. While the Kyrg zstani public, from ordinary citizens 
to high officials, were being overwhelmed by the multiplicity of concerns all competing 
for attention, the scholarly community studying the whole process has been occupied 
with analysis of discrete problems – taking the constitutional complex of problems into 
separate parts, ultimately contributing to still greater confusion and loss of a sense of the 
constitutional predicament. Thinking in terms of the pragmatic republican framework, it 
has been suggested, it is possible to bring the many threads of seemingly disparate 
problems together into a few constitutional themes.  
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At the most general level, it is suggested that a key problem that is responsible for 
the ‘stable instability’ is the lack of a sense of res publica among the citizenry. 
Kyrgyzstanis have lacked a clear sense of being members of a larger, common project, 
being instead pulled in disparate directions toward narrower group and individual 
interests and identities. In the language of pragmatic republicanism, this is to say that 
there has been little to no identification with a vision of the good polity to which 
Kyrgyzstan is oriented. The several elements of the good polity sketched out in this work 
have only weakly been realized or understood in Kyrgyzstan but envisioning of a good 
polity as a complete whole has been clearly lacking. Thus there have persisted a wide 
variety of broadly held views of where Kyrgyzstan should be going as a polity, many of 
those views mutually exclusive, but also few if any of those views enjoying any 
considerable intensity of allegiance, (see Murzakulova and Schoeberlein 2011). Reviving 
putative political forms from the Kyrgyz past, moving toward a more Muslim statehood, 
returning to a likeness of the Soviet Union in a reunification with Russia and others, and 
establishing a democratic state – this view being held by a stable majority – are some of 
the rather diverse variety of political imaginations.  
This deficit of a vision of res publica is conceptualized in three rather broad 
constitutional impediments: a high-degree multidimensional social fragmentation, a 
widespread occurrence of institutional subversions, and a bad kind of egalitarianism. 
These are the basic conditions of constitution, prima ly making up the relevant context, 
and shaping the requisite kinds of civic capabilities.  
A pragmatic republican perspective takes these negativ  phenomena as the actual 
starting point, and considers where the path of constitutional development may lie. 
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Elaborating such a path must heed to the disciplining ontological condition of continuity 
– the idea that between a given bad condition and an imagined good or improved 
condition there is a continuum of actual, practical tr nsformation. If a proposal for reform 
or improvement cannot account for that continuum, then it is obviously a very poor kind 
of constitutional proposal.  
The proposed transformative activities for Kyrgyzstan try to comply with this 
expectation. For each of the three themes of transformation – fragmentation into 
pluralism, institutional subversions into institutional creativity, self-centered 
egalitarianism into sense of membership in a common pr ject – there are several realistic 
activities that can be taken up to effect that transformation. Said another way, these 
proposals are very different from simply proposing to change social fragmentation into 
social pluralism without elaboration of the actual ways and processes that may produce 
such a change.  
The problem of the lack of a sense of res publica in Kyrgyzstan can be mended in 
the process of undertaking these transformative activities. In activities that encourage 
generally anti-constitutional citizen capabilities and outlooks to change into ones 
conducive to and supportive of constitutionalism, the guiding principles are those we 
have called thin-normative procedural principles, or orientations. Pursuit of overlapping 
public goods, development and maintenance of an attitude of political vigilance, and 
cultivation of a culture of moderation are the guiding principles, and they are filled up 




All of these considerations and proposals together ar  what amount to constitutional 
crafting. The careful understanding of the existing problems as constitutional problems, 
an understanding of why it is so, and where the source of the problems lies, the realistic 
assessment of basic given conditions, and the thinking up of realistic ways in which those 
basic conditions may be transformed under the thin-normative procedural principles, and 
envisioning of a possible good polity through the activities that should change the basic 
conditions – all of this together is constitutional crafting.  
Thus, all key elements of pragmatic republicanism are involved in the story of 
Kyrgyzstan. They are involved not in a mechanical, improbably neat process of check-
marking the application of each individual criterion r concept, but are instead relied 
upon in a somewhat implicit, or rather integrated, manner in the development of the 
problems and prospects of Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional predicament. While the concepts 
themselves could be explained and outlined in a neat flow, it was warned that in actual 
constitutional process such neatness is hardly to be met. But the importance and 
relevance of the different constitutional perspective – that of pragmatic republicanism – 
that this conceptual ensemble enables is clear and instructive. A further specific 
elaboration, including the best and likely key actors, the desirable kinds and sources of 
external support, the realistic accounts of needed resources, all the way down to 
engagement in practical crafting of this nuanced constitutional project, remains with the 
constituents of the envisioned good polity of Kyrgyzstan.            
To conclude these remarks on application of pragmatic republicanism on a broader 
note, recall the kind of constitutional thinking tha  has been defended and advocated 
throughout this work. The many ways of constitutional crafting elaborated for 
272 
 
Kyrgyzstan propose ways of dealing with this society’s several most widespread and 
fundamental problems. It invites to view these problems not as forever settled and 
fatalistic givens, but as practical impediments that obtain at this period in an otherwise 
changeable and always changing social life. Crafting directs people’s energies to 
engagements that can enable them to overcome those impediments. It does so from a 
situated, contextualized position, takings its departure from the impediments as they are 
experienced, and thinking of engagements to which people can relate from their situated 
experiences. Elkin writes in a very relevant passage: “The essential problem of 
republican government, then, is to prevent free men and women from doing that which 
could destroy their own rule. There is no greater force than themselves to prevent this 
from happening. If there were, the people would be neither free nor sovereign, and a 
republican regime impossible,” (2006: 5).93 The point here is that constitution is the work 
of people, and securing a good order, maintaining it, and developing it still more, is only 
to come from the people themselves. Constitutional cr fting, therefore, must remain 
always alert on this point. It must be an activity of enabling the citizenry to be all co-
creators of their own polity. It must be a continuous work of developing citizens’ 
constitutional capabilities, so that the question of coordination does not need to be left to 
a rational model or be tied to a formal document or a circumstantial elite treaty, always 
lingering in suspension. The bottom line of this chapter, beyond some critique of the 
latter kinds of fallacies, has been to illustrate how such a citizen-capability centered 
constitutional crafting may be realized. 
                                                
93 There seems to be an unintended contradiction here, wh n it is the government’s problem to prevent men 
and women from destroying their own rule, but those men and women are the only eligible force for 
preventing that, and that any other force – such as a government – called to do that preventing is the end of 





It cannot fail to be obvious by now how very broad-based, or even ambitious, this 
project is, possibly at times much too ambitious for what it could actually bite off. It is 
concerned with a problem of serious urgency – the question of constituting good polities 
– and that urgency is at least some excuse for being ambitious: a meeker approach, a less 
broad range of considerations, would be unfit for engaging the problem. The ambition of 
the work, however, is somewhat compensated by the incompleteness that pragmatic 
republican political constitution accommodates: in part because it could not be more 
complete within the scope of this dissertation, butespecially because it must retain a 
principled margin of incompleteness even when the project is carried to a greater degree 
of specification and elaboration. The breadth of the discussion can be organized along the 
three main facets that Peter Levine identifies in El or Ostrom’s work and as descriptive 
also of ‘civic studies’: ‘facts, values, and strategies’ (Levine 2011: 5). Both in its critical 
parts, and especially in elaborating the idea of pragmatic republicanism, this work 
attempts to address the problem of political constitution as comprising these three facets. 
In its principled incomplete elaboration of constitutionally relevant facts, values, and 
strategies, this has been animated by a normative bias, or rather, by a hope: a hope for the 
possibility of creating, maintaining, and improving good political life around the actual 
world, one that serves common interests of its members, opposes arbitrary applications of 
power, upholds social diversity, and is capable to last. In all of this, this work represents a 
nod toward a different kind of political science, criti al of some of its mainstreams, and 
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possibly, one that is identifiable as a contribution t  the emerging discipline of ‘civic 
studies’ that Levine invokes (see also Soltan 2011).94  
This work leaves much further work to be done. As noted at the beginning, this is 
more of a preface to a more elaborate, comprehensiv, and more complete product. Thus, 
it remains to specify in more detail, and preferably ased on concrete cases, who the 
supposed craftsmen and craftswomen would be, in what relationship they would stand to 
each other and to the state. The concept of the political may benefit from a more focused 
discussion vis-à-vis the quite rich literature on the subject, with a fuller critique of that 
literature. It will also be important – albeit opening up a vast and nearly untouched body 
of work – to discuss the political economy of pragmtic republicanism. These are just 
some of the possible tasks that subsequent work should undertake.   
But some important amount of discussion, including some of the above topics, has 
been presented as a beginning toward a more complete and accurate political conception 
of the problem of constitution. The following few pages briefly recapitulate the several 
threads of discussion held in this work: its discusion of ‘facts, values, and strategies’ – 
the existing problems in grasping and dealing with them, and the remedy that political 
constitution as pragmatic republicanism proposes; its import vis-à-vis constitutional 
political science; and the hopefulness that accompanies its incompleteness.         
 
What is the problem this work addresses? 
Out of the nearly 200 countries in the world, some three quarters officially call 
themselves republics – states that define themselves as in pursuit of the good of all its 
                                                
94 See the Institute of Civic Studies Framing Statement authored by seven political scientists committed to 




members, governed by legitimate laws and ultimately answerable to the single source of 
sovereignty, the people as a whole. But only a small p rt of these countries can be 
recognized as genuinely adhering to these principles, without hypocritical stretching and 
twisting of these ideals. Almost all of the nearly 200 countries have by now adopted 
written Constitutions – fine documents that outline fi  principles by which the countries 
undertake to govern themselves. Again, the greater majority of these documents can 
safely be assumed to be either shams or only minimally adhered. Put differently, it seems 
like almost all of the countries in existence know what makes a good society, but far 
fewer of them know how to make a good society.  
The problem that lies at the heart of this work is a very practical one. As we enter 
the XXI century, despite all the talk about achievements of human civilization, despite all 
the gadgets millions carry that were unthinkable only recently, and despite the mind-
boggling possibilities of communication and sharing about the civilizational 
achievements that those gadgets allow, there remains a vast diversity in terms of how 
well various peoples live around the world. What are rightfully described as 
constitutional polities are concentrated in north-western hemisphere, with a few ‘outliers’ 
thinly scattered in other regions. Yet, this is notto say that all the remaining societies are 
about to disappear or otherwise en route to some terminal loss. Except for very few – 
such as, probably, Somalia, parts of Sudan, and parts of Mali – the majority of those 
societies have had rather steady records of some form of governance, have been 
reproducing and living on. Only, those societies cannot be described as constitutional 
polities in a meaningful sense. Put otherwise, the peoples of those societies have not been 
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enjoying a decent life and have not been able to pursue the kinds of lives that they could 
otherwise want.  
The practical problem, then, is about understanding the predicament of these 
steadily non-constitutional societies. This is alredy not a point in intellectual history to 
have to argue that human societies are capable of changing, that they are not ‘doomed’ to 
the kind of social order they happen to have at a given period. The puzzle is, if societies 
are capable of change, why so many societies go on putting up with the barely bearable 
existence that they have had for so long. That is, why they have not made the 
constitutional progress that they, by nature of human life, are capable of making. 
Understanding this puzzle means being better positioned to suggest workable ways in 
which that innate capability for change can be positively activated. 
This is not to say that until now political science – the science in the business of 
understanding and explaining problems and prospects of good constitutional order – has 
not asked these questions or has not attempted to answer them. Rather, it is to suggest 
that a good part – the much larger part, really – of scholarship that has engaged these 
issues has done so in flawed, misleading ways. Since some of the mainstream political 
science problems relevant to the problem of constitution are taken up below in a separate 
section, it may suffice here to only note that too often its handling of the substantive 
problem has tended to be compromised to its pursuits of methodological rigors, 
generalizability and parsimony of its theoretical propositions.   
As a result, what such scientific efforts have continuously overlooked is the kind of 
problem that good constitution presents. It is a political problem. It is political in the 
sense that no abstract, a priori, general solution, n the form of formulas, laws or 
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equations, is capable of capturing its actual working. It is political in the sense of being 
generated, forever, in the bosom of the very societies that require good constitution, the 
human societies in their multiplicity, dynamism, cognitive burdens, real and potential 
capabilities, and collectivity. That is, this problem is not external to the otherwise 
automatically well-constituted human societies, such that once it is removed, the society 
returns to the good normal life; it is an inherent liability of human societies. In view of 
such qualities, therefore, it is better described as a predicament – the kind of problem 
whose always tenuous solution is to be found in its own conditions. So it is not, strictly 
speaking, a puzzle that can be resolved by applying the power of intellect alone.  
 
 
What is the remedy? 
This work has attempted to face the predicament of political constitution by, first, 
reconsidering the scope and kind of ‘the political’ implicated in constitutional thinking, 
second, putting forth a particular formulation of political constitution thus reconsidered 
under the name of ‘pragmatic republicanism’ made up of four essential components, and 
third, proposing some ways of pragmatic republican o stitutional crafting, applying the 
idea particularly to one of the steadily non-constitutionalizing societies, Kyrgyzstan.  
The meaning of politics must be significantly revised and broadened, if the 
predicament of good constitution itself is to be properly understood. In the growing 
recent literature self-identified as ‘political constitutional’, there have been a number of 
ways in which this definitive concept has been too narrowly construed, such as implying 
it to be a matter reserved for elites, suggesting it to be normatively neutral, imagining it 
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as being in opposition to law, but the most prominent of them being the equation of 
politics with unceasing antagonism, or more substantively, with struggle for power. If 
politics is understood in these ways, then its remedies would be correspondingly narrow 
and ultimately incapable of grasping the constitutional predicament. Examples of such 
remedies, when offered at all (e.g. Mouffe doesn’t eem to: 1993), have included better 
deliberative reasoning (Rawls 1993; Cohen 1998), better procedures more generally 
(Habermas 1998; 1996); various institutional measure  – such as party-based 
competition, balance of powers, and electoral channeli g (Bellamy 2007, Thomas 2004), 
more participation (Barber 1984; Urbinati 2010); or less participation (Pettit 2004; 
Huntington 1975). If politics is understood in any of the narrow ways, how any of these 
constitutional remedies might be an answer (except intellectual) remains generally an 
open question. 
A more accurate understanding of politics, if only too messy and imprecise for 
political scientists (Salkever 1999), will need to begin from realization that constitution is 
a holistic project, incapable of being compartmentalized into more discrete parts, some 
left for lawyers, some for economists, some for public administration experts, some for 
sociologists, and some for political scientists, (Elkin 2010). If divided up in any such 
manner, the parts cannot be later put back together to p oduce a neat edifice like Lego 
bricks can. Constitution so understood is political, then, in the sense that politics concerns 
the whole of a polity. It is not a trivial thing that these two terms share a root: they have 
the same referent. 
Secondly, it is unnecessarily problematic – narrow, reductionist, hopeless, and 
plainly not very accurate empirically – if political is understood as always about elite 
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struggles for power. To a degree, of course, this is true – and in that sense, it would be 
almost the same as saying ‘water is watery’. Certainly, elites in some sense are always 
leading in politics, including constitutional politics, and certainly, different ideas, 
interests, and abilities compete for the end of ‘authoritative allocation of values in 
society’. These essential properties of politics, however, are better conceived in a 
language that allows for changing possibilities andcapabilities, for shifting make-up of 
those who count as elites, and for the indeterminate line that divides the elite from the 
non-elite. In largely avoiding the language of ‘elit s’ and ‘power’ without denying the 
actuality of their meanings, this work has attempted o conceive constitution as a 
predicament – and task – of situated but open possibilities.   
Hence, the next point is to situate politics, undersco e its condition in media res. 
This has to encompass at least three different considerations: the midst of historical 
continuity within which politics is found and conducted at any given time and place; the 
midst of an obtaining but changeable context that gives politics at any instance its shapes 
and colors; and the midst of actual and potential human capabilities which ultimately are 
all that animate or even make up politics as such. These are to say that politics, insofar as 
this is a reference to human activity, always and oly occurs within the actual and 
variable conditions that obtain at a time and place of concern. It cannot be meaningfully, 
or at least usefully, spoken of in the abstract. 
Now, at some basic sense, political engagements are always purposive. This is not 
to say they are purposive in some strong teleological sense; rather, it is to say the 
societies do not engage in political transactions ‘ju t so’, with nothing intended. If so, the 
task for constitutional thought is to consider ways in which these ‘mid-purposive’ 
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political activities may be oriented toward producing, ever so steadily, a polity that is 
better than the status quo. This necessitates a somewhat specific articulation of such 
constitutional orientations – not as specific as to exactly ‘tell’ what a society must do, 
because for situated politics such specificity of general orientations would be irrelevant, 
but specific enough to orient the thrust of politics toward an acceptable vision of good 
polity. To proceed with the task, then, one requires an idea of that vision first. 
An acceptable vision of good polity has to be acceptable on account of its goodness 
but also on account of its feasibility in the given world. A utopian vision produced 
through intellectual imagination, then, would probably not do. A better source for 
deriving the vision is the patterns of good polity that exist or have existed in real world; 
while every individual case has its own flaws, the contemporary political civilization can 
be plausibly supposed to have arrived at a general consensus on what makes a good 
polity. Based on the available real patterns, and on literature devoted to explicating those 
patterns, it is possible to sketch a realistic but at the same general enough vision of a good 
polity, organizing it – for convenience, at least – in terms of five elements: commitment 
to serving common goods, upholding of a mixed regim, preservation of social pluralism, 
adherence to the principle of popular sovereignty, and pursuit of constitutional resilience. 
Each of these elements, in combining to make up a single polity, will be filled with 
somewhat variable normative core and institutional fr me in every specific society’s 
pursuit of good constitution.  
Equipped with this thin sketch of a good polity, it is possible to suggest some 
normative political orientations – that is, some procedural norms to guide where political 
engagements need to be directed. In view of the situated-ness of every constitutionalizing 
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case, these orientations would need to also be thinly conceived, leaving greater 
concretization to an actual constitutional project to author it for itself. Being conceptually 
economical, three broad thin orientations can suffice to highlight: an orientation to 
engaging and pursuing common goods, an orientation to minimization of arbitrary uses of 
power, and an orientation toward a principle of moderation. If the outlined vision of a 
good polity is admitted as their objective, and if these three thin-normative principles 
guide the content of actual political engagements, the aspiring constituents of a good 
polity can be expected to be on a workable route. 
“Can be expected” is not a very strong way of putting, but it cannot be put more 
strongly. Politics, as already stressed excessively, is not a machine-like process that 
would work as intended once all the several elements have been plugged in. These 
several elements by themselves are just ideas, disembodied concepts. Putting them 
together into a dynamic and productive political life s the territory of constitutional 
crafting. When a society is engaged in constituting itself into a good polity, engaging in 
collective interactions at high as well as low level politics, or ‘constitutional’ and 
‘normal’, as individuals, groups, leaders and followers, what they are engaged in is 
crafting of their polity. They undergo debates, disagreements, compromises, rule-setting, 
education, story-telling, remembering, and countless other variety of crafting 
engagements. In the end, on each instance or issue of collective engagements some 
compromise, argument or institutional ordering gains a more authoritative status among 
the public over alternatives, never quite permanently but for as long as the public 
manages to hold it as authoritative. Some of the actual ways of crafting, set within real 
political contexts as it should, are illustrated on the example of Norway, one of the best 
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constituted polities today, and that of Kyrgyzstan, o e in somewhat erratic quest for a 
good polity. 
 
This particular formulation of political constitution, with the three parameters of 
observing its situated-ness (the basic empirical conditions), the three parameters of its 
normative orientation, the thin sketch of a vision of good polity, and the conception of the 
activity of constituting in accordance with these el ments as constitutional crafting, is 
what is called pragmatic republicanism. Pragmatic republicanism, as noted above, is an 
instance of political constitution, implying that other ways of conceiving political 
constitution may be possible. However it is conceived, any such alternative would require 
to be based on a proper understanding of the political-ness of the whole enterprise. In 
trying to succinctly formulate that proper understanding, it has been proposed here that 
“politics is the whole complex of a public’s engagements in pursuing authoritative public 
interests”. Different ways of formulating it are certainly possible, but the key points of it 
– its breadth, collective-ness, relation to authoritative public interests, and situated-ness 
within a public (within its given context) – must be observed.  
 
What does the idea of political constitution imply for political science? 
The idea of political constitution, and its instance in pragmatic republicanism, is a 
call for a much more problem-driven and practical approach in political science of 
constitution. It is a call to be guided by the nature and scope of the predicament, and in 
pursuing answers to it, to be unhindered by either inter-disciplinary boundaries, or 
methodological strictures. For some, this may be equivalent to a call for modesty in 
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political science. Aristotle said very much about the kind of subject politics is, and the 
degree of certainty it can ever allow. To heed to his warnings, constitutional political 
science will need to be a discipline of phronesis, as Bent Flyvbjerg (2001) has very 
eloquently championed it, and as much of PEGS and Bloomington schools of 
constitutional thought exercised it (albeit, not alw ys calling it so, and often preferring to 
speak of a ‘discipline of civic studies’).  
What does political science in the manner of phronesis argue? For illustration, take 
the famous Lijphart-Horowitz debate that was mentioned above several times (see 
Choudhry 2008: 15ff; O’Flynn 2007). Both Arend Lijphart (e.g. 2004) and Donald 
Horowitz (e.g. 1993) took up the problem of governance in divided societies – a highly 
pertinent, urgent constitutional issue in contemporary world.95 Based on his extensive 
comparative research, in which for him cases such as Belgium and Switzerland were 
especially rich theoretically, Lijphart argued that societies caught in the chronic problems 
of ethnic or other ‘segmental cleavages’ would be best advised to opt for constitution that 
accommodates those differences: that is, by various institutional means such as 
federalism, parliamentarism, proportional representation, they need to aim at 
accommodating the differences – ‘consociational constituonal’ in Lijphart’s language. 
Horowitz, on the other hand, with his extensive research on much more problematic 
experiences of African and other ‘Third World’ divided societies, argued that a more 
integrative accommodation would be the wiser strategy: the constitution should instead 
aim at bringing the divided parts closer to together, having them cooperate and thus 
become moderate, especially on the electoral plain – what might be called a convergence-
                                                
95 For an extended bibliography of Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s works on the subject, see Choudhry 2007: 15, 
fn. 32.  
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oriented constitution. Both propose rather detailed, laborate institutional schemes – 
electoral politics being their most pronounced sphere of debate – for pursuing their 
respective alternatives. Both agree that disintegraion, anarchy, or assimilation, are not 
acceptable options. For neither side, of course, thre is no guarantee that one of these 
unacceptable options would not materialize.  
To see the problems of Lijphart and Horowitz, let us first bring political constitution 
onto the table. Political constitution, too, is not the kind of enterprise that involves 
guarantees. Danger of unintended outcomes always looms upon the horizon. The answer 
to this from political constitution is in the cultivation of strong civic capabilities and a 
culture of moderation and political vigilance – constitutional resilience, in a word. For 
constitutional resilience fit for securing a constitutional order to emerge and obtain, the 
constitutional order itself must be a product of the resilient public, one that is crafted 
through trials and errors, through debates, quests, compromises and settlements. Only 
such a product has the best likelihood of being valued enough by the public and, in the 
process of its development, of engendering its own resilience mechanisms. That would be 
so, because that constitutional order would cohere – over the period of its probably 
uneven evolution – with the pertinent conditions of the society, its history, context, civic 
capabilities; the constitutional order would grow, as it were, together with the public 
itself in all its characteristics. It would, as a result, be a whole system of institutions, 
rules, and laws (if these are any different), and of civic culture, whose manifest contours 
would not be possible to imagine with any precision before it happens.  
The problem in the kind of constitutional political science that Lijphart and 
Horowitz exemplify is that the scientists engage in predicting the best ‘manifest contours’ 
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of a constitution for a certain class of societies. Their proposed contours are 
generalizations based on sets of previously seen patterns, some predominantly in the 
developed West – as with Lijphart, and some mainly from the less developed South and 
East – as with Horowitz. Because the constitutional forms they recommend are thus 
preconceived for any particular society in need of one, the resilience that such forms 
require can only be gained by fitting the society to the constitution (or, to grant more 
agency and awkwardness, by the ability of the society to fit itself to the constitution). 
This is a rather crooked, inflexible logic. The presence of such logic is evidenced by the 
very fact that a Lijphart-Horowitz debate should even take place, as if it were imaginable 
to ever establish the correctness of one side and mistaken-ness of the other. It is also 
reinforced by the class of societies the debate involves, the divided kind, as if every 
divided society in regards to its constitutional con erns is just about the same as any other 
divided society. Lijphart and Horowitz, eminent scholars that they are, are only invoked 
here as a convenient example, whereas the kind of political science they exemplify is 
rather populous.96  
To return to the question that interests us, what poli ical science as phronesis argues 
is that political constitution defies the kind of scientific manipulations that some more 
exact or natural sciences can afford, (see Flyvbjerg 2001: passim) The concern of 
political science is ultimately good political orde – a problem that David Levy, as quoted 
above, very rightly identifies as a perennial one because of the particular ontology of 
human life: that we are political animals, and that n ture has not provided for permanence 
                                                
96 See Michael Bernhard for a cogent critique of four wo ks in ‘institutional choice’ type scholarship, 
including Lijphart; “Institutional Choice after Comunism: A critique of theory-building in an empirical 
wasteland”, (2000). See also McGarry, O’Leary and Simeon for a discussion of Lijphart and Horowitz as 




of our order the way it provides it for other animals (Levy 1987). The political animals 
are left to come up with the political, or constitutional, order on their own; and just as 
they are capable of creating it, they are also capable of losing it.  
If so, then the best way to secure a political order is by letting it be the product of 
the concerned society itself. It is nearly impossible to introduce political order completely 
from without (except maybe some rare cases of colonial rule), but even proposing 
somewhat finished schemes of political order for free adoption – the way non-phronesis 
political science can be said to proceed – is flawed. Doing so, as was observed early in 
this work, has led generally to the captivity of political science to a terse, inflexible 
model of political order, what has been called ‘the W berian-style state’. Some political 
scientists have started to battle this captivity in very welcome directions, such as Joel 
Migdal (2001), James C. Scott (1998), and Lisa Anderson (2004), among others. They 
have, specifically, argued for viewing state and society as one continuous whole, one 
belonging to and in the other, as opposed to seeing them as an object and a subject, or as 
otherwise discretely divided. To understand the shape, the capacity and chances, the 
problems, of a state, it must be viewed within its social (and cultural) context. A 
workable state is one that arises out of its social context, and coheres with it. By ‘political 
order’ one can only mean the whole of that society and its state. Less cumbersomely put, 
it is constitution.  What these critical scholars have engaged in is a political science in the 
manner of phronesis. Phronesis would hold, as suggested here, that the only legitimate 




For constitutional scholarship, this means taking the political-ness of constitution 
seriously and, especially, more accurately than it has tended to. It needs to adhere more to 
‘a politics of a different kind’ that Harry Boyte has promoted, to the perspective of 
‘citizens as co-creators’ that Soltan and colleagues have held, or to understanding 
constitution as crafting that has been proposed in these pages.          
 
The hopefulness of the idea of political constitution 
In closing, to bring the discussion back to something it began with: the practical 
problem of constituting good polities. In the end, it is for the peoples of the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Norway to keep and improve the good polities that they have 
constituted for themselves. It is for the peoples of Egypt, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan to 
constitute better politics than they have now. Political scientists, in their capacity as such, 
can only be of limited, or incomplete, relevance in meeting this predicament. That margin 
of relevance, however, can be increased by the degree to which political science 
approximates the practical-ness of the predicament.  
In this regard, the idea of political constitution as proposed here can be viewed as a 
hopeful idea; it approximates the practical-ness of the problem by being guided by a 
practical kind of hope. It is a grounded kind of hope, not the kind that sees it appropriate 
to intellectually contrive the best political order thinkable and hope that it sticks to life. It 
is a hope situated within the actual political life itself. It is encouraged by the evidence 
throughout history that human societies are capable of changing, even if at widely 
varying paces, capable of discerning their own best common interests, even if through 
trying and often erring, and capable of holding on t  their achievements in ordering their 
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lives, even if that is always subject to revision. It is a hope based on the actual prevalence 
of order over chaos, on the evidence – even if it is sometimes weak – that most human 
societies operate on some stable foundations of common understanding. 
This hope is a sober kind of hope. It is aware of dangers in political life, and 
therefore recognizes the sobering power of being guided by fear, as Judith Shklar advised 
(1998: Ch. 1). It is aware of the real possibility of political order imploding into 
despotism, if that is how Montesquieu’s discussion of the matter is to be understood 
(Robin 2000). But this hope is not dominated by such fears, and does not privilege fear to 
dictate constitution of good polity. Neither is it an overly optimistic hope. While it is 
enthused by Roberto Unger’s ideas of amalgamating ideas and practice into a hopeful 
politics of experimentation (1998), it is more careful than joining him in a call to ‘smash 
all contexts’ (cited in Soltan 1993b: 75).  
It is a hope pegged to the limits of the possible, then. Put otherwise, it is a 
pragmatic hope in the manner that some of the pragmatic thinkers have held it, Dewey 
most importantly (1954), and Rorty more recently (1999 generally). These pragmatists 
underscore the importance of human experience – the sturdiest basis of knowledge and 
judgment; they resent the a-priorism of ideal theory, the hopelessness of essentialism, 
and the unfounded-ness of foundationalism. It is these important perspectives of 
pragmatist thought that the idea of political constitution shares. It holds on to a 
responsible kind of hope, one that constantly keeps in check the linkage between the 
actual and the potential, the real and the possible. On all of these understandings, modern 
pragmatists themselves trace their ancestry much furt er back – the ancestry that the idea 
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of political constitution itself claims – to Tocqueville, Montesquieu, Machiavelli, and 
many more.        
The idea of political constitution builds on this hope. If all of these moderate hope-
giving characteristics of human life are right, then crafting more desirable political orders 
is within human capabilities. If there is one rubric on which to base the hopefulness about 
political order, it is probably the human capability to learn. It is this capability to which, 
for example, Machiavelli – the realist of all – singularly appeals by his ‘wholly new 
route’ of teaching about ways of keeping a free republican order. It is this hope-giving 
capability that even Hobbes – the seemingly hopeless po itivist of The Leviathan – can be 
argued to appeal in his other book, The Behemoth (Vaughan 2001). 
A much more recent turn to the capability to learn within the theme of constitution 
is the idea of ‘civic studies’.97 ‘Civic studies’ is a hopeful initiative concerned with the 
development of a constitutionally capable and respon ible citizenry. It is proposed as a 
different kind of educational program, or even discipline, one where the knowledge of 
some is not transferred neatly onto the brains of others in a classroom setting, but where 
civic learning is acquired by common critical pursuit  in reflective mixing of theoretical 
and practical material. The present idea of political onstitution can be said to be a 
contribution to civic studies. Only it is not to be therefore tied to a classroom or other 
limited setting of teachers and learners. So it can be put in a broader, more 
‘constitutional’ scope, by referring to our two examples: the idea of political constitution 
draws on the lessons from the constitution of the Norwegians, where they – guided by a 
sober hope – learned by doing; and it is encouraged by those lessons in thinking of the 
                                                
97 See the preceding footnote, and the articles by Peter L vine (2011) and Karol Soltan (2011). 
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possible Kyrgyzstani constitution, where they will require to learn – from the Norwegian 
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